I am trying to conceptualize a board game focusing on the Guadalcanal campaign. It would use an area movement system that defines operationally significant areas (e.g. the Slot, Ironbottom Sound, the open ocean NE of the Solomons) that ship groups would move between.
I’m trying to create rules that realistically depict limitations of fuel and endurance without becoming overly detailed or burdensome. One perspective that I’m missing is having a good sense of the activities and length of a typical patrol for a surface or carrier group. I understand that there were no standardized patrols, but it would be very helpful get a sense of what a “typical” cruiser group might do and how much time it would spend in each area.
Based on some reading material, it seemed like the following might not be an unreasonable timetable for a cruiser group, assuming no at-sea refueling (I’m using 3 day increments because I’m considering using those as the possible turn length):
Days 1 – 3: Travel from Espiritu Santo to loiter area S of Guadalcanal Days 3 - 5 and 6 - 8: On station S of Guadalcanal Days 9 - 11: patrol “the Slot” to interdict Japanese ships Days 12 - 14: return to loiter station S of Guadalcanal Days 15 - 17: return to Espiritu Santo Days 18 - 20: refuel and resupply at Espiritu Santo
For the purposes of the game, I’m trying to create a decision process whereby a player must decide the best use of limited resources. Not only will ships themselves be in short supply, but so too will be the player’s ability to have them ready and in the area of operations at the right time.
In additional to opinions and insight, I would be very appreciative of sources for your information so I can learn more about this crucial campaign.
Thanks in advance for any help!
So I can certainly offer advice about where to look next, in particular vis a vis fueling needs of the task forces.
I would grab a copy(its available as an E-Book if you like) of John Lundstrom's Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal Link to its USNI page. While nominally about Admiral Fletcher's tenure in command of carriers until his wounding aboard Saratoga off Guadalcanal, it also serves as a great look into the conduct off the various task forces in the first year of the war. And best for your purposes it often takes a look at fueling needs, both the rate that ships were using fuel, when the fueled, how much was available from where, and how long it took. This is in part to reexamine critiques that Fletcher was a worrier who was too focused on when his next fill up would come than in doing something with the fuel in his ships. It particularly is nice to see it admitted that many of the Navy's prewar assumptions about fuel burn rates could be very wrong with DD's burning their fuel up to 50% faster with all the high speed runs for flight ops and just being always ready for battle, while fueling at sea was a skill the USN got proficient at only gradually while dealing with old and sometimes very limited oilers as their lifeline.
If you like I can try going through my copy and see if I can't get the dates that TF 61 and its components refueled, from there you can at least get a sense of the tempo of operations, the notes also contain sometimes extensive quotations on the reported and logged fuel levels of the various ships. Its worthwhile to look at the carrier operations, since especially around CACTUS the surface task forces were usually simply detached from carrier screens to provide close in support around the beachhead.
Some other sources I might suggest would be Richard Frank's Guadalcanal, Prados's Islands of Destiny, and Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno. There are also some excellent sources out there looking at some of the turning points of the campaign, for instance this Thesis by a LCDR Farr to the Army War College on Fletcher's message to Ghromley on withdrawing the carriers on 8 August and his reasons for doing so warning PDF.