Resources, yes, technology, no. In 1943, for example, Germany was ourproducing the USSR in steel by a factor of 4:1. However, inefficiencies in the German procurement and manufacturing organization resulted in extremely poor use of those resources. The obsession with "wonder weapons", constant struggling of every arms company to grab a piece of the pie, increasing reliance on underfed and undermotivated slave labour, ludicrous ignorance of the realities of war (i.e. rejecting tanks for unpolished welds or an unsatisfactory paint job) all greatly harmed production. As a result, the Germans were unable to put these superior resources to use.

On the other hand, Soviet industry prioritized production above all else. At the start of the war, "wonder-weapon" projects like the superheavy KV-3, 4, and 5 were cancelled, and even more reasonable, but difficult to produce weapons like the ZIS-2 57 mm anti-tank gun and T-50 light tank were cancelled. The People's Commissariat of Tank Production and State Council of Defense were formed, which had ultimate authority in military matters. The American-style assembly line process that focused on automation could produce tanks much more efficiently than the German craftsman-style approach, and the resulting tanks were also much more interchangeable once they hit the battlefield. Strict discipline regarding new tank production was also enforced. For example, the T-34-85M, T-43 and T-44 tanks were unquestionably better than the T-34. However, putting those tanks in production would drop output too far to be acceptable in wartime, so it was not done. The T-34, then the T-34-85, was good enough to fight, so it fought on.

To compare, the Germans did not shy from shuffling their production around to ultimate detriment. For example, when Nibelungenwerke ramped up to produce 150 PzIV tanks per month, the OKH decided to scale back production to let them work with Porsche on a new heavy tank, at the cost of dropping PzIV production to only 2-8 tanks per month for the first half of 1942 instead of 150. Porsche's bid for the Tiger project was ultimately unsuccessful, but he was so sure of his victory that he had 90 hulls built anyway. As a result, Nibelungenwerke only built 186 PzIV tanks in 1942.

The issue of superior Soviet manpower has been blown out of proportion by the memoirs of German officers, which, for a very long time, was the only way that a Western reader would be able to study the Eastern Front. For example, Guderian wrote "[The German soldier] is an excellent warrior, and can be thrown into battle against an enemy with five times the numbers without hesitation. With proper control, due to his brilliant qualities, he negated this numeric advantage and won". Even though the Red Army never had a 5:1 advantage over the Wehrmacht at any point in the war, the "Red Hordes" mythology of one German soldier/tank being able to kill 5 (or 10, or 20, take your pick) Soviet soldiers/tanks was later gleefully perpetuated by Hollywood.

As for why the Red Army was able to push the Germans back, it was their ability to learn and improve, coupled with the Germans' ability to consistently underestimate their enemy. The Red Army of 1943 had little in common with the Red Army of 1941. The aforementioned industrial efficiency allowed the Red Army to recover its losses of materiel, and the Soviet mobilization and training system allowed them to recover their losses in manpower. The Germans, on the other hand, suffered from declining quality and quantity of their replacements. By 1943, the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of the same devastating armoured thrusts as they were in 1941, and all they could hope to do was attempt to hold the Red Army back for as long as possible.

R. Forczyk Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

N. Nevskiy Great Patriotic War: An Issue in Tank Factories

P. Samsonov T-34-85M

P. Samsonov A Matter of Ratios

R. Forczyk Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

J. Radey, C. Sharp, *The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank *