It's an interesting question. Regarding the Eastern Front, Soviet infantry survival rate varied because of different factors and different years. Generally speaking, tensions and stakes on Eastern front were so high, that mortality rate was extraordinary high. In 1941 and early 1942, Soviet infantry faced high level of officer incompetence. Soviet Chiefs of Staffs didn't manage to handle the tempo of German blitzkrieg, and hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were encircled and taken prisoners. It wasn't a nice picture on a tactical level too. Soviet historician Aron Shneer in his memoirs provided grim picture of this war episodes: "If Vanjka-vzvodnij [slang name for NCO in Russian army] knew, that Pz1 could be eliminated with armor-piercing bullets, they wouldn't retreat western of Pripyat... If he knew that some pieces of German artillery can't shoot further than 12km, he would retreat for 20km... But vanjka-vzvodnij didn't know it". For soldiers in this disastrous year chance of survival basically was a question of luck: will their regiment manage to retreat, or will it be surrounded by Germans? And if they are encircled, will they manage to break the encirclement like general Kuznecov with his troops did, or will they all be captured, like 616 304 soldiers in the Kiev pocket? For those who were captured by Germans, chance of survival was bleak: from now, chance of survival depended only on their luck, physical strengh and cruelty of Nazis. Around 57% (3,5 millions) of all Soviet POWs died in Nazi camps. Early 1942 have seen Soviet offensive at Ljubanj, which might be the "offensive with low survival rate, no matter what" that you are looking for. It was a badly planned offensive in Leningrad's swampy outskirts — Soviet command was hoping to lift the siege of Leningrad. More than 300 000 men pierced the German defences in this swampy and difficult terrain, but soon Germans surronded them. It was a hopeless slaughterhouse. In swampy terrain surrounded group couldn't construct good defences, and couldn't find any food. One of the survivors recited later: "The Germans didn't even attack us — they just hunt us, like if we were animals, and endlessly shell with artillery". Estimated casualties were 308 000 soldiers, 94% of all soldiers participating in the operation. In late 1942 situation changed. It was Stalingrad that now became the main bloodshed on Eastern Front. Stalingrad defence was orchestrated by highly skilled Vasiliy Chuikov, and it differed from previous battles. German soldiers called Stalingrad clashes "Rattenkrieg", "the rat war". Popular myth says that average life expentancy for experienced soldiers there was 5-7 days, and only 24 hours for newcomers, but I haven't found research on that. Anyway, according to Grigory Krivosheev — a generally credible researcher of Soviet casualties — each day there were 3280 casualties in the city. In this city clashes, soldiers skills mattered and were crucial to his survival. It were personal skills of detecting snipers, of fighting in close-quarters, of hand to hand combat, that determined lengh of infatrymen life. Those, who mastered those skills, survived and became legends - like sharpshooter Vasilij Zaicev or soldiers of colonel Ludnikov's 138th division. For 30 days Ludnikov's men were holding out the Germans on so-called "Ludnikovs island" — a 700x400 meters salient. From 1943 the situation changed again. Close-quarters battles like Stalingrad weren't now very common, and in massive field operations soldier's personal skill is less crucial to survival. Nevertheless, in 1943-1945 Soviet army gained experienced NCOs, obtained air superiority, and finally formed a talented Chief of Staffs. In these years military operations became much more successfull, with sufficient air and artillery support. Soldiers finally were relieved of horrible military leadership, and now their survival was more "in their hands" — not in bad commanders'. But still, there were 1,5 million Soviet soldiers fighting in Operation Bagration only. Even if you were very skilled, you might still be easily killed — battles like this involved way too much firepower, tanks and attack aircrafts, to make personal fighting skill a 100% survival guarantee.

There are two distinguishing points about the Normandy landings here that make them a poor departure point for a conversation about the value of proper fieldcraft and experience of veterans in infantry operations:

First, amphibious landings are a situation in which the "random" factor is exacerbated. Attacking a defended beach is absolutely one of the most difficult operations a unit can be called on to perform (one which was generally considered the next thing to suicidal before WW2). You can have meticulous preparation, absolute air superiority, and crushing bombardment, but ultimately the key is to attack with an overwhelming number of troops in order to swamp the defenses, knowing that those defenses will take their toll on the landing craft and the infantry in those craft. This was all the more so in Normandy since the Allies didn't have the luxury of days of offshore fire, as was frequently done in the Pacific - delay would have attracted significant reinforcements.

On top of that, the troops landing on Normandy weren't veterans. They had trained extensively, but virtually all of the troops were new enlistees or draftees who had not previously seen combat. There weren't large gaps of experience among the men, where some were fresh and others had several months or years of fighting under their belts.

So in a situation where there wasn't really a core of veterans in the units, and where the tactical situation called for assaulting fixed defenses with little in the way of cover, and the infantry not really in control of where they were landed, the random element was definitely emphasized. In a more conventional engagement, veterans have a lot more ability to influence their own chances of survival (even if a lot of the time this manifests in "know when to keep your head down!")

To slightly expand on a different comment I made and reinforce what the other two comments are saying, there is a single school of thought that applies to many encounters and one that is perhaps the easiest to explain in 'game' terms: The Luck vs Skill scale.

Consider, like /u/Avatar_exADV said, the invasion of Normandy. It it a suicidal mission by all respects for those times: You assault a heavily fortified, mined beach with almost zero cover and ineffective support. Your survival here depends mostly on luck, as you are put against such overwhelming odds that even your skill has a very low chance of saving you, assuming you're a veteran. If you are not...you're depending on luck more than you could ever know.

Now consider you, a grizzled veteran who has been taught by fire and you're now assaulting a position the time and place of which you control. Now your skill matters more and you can almost eliminate the Luck factor by applying what you have learned. There is still a chance you'll die due to some happenstance(mines placed by the enemy increase the chance you'll die, having an engineer spotting them counteracts this somewhat) and it's all an interplay of many variables that ultimately determine whether you survive.

The more skilled you become at something, the less luck plays a factor, but it can be easily the sole thing you rely on if your enemy does something you've never seen or has knowledge you do not. Modern elite military units do not get trained to only do what they do best: they get trained to improvise and handle situations they have never handled before.