A CIA report from spring of 1989 ("Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problems and Prospects for Resolution") definitely characterized the state of the USSR as precarious, saying that "the next several years promise to be some of the most turbulent in Soviet history." The report acknowledges that the USSR faced many domestic challenges (popular discontent and skepticism about reforms, nationalist and ethnic issues, etc.) and predicted a variety of outcomes depending on the extent to which these issues were successfully (or not) addressed.

While these predictions did not go so far as to describe the complete dissolution of the USSR (they emphasize that power might change hands at the top, or that opposition groups might get more representation under the existing system), the report indicates that the CIA was aware of the problems that ultimately lead to the fall of the USSR. The report stated that "while the Soviet Union could slowly become less stable if conditions in...critical areas deteriorate, it is also possible that some sudden trigger event could quickly precipitate a crisis and undermine stability" and that "nationalist movement [are] unleashing centrifugal forces that, if unchecked, could threaten to tear the system apart," implying that the CIA (or, at least, the analysts from the branch writing the report) had not ruled out the possibility of a dramatic change that would challenge/undermine the authority and legitimacy of the USSR as a meaningful state.

Even in "Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: why the CIA gets it wrong and what needs to be done to get it right", former CIA analyst Richard Russel, who is in general critical of the CIA, admits that although it faltered in other areas, "The CIA was also successful in analytically warning the president of increasing odds of the Soviet Union's failure than is publicly recognized. Its analysis sufficiently illuminated a key strategic mystery to warn President Bush of the chances of a Soviet collapse. This episode...is a model of strategic intelligence performance."

So yes, the CIA did fail to predict the exact date and exact mechanism of the USSR's fall, but it would be erroneous to claim that this outcome would have been incredibly shocking or surprising to some analysts there.

(As you might expect, the CIA itself has contested allegations that it failed so dramatically to predict the end of the Cold War, and they have a whole page analyzing the allegations leveled against them, you can read it here if you're interested and make your own conclusions about its reliability.)