There wasn't any organized, effective resistance against Nazi Germany, particularly when you compare that lack to German resistance of the French in the Ruhr. There, during the 1920s, Germans executed a vast campaign of dedicated, passive resistance that was ultimately successful ─ but hugely expensive.

In 1923, after repeated German defaults on scheduled reparation payments, France occupied the Ruhr basin, Germany's industrial heart, as a means to extract revenue. The nation almost universally agreed upon a campaign of passive resistance and non-compliance, building upon experience learned during the Allied occupation of the Rhineland and the French occupation of the Saar (which continued until 1935).

Railway officials would refuse to comply with French orders. Civil service workers would entangle the French in red tape. People would work deliberately slowly to frustrate the French. In either a deliberate program or as a result of the French occupation, Germany underwent a period of monstrous hyperinflation that made its currency almost entirely worthless. In the Ruhr itself, the railroad slowdowns led to hunger and near starvation.

Nevertheless, the German resistance continued, and though the French eventually made the Ruhr pay, the world's sympathy was with Germany, and the creation of the Dawes Plan (coupled with the collapse of the French franc) led to France's withdrawal from the Ruhr in 1925.

If you're interested in reading about this period, try Conan Fischer's The Ruhr Crisis: 1923-1924 or Gerald Feldman's The Great Disorder.

In 1933, there was none of the resistance that took place 10 years before. Germany had been through a period of intense political conflict, and there was no desire in the center or center-left to aggravate that. The communists had clashed with conservatives and the Nazis, including violent confrontations, and the Nazis had responded with more violence. The Social Democrats wanted no part of the violence or confrontation, and this is critical because they had been the core of the Weimar Republic for most of its existence. When the crisis came, they buckled. They believed that violence and confrontation on their part would only play into the Nazis' hands, because they were more prepared to wield violence.

Locally, Social Democrats and those in the political in the center were prepared to resist, but there was no national leadership. Plans for a nationwide strike fizzled. As Evans writes in The Coming of the Third Reich:

"Leading Social Democrats and trade unionists met in Berlin on 31 January to plan a nationwide general strike. But while local organizations waited, the national leadership dithered, conscious of the difficulties of staging a strike in the middle of the worst unemployment crisis the nation had ever seen. The unions feared that Nazi stormtroopers would occupy the factories in such a situation. And how could the party justify illegal action in defence of legality?"

There were local strikes and rallies, "But no general policy of resistance emerged from the center," Evans writes.

During that critical four-month period between the November 1932 election and the passage of the Enabling Acts in March, the Social Democrats retreated. When one leading Social Democrat reported that Nazis were invading his political meetings and attacking people, the party's central committee responded by limiting the number of meetings.

When the Social Democratic mayor of Strassfurt was assassinated by a Nazi, the party did nothing. When the Social Democratic paper protested the killing of a communist by Nazis, the police in Berlin shut down the paper for a week.

"Throughout the early months of 1933 ... they stuck rigidly to a legalistic approach and avoided anything that might provoke the Nazis into even more violent action against them," Evans writes.

This was a fatal move. After March 1933, the Nazis were able to manipulate the Reichstag fire so that no one could resist them.