How were any of these concerns addressed? And additionally, what changes happened infrastructurally post-war to allow the military to begin sustaining greater numbers of active duty personnel?
And additionally, what changes happened infrastructurally post-war to allow the military to begin sustaining greater numbers of active duty personnel?
In sum, the modern notion of the 'military industrial complex' was borne out of the post-WW2 analysis of the shortfalls regarding the US military, and the price it paid from such a war.
In this area, we have very good primary sources to pull from. The Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945 - by General George C. Marshall, goes quite into depth into the necessity of post-war modernization of the US military structure and its shortfalls in the lead up to World War II.
This compilation of reports, put together in 1996, is available online from the Army: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-57/CMH_Pub_70-57.pdf
As a side note, I should point out that this is a FANTASTIC source, which goes in depth on US Army/Army Air Forces operations extensively from pre-war to post-war.
General Marshall in the chapter For the Common Defense, sums up many of the needs:
To fulfill its responsibility for protecting this Nation against foreign enemies, the Army must project its planning beyond the immediate future. In this connection I feel that I have a duty, a responsibility, to present publicly at this time my conception, from a military point of view, of what is required to prevent another international catastrophe.
He points out that geography will no longer be a barrier for US security:
The security of the United States of America was saved by sea distances, by Allies, and by the errors of a prepared enemy. For probably the last time in the history of warfare those ocean distances were a vital factor in our defense. We may elect again to depend on others and the whim and error of potential enemies, but if we do we will be carrying the treasure and freedom of this great Nation in a paper bag.
He talks about how the US was caught unprepared to fight in climates as extreme as the heat of Burma:
From this lesson there is no alternative but that this Nation must be prepared to defend its interest against any nation or combination of nations which might sometime feel powerful enough to attempt the settlement of political arguments or gain resources or territory by force of arms.
He also talks extensively about how the notion that the US could simply wait and build up arms and men at arms would no longer apply, particularly because modern airplane technology and rocket technology had changed the front line of warfare:
Twice in recent history the factories and farms and people of the United States have foiled aggressor nations; conspirators against the peace would not give us a third opportunity.
And:
Goering stated after his capture that it was a certainty the eastern American cities would have been under rocket bombardment had Germany remained undefeated for two more years. The first attacks would have started much sooner. The technique of war has brought the United States, its homes and factories into the front line of world conflict. They escaped destructive bombardment in the second World War. They would not in a third.
It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And the peace can only be maintained by the strong.
He then asks the question of how the US can reconcile the need for a strong standing military without bankrupting the country or abandoning the principles of this nation:
What then must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt ourselves on military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively expensive professional army even if one could be recruited? President Washington answered that question in recommendations to the frrst Congress to convene under the United States Constitution. He proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen army. At that time the conception of a large professional Regular Army was considered dangerous to the liberties of the Nation. It is still so today. But the determining factor in solving this problem will inevitably be the relation between the maintenance of military power and the cost in annual appropriations. No system, even if actually adopted in the near future, can survive the political pressure to reduce the military budget if the costs are high-and professional armies are very costly.
He then goes on to list some ideas, including universal military training (not universal military service). He also makes the distinction that this isn't just training for a mass Army - he points out that the vast majority of mobilization in the armed forces was in technical areas, from machinery to production.
He points out other ideas, including the necessity of maintaining forces overseas, the importance of the organized Reserve forces (Reserve and National Guard), the ROTC programs, and the 'institution' of a standing professional force.
He wrote this line, before the War in the Pacific had even ended:
The Regular Army must be comprised largely of a strategic force, heavy in air power, partially deployed in the Pacific and the Caribbean ready to protect the Nation against a sudden hostile thrust and immediately available for emergency action wherever required. It is obvious that another war would start with a lightning attack to take us unaware. The pace of the attack would be at supersonic speeds of rocket weapons closely followed by a striking force which would seek to exploit the initial and critical advantage. We must be sufficiently prepared against such a threat to hold the enemy at a distance until we can rapidly mobilize our strength. The Regular Army, and the National Guard, must be prepared to meet such a crisis.
And then he writes:
The third mission of the permanent Army is to furnish the overhead, the higher headquarters which must keep the machine and the plans up to date for whatever national emergency we may face in the future. This overhead includes the War Department, the War College, the service schools, and the headquarters of the military areas into which continental United States is subdivided to facilitate decentralized command and coordination of the peacetime military machine. This was about all we had on the eve of this war, planners and a small number of men who had little to handle in practice but sound ideas on how to employ the wartime hosts that would be gathered in the storm. Had it not been for the time the British Empire and the Soviets bought us, those plans and ideas would have been of little use.
The fourth and probably the most important mission of the Regular Army is to provide the knowledge, the expert personnel, and the installations for training the citizen-soldier upon whom, in my view, the future peace of the world largely depends.
As you can see, while universal military training did not end up being implemented in the post WW2 world, many of his ideas and predictions (on Korea, notably) did in fact happen.
The US military, since World War 2 and since the reforms of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986:
Perhaps the best quote that encapsulates all this is what Ike said, 16 years later, at his farewell address (the one known today as the 'military industrial complex' speech), right before the line that gets quoted all the time about the military industrial complex:
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.
Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions
Long story short, in the ashes of WW2, the US military understood that the US entered the war and did not suffer more from it because the Brits and Soviets bore the brunt of it for years, and that future wars would not spare the US. Waiting to build up a Navy and Air Force would not be viable.
As thus, a professional military that could maintain the institutions, knowledge, and equipment needed for a future war would be balanced with a ready supply of manpower. The military would also be focused on the weapons that proved decisive in modern warfare. And forces would need to be forward deployed to make any future mobilization a possibility - and be ready to respond immediately.
Sounds familiar to me.
I can't speak for infantrymen but I can give some relevant information on the war department's/DOD's armor policies.
Immediate post-WW2 saw a rapid demilitarization of the US arsenal. It was expensive to keep such a large reserve numbering over 150,000 active tanks/trucks/armored cars/half tracks, etc so we had massive surplus sales selling vehicles to any nation and private citizen who'd buy them. We didn't really have any policy or plan on maintaining our army besides we needed one.
Then Korea started. We kicked ourselves in the ass for dumping our gear and we rushed armor that was still left over in the Pacific and Japan to Korea which was useful when it got there but still far too few in numbers for the size of the conflict.
After that we realized really how big we needed to maintain ourselves in the Cold War. The now DOD put out an order to have, at any point and time, a minimum amount of combat ready, active tanks that could be deployed. I believe this number was like 15,000 tanks and we were not allowed to sell or scrap tanks if they couldn't be immediately replaced with something equal or better. The overall production of vehicles didn't really change, but in typical US fashion we made several dozen variants of every tank so tons of parts were interchangeable between vehicles, as well as having continuous upgrade plans as opposed to introducing an entirely new vehicle. This being really clear between the M46 and M60, all of which used similar chassis, suspension, and drivetrain from 1949 to 1980 when the M60 was finally succeeded by the M1.
We also invested in tank repair plants in Egypt and Japan, the Japan one in particular being quite busy during the Vietnam War as the US has to recover every tank they possibly could.
I know my answer only covers a small portion of the US military but the general concept holds true across most branches. Hope it helps.
There was a book called The Regulars by Edward Hoffman that covers the US Army from 1898-1941, you might want to check it out.