In political science, this has been researched fairly widely under the theory of Varities of Capitalism, where different countries develop different capitalist structures - one of them being the investment structures of major corporations. Where companies in "liberal market economies" such as the US would rely on public trading for funding, firms in "coordinated market economies" such as Germany would take their funding much more from the so-called "patient capital" of major banks.
The differences extend way beyond corporate governance/funding, and are a really interesting way to look at some familiar differences between seemingly similar economies. The theory connects all aspects of capitalist economies - from the boardrooms, to employer relations, inter-employee relations, and government-firm dynamics.
As for a unified answer for "why", there isn't much agreement, but in general, capitalist and economic structures emerged from a combination of local culture, regional socio-political forces, and some chance historical events - with some competing theories for regional diffusion or the influence of global ideologies. Some examples of lucky local factors that might have led to long-term capitalist structures would be the differences in labor union strength between countries, or the extent to which countries' economies were agrarian. It's all a bit contested as to why some countries became LME, some CME, and so-on, but I'd really recommend reading the various accounts of 19th-20th century economic development.
The best work in the literature that covers the debate, and history, is Hall and Soskice (2001) - Varieties of Capitalism.
The "Gold Standard" (if you don't mind the economic history pun) of european economic development is, for better or worse, the work done at Harvard by Alexander Gerschenkron, probably most extensively reexamined and evaluated by Sylla and Toniolo in Patterns of European Industrialization: the Nineteenth Century.
Gerschenkron was educated at the University of Vienna and in spite of conducting most of his work in the United States is considered one of the most prominent scholars in the Austrian School of Economics; not only is he methodical, but he understand Mitteleurope very well.
Gerschenkron points out a series of "Substitutable Factors" in his work, and compares the efficiency of each. One of these is, of course, capital.
England, the example par excellence of industrialization (and industrial decline) had a large and politically active middle class, who contributed (through the house of commons) to a political system favoring individual investment and individual entrepreneurship. In fact, the middle class' desire to protect itself led to tight legislation after a number of speculative bubbles, curbing excessive lending and stock inflation.
France and Germany, on the other hand, historically had a small middle class, and much stronger landed nobility. There was a need to organize the collection of capital of middle class-savers in order to invest it in industrialization. The institution proved to be the "Universal Bank;" banks that manage both small savings and loans as well as large scale capital investments and corporate treasury services.
The system wasn't the same in France as in Germany: France was historically very centralized around Paris, and a lot of industrialization (especially railroads, but other sectors like metals and mining too) was conducted by the public sector. This did a lot to alleviate the risks associated with speculative bubbles and created a steady, manageable industrialization with superior living standards, however public money not only created inefficiencies (railroads went where officials in Paris thought they ought to go, not where they needed to go) but also competed with the Banks, which didn't grow as they did in Germany and were squeezed out of "safe" investments (railroads, coal and steel) into more speculative projects.
Germany, on the other hand, relied almost entirely on Banks. A customs union 9the "Zollverein") had preceded unification by forty years, meaning that long before a central government began dictating economic policy, Deutschland-wide banks were already in operation moving capital to where it needed to go. Banks had their hands in so many corporations in Germany they began placing their top executives in corporate boardrooms, focusing corporate strategy on profits rather than expansion.
And this is a good segway to the United States, which had the opposite approach to industrialization: in American corporate colture, the company must expand upstream, downstream, sideways and conceivable direction in order to survive. This is a consequence of the United States' relative isolation: in order to secure resources and raw materials, american corporations often found themselves forced to go get them themselves. Isolation also contributed to the United States industrializing late: there's only a boom in late in the 19th century. American industrialization also took place in an extremely strict regulatory environment: investment banks and savings banks were separated by law in 1864, and investment banks were limited to one branch office in each state. A significantly limiting factor in the age of the telegraph! Consequentially, American corporations turned to the market for capital, leading to a very active stock market.
Why were Americans so adverse to investment banks? Most point the finger to Andrew Jackson, although he was only the personification of an existing belief in the United States. Large banks would welcome investment by foreigners; an alien concept for the country of the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny. Jackson even points this out when he vetoes the renewal of the national bank in 1832!