Confederate logistics were always a bit sketchy, and they became downright atrocious by the spring of 1865. Owing to the devastation of the Virginia countryside and the deterioration of the Confederate rail network, adequate supplies of food and forage were increasingly difficult to come by from 1863 on. However, the Army of Northern Virginia was receiving fairly regular supplies of clothing and accouterments through the winter of 1864-65, and their situation in this regard was almost certainly better than it had been in 1861-62, when the Confederacy was almost wholly reliant on soldiers acquiring uniforms and shoes from home. The kinks had been worked out of the depot system by this point, but shortages of raw materials made the Confederacy increasingly dependent on running English goods through the blockade. By the end of the year, the Confederacy was importing not only leather and cloth to feed domestic production, but finished goods in huge quantities; those which went to support Lee's army came mostly through Wilmington, North Carolina, with a smaller portion going through Charleston, South Carolina. The closing of these two ports, in January and February 1865, respectively, more than any other factor, destroyed the Confederacy's ability to adequately sustain itself.

Wise, in Lifeline of the Confederacy, writes that after the Atlanta campaign "the Army of Tennessee required over 58,000 pairs of shoes, 55,000 pairs of pants, 38,000 small arms, and 21,000 blankets." After the Franklin-Nashville campaign, that army requisitioned "45,000 jackets, 100,000 pairs of pants, 100,000 pairs of shoes, 27,000 blankets, 60,000 shirts, and 108,000 pairs of drawers, supplies for only an army of 25,000."

During the last six months of 1864, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia received from the Confederate War Department "100,000 jackets, 140,000 pairs of pants, 167,000 pairs of shoes, 74,000 blankets, 4,800 overcoats, 170,000 pairs of drawers, and 150,000 cotton shirts." This was in addition to clothing and shoes issued by the states of North Carolina and Georgia, which maintained their own parallel logistics network for their troops; Georgia alone during 1864 issued "26,700 jackets, 28,000 pairs of pants, 37,000 pairs of shoes, 7,500 blankets, 24,000 shirts, 24,000 pairs of drawers, and 23,000 pairs of socks" to their troops in the Army of Tennessee and the Army of Northern Virginia.

Now, given that Lee never had more than 73,000 men at his disposal in 1864, and often much less than that, this represents a fairly considerable supply of clothing. However, it must be remembered that Lee spent most of May and June marching and fighting in northern Virginia, and the succeeding nine months engaged in an epic siege around Petersburg. Both marching and digging wear out clothing, especially shoes and trousers, and Confederate clothing was never of the highest quality. The approach of winter also heightened the demand for clothing. There were certainly instances of privation, and the situation was always far from ideal, but for most of 1864, Lee's soldiers could expect to receive fairly regular issues of new kit. The image of Lee's army as as being universally composed of ragamuffins and scarecrows is largely a myth. Rather, you could expect to see great variation between units. A brigade which had just drawn a fresh supply of clothing would present a much more uniform, military appearance than a neighboring brigade which was waiting to receive one.