It was not a very common practice overall. While some Allied soldiers did use Axis equipment, it was often more out of temporary necessity than practice. Using enemy equipment on the frontlines was often hazardous and its problems outweighed its benefits.

Highly advanced technical equipment like new aircraft models were almost universally preserved by all sides and sent back well behind the lines for study of their technical secrets. Captured new tank models often became highly-valued war prizes and were not wasted being used against their former masters. For example, the Soviets captured a Tiger I on the Leningrad front in January 1943 and immediately sent it back well behind the lines for evaluation. In places where logistical resupply was quite difficult, using captured equipment was one expedient solution. In North Africa, the British, Germans, and Italians each used each other's captured equipment. One German veteran of Arnhem recalled that both sides used captured equipment which makes sense; the battered German formations had lost a good deal of equipment in the July retreats and had overrun many of the drop zones for the 1st Airborne. In this case, both sides needed to make do with what was available. The Soviets occasionally used Tigers and Panthers on the front, but discovered they frequently broke down. More prosaic weapons, such as small arms, were sometimes parceled out to irregular and satellite forces; the Soviet offensives did capture large stocks of Mauser K98s and instead of supplementing their own forces, they often ended up in the hands of their non-Soviet allies in the Eastern front.

German practice highlights the stark differences between Allied limited use of captured weapons. Of the belligerents, it was the Germans most frequently employed captured equipment in combat, often designating them Beute (booty) models. This was in no small part due to the shortcomings of German industry and the general unreliability of some German equipment like the fabled Panthers and Tigers. Allied equipment was often more reliable, but these various industrial bottlenecks and persistence of breakdowns meant many German units were understrength. Using captured equipment was a necessity. Additionally, the Germans needed captured cars and other motor transport to keep its large formations mechanized. The Germans had captured large stocks of Allied equipment, especially Soviet in particular, between 1939-42, and that allowed them to escape the common problem of using captured stocks: ammunition and spare parts.

The only piece of Axis equipment regularly used by American forces, the Panzerfaust, demonstrates why other Axis equipment was not used regularly. The Panzerfaust was a man-portable anti-tank weapon that was easier to use than its Allied equivalent, the bazooka, and much more portable. The Panzerfaust was also better than the Bazooka against hardened bunkers and could be easily stowed in a jeep for emergencies. Its one-shot use meant that the issue of resupply was not an issue. The one-shot and small nature also meant that it mitigated the issue of friendly fire as it was concealable and its audio-signature was not repeated once fired, unlike, say, a captured machine gun. In short, the Panzerfaust did its job slightly better than Allied equivalents and its one-shot design mitigated the usual problems associated with using foreign equipment. This was not the case for more advanced equipment like tanks.

But in many ways, situations like North Africa and Germany were the exception rather than the rule. Using enemy equipment compounded already complicated logistical problems and even more dangerously, greatly increased the possibility of friendly-fire accidents. The Germans' use of Beute equipment was less a matter of military efficiency and more desperation on their part. The Allies did not suffer from this problem, especially since they managed their war economy far more efficiently than the Germans.