At first, beginning in August 1942, American bombers hit targets in northern France and along the coasts of Belgium and the Netherlands, probing farther inland in late 1942. They finally hit Germany on January 27, 1943. These early missions were unescorted or escorted by RAF Spitfires, which had a combat radius of about 175 miles, just enough to cross the European coast. American P-47s began operations in May 1943, but their range was not much better than the Spitfire. Improved tactics and the use of a crude 200-gallon unpressurized laminated paper drop tank soon allowed a range of about 230 miles, and the P-47s were able to enter Germany with the bombers for the first time on July 30, 1943. The P-47s surprised the attacking German fighters over their own territory, claiming 25 enemy aircraft while losing 7 of their own.

The German strategy throughout 1943 was quite haphazard at first; this was the first time the Americans launched long range heavy bomber raids, and it was the first time the Germans had to defend against them. Their system went from relatively crude (single-engined fighters attempted to drop bombs on enemy planes from above, or trailed bombs on long cables) to relatively refined by the end of 1943. Single-engined Bf 109s and Fw 190s armed with heavy cannon (no doubt installed because of the B-17's capacity to take damage) backed up twin-engined Bf 110s, Ju-88s, and others (that were hideously vulnerable to American escort fighters) that fired large-caliber unguided rockets into American bomber formations, hoping to hit bombers or cause the formation to break up. Stragglers and damaged bombers were easy prey for the single-engine fighters, who also attacked the bomber formations singly and in groups as well as protected the twin-engined attackers from American escort fighters. The Luftwaffe, unnerved by the long range and increasing number of American bombers, began to transfer fighter forces, especially twin-engined fighters, from the Eastern Front to defend the Reich. The German situation in the "defense of the Reich" campaign gradually began to break down over the summer of 1943.

The range of American escort fighters increased throughout late 1943, and new types became available. Standardized 75-gallon and 108-gallon drop tanks replaced the 200-gallon model beginning in August 1943, and P-47s began being equipped with belly shackles and wing pylons, enabling them to carry two (or rarely three) drop tanks. A P-47 equipped with a single 75-gallon drop tank had the range to reach basically any target in North Rhine or Westphalia; a 108-gallon belly tank allowed them to range all the way to Frankfurt. The first group of 8th Air Force P-38s became operational in October 1943, the second in December, and the third in January 1944. Equipped with two 75-gallon drop tanks, the P-38 had a range of 520 miles, nearly enough to reach Berlin. Serious technical problems hampered the combat effectiveness of the P-38, and their increased range often meant they were forced to stand alone deep inside German territory. 150-gallon drop tanks became available for the P-47 in early 1944. The range of American escort fighters had been increasing gradually throughout 1943, so the appearance of the P-51 was not as shocking as could be imagined. The Germans noticed that the range of U.S. escort fighters was increasing, but failed to react in time due to the fact that their intelligence had no idea how close the Americans were to a true solution (read: Mustang);

"What's the idea of telling the Führer that American fighters have penetrated into the territory of the Reich?" Göring snapped....

"Herr Reichsmarschall," Galland replied with imperturbable calm, "they will soon be flying even deeper." Göring spoke even more vehemently:

"That's nonsense, Galland, what gives you fantasies? That's pure bluff!" Galland shook his head. "Those are the facts, Herr Reichsmarschall!...American fighters have been shot down over Aachen. There is no doubt about it!"

Unescorted U.S. bombers were beaten badly during the Schweinfurt and Regensburg missions of August and October 1943, and deep-penetration missions into Germany were temporarily suspended for a period of several weeks in November. It is not to be overlooked that during this period, the Germans were taking serious fighter losses;

The fighter...formations have not been able to secure decisive success in air defense against American...formations. The introduction of new weapons...has not...changed the situation. The main reason for the failure is that the Kommandeure and Kapitane [sic] do not succeed in securing attacks in close formation up to the shortest ranges....

The Reichsmarschall has, therefore, ordered the setting up of an assault Staffel (Sturmstaffel). Its tasks will be to break up the enemy by using more heavily armored fighters in all-out...attacks....Then there is no need to discuss here whether this is to be done by shooting down the enemy at the closest range, by employing a new type of weapon, or by ramming.

