The tactics to be used for the D-Day landings were agreed upon in late 1943 (around the same time the LVT saw its first significant combat on Tarawa) and training began in early 1944. The sudden inclusion of LVTs into the assault plan would have thrown a wrench into the whole operation, requiring reorganization of the first waves of assault troops. There was a stock of several hundred LVTs in England before D-Day, but these were the early LVT-1 and -2 type that could only carry 18 passengers and had no rear ramp, forcing the passengers to disembark over the side. All things considered, the LVT really provided no advantage over boat-like landing craft, and were suited more for Pacific operations. As the engine in these early types was at the rear, the drive shaft which ran through the relatively small passenger compartment precluded the carriage of any large, boxy cargo such as a jeep, LVTs were unarmored, save the LVT(A)-2, LVT-2s built after March 1944, the gun-armed LVT(A)-1 and LVT(A)-4, and ones that had expedient armor added in the field. This armor was thin as a result of the LVT's need to float in the water, only 1/4 to 1/2 inch (6.5-12.7 mm) thick; the large ponton sides had only mild 12-gauge steel (0.1046 in, roughly 2.65 mm) armor. As a result, they were theoretically as mobile as a tank on land, but far less armored. Like tanks, they would have struggled in making their way over the shingle, a bank of small slippery stones washed up by the sea. The LVT was also slower than the LCVP or LCA in the water, having a top speed of 6.5 knots, in contrast to the LCVP's 9 to 12 knots. A significant number of LVTs also needed to be hoarded for Pacific operations; the invasion of the Mariana and Palau Islands (Operation Forager) took place around the same time as D-Day. The LVT-4, with a rear ramp, was not produced in quantity until early 1944, and there were not enough available to make a significant impact even in the Pacific until the battle on Saipan in July 1944; an Army infantry division often utilized nearly 400 LVTs in combat and support roles for a single operation. The LVT(A)-1, with a 37 mm gun, did not enter production until December 1943 (entering service in February 1944) and the LVT(A)-4, with a 75 mm howitzer entered service around the same time as the LVT-4.

The main design considerations for Higgins boats was how fast they could be produced and how effectively they operated in shallow water. A secondary consideration was how seaworthy they would be in deeper water. Little if any consideration was given in the design process to resisting enemy fire.

The reason for this is that the Allied military needed a lot of boats in order to land a force that could hold and expand a beachead against the German army, and they needed them built very quickly. Higgins boats could get churned out at about 700 a month just from one shipyard. The US saw the need for more than 20,000 of these and other small craft during the course of the war, but in 1941 they had only perhaps 300 on hand. US strategic planners would have liked to have a lot more landing craft at most points in the war and especially in 1943 and 44 when a shortage of landing craft and ship to shore capacity in general was the logistical bottleneck for US and British operations in Europe.

The effectiveness of Higgins boats should not be evaluated just on the basis of the morning of June 6th 1944 at Omaha. They provided the ship to shore lift at many other beaches where the enemy resistance at the waterline was much less effective, and continued to logistically support the troops after the initial landing.