Daimler Benz's tender for what would become the Panther, the VK3002 (DB), did very much resemble the T-34. The turret was located far forward, the angled front glacis, the very low profile, and although the VK3002(DB) did use a different suspension than the T-34's Christie suspension, its large bogies do resemble the T-34's and not the interlocking monstrosity of its competing MAN design, which eventually became the Panther. The VK3002(DB) did use a diesel engine, which had a number of proponents within the Third Reich hierarchy, including Hitler and Speer.

But the VK3002(DB) was a somewhat problematic design. The prototype was too small to fit the KwK 42 L/70 gun that the German Heer wanted for the tank. Production variants would have to have a newer turret and would affect the vehicle's balance. The Waffenamt inspectors also thought the tank's rear drive also would impact cross-country mobility. Despite these problems, the Heer was sufficiently impressed by the prototype and ordered an initial production batch.

Daimler-Benz had a major problem in the form of its main rival for the Panther, MAN. The MAN design for the tank incorporated solutions to some of the problems of the DB tank in its design and it began something of a whispering campaign against the VK3002(DB) as being too unreliable and too "Russian" in design and ethos. The MAN turret could easily field the KwK 42 L/70 and it argued that its gasoline Maybach engine would deliver more power and ease maintenance issues as the Tiger I had the same engine. This campaign worked and in May 1942, the production decision was reversed for DB and MAN received the production order for the Panther.

As the above indicates, copying an enemy vehicle is much easier said than done. Even though the T-34 was a robust and comparatively simple design, it reflected a design and procurement process that was different than what took place in Germany. The Soviets had extensive experience with Christie suspension systems, for example, but the Germans did not. Incorporating new elements into existing design processes was a calculated risk. MAN's success at blending real problems such as friendly-fire and more questionable ones like disparagement of DB's failure to meet design goals (and this was a case of glass houses and stones) shows that private firms were often inhibited from taking these types of calculated risks of incorporating an enemy design.