In late 1943, the Germans modified certain Fw 190s by fitting them with additional cockpit and fuselage armor, 13.2 mm instead of 7.7 mm nose machine guns, and two or four additional 20 or 30 mm wing cannons, to be used as bomber destroyers. The Fw 190 Sturmböcke were potent in terms of armament, but due to the weight they were slow and not very maneuverable, needing to be protected by single-engined fighters. It was realized that most fighter losses took place over forward areas such as Belgium, Luxembourg, or the Netherlands. As a result, the Germans reacted by pulling their fighter forces back into Germany itself. Production of fighters for Germany decreased in late 1943, before increasing again beginning in early 1944 due to the efforts of Albert Speer;

Month	Bf 109	Fw 190	Total
June 1943	663	109	772
July 1943	704	169	873
August 1943	515	159	674
September 1943	525	167	682
October 1943	556	127	683
November 1943	472	114	576
December 1943	350	313	663

Despite losses, the U.S. was managing to send more and more new bombers and crews on missions, and attacking German targets through weather previously thought unviable by using radar.

In 1943, the USAAF explored the ability of the "orphan" P-51 to act as an escort fighter, and were satisfied after it had been suitably modified. The first P-51s arrived in England in late 1943, and began flying escort missions in small numbers beginning in December 1943. The P-51 had a basic range of 475 miles, (the same range as the P-47 when equipped with two 108-gallon drop tanks!) and could go 650 miles with two 75-gallon drop tanks. Two 108-gallon drop tanks gave it a range of well over 800 miles, enough to reach any target in western Europe and even fly to Ukraine. P-51 numbers grew steadily into early 1944 as P-47 groups converted, and groups equipped with P-51s from the beginning arrived in England. The arrival of large numbers of P-51s finally allowed USAAF officials to realize their ultimate plan; the complete destruction of the Luftwaffe's ability to resist before the invasion of occupied Europe.

American fighters "cleared the skies" over western Europe in late 1943 and early 1944, swatting away first the twin-engined fighters, and then the Sturmböcke. The arrival of large numbers of P-51s and trained pilots led up to "Big Week" in late February 1944. The mission consisted of a week of large-scale attacks on German aircraft factories. American logic was that the Germans could either meet the bombers in the air and take heavy losses versus the escort fighters, or sit on their hands and not meet them, losing critical industrial resources in the process. The battle resulted in serious losses to both sides; the Americans could replace theirs, while the Germans could not. The Combined Bomber Offensive formally ended in April 1944 in preparation for D-Day, and in the meantime, the American fighter force took on the secondary mission of attacking targets in occupied northern France and strafing anything that moved after being released from their escort missions.

The Americans ratcheted up their pressure on Germany via the air, and the Luftwaffe began to crack under the strain, writing off 43% of their fighters and losing 20% of their pilots in the West during April. The Americans lost 24.6% of tactical aircraft present at the beginning of April but, again, they could replace their losses while the Germans could not. The Germans began to throw instructors and low-hour trainees (the average German cadet in 1944 received only 60 to 80 hours of flight training, while American replacement pilots often had well over 300!) into the fight. May was a bad month; the Luftwaffe wrote off 50.4% of their aircraft and lost 25% of their pilots. After spring 1944, the Luftwaffe was decisively beaten in the West, and American bomber losses steadily decreased.

Loss Rate as % of Credit Sorties:

Year	Bombers	Fighters
Aug 42	~0	0.9
Sep 42	1.9	~0
Oct 42	4.5	0.5
Nov 42	2.9	0.5
Dec 42	5.8	~0
Average, 1942	3.5	0.5
Jan 43	7.5	1.7
Feb 43	8.1	1.1
Mar 43	3.2	0.8
Apr 43	7.8	1.2
May 43	5.4	0.6
Jun 43	6.4	0.5
Jul 43	5.5	0.6
Aug 43	6.0	0.5
Sep 43	3.9	0.5
Oct 43	9.2	0.5
Nov 43	3.9	1.6
Dec 43	3.6	0.8
Average, 1943	5.1	0.8
Jan 44	3.8	1.1
Feb 44	3.5	1.1
Mar 44	3.3	1.6
Apr 44	3.6	1.3
May 44	2.2	1.4
Jun 44	1.1	1.0
Jul 44	1.5	0.9
Aug 44	1.5	1.5
Sep 44	2.2	1.9
Oct 44	1.1	1.0
Nov 44	2.2	1.8
Dec 44	1.2	1.2
Average, 1944	1.9	1.3

Sources:

• Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany, by Donald L. Miller

• Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1939-1945, by Williamson Murray

• 8th Air Force Combat Chronology, 1943