That is Mussolini.

The Italian Greek campaign started on October 28^th 1940, after a rushed preparation, which betrayed the confusion and lack of a clear strategy in the political and military leadership.

The offensive led by Army Corp General Visconti Prasca - a favourite of Mussolini, at the time - was a disaster. Soon followed by a Greek counteroffensive which threatened to push the Italians back to the sea.

In fact the first week of December 1940 was the worst time for the Italian forces, who were at risk of losing Valona, after being driven out of Delvino and Argyrokastro.

Obviously the Germans weren't pleased with the results. Hitler had (already in early November if memory serves me right) given orders to review the plans for the invasion of Jugoslavia in order to add an invasion of Greece from the Bulgarian border - which would became the offensive of Aril 1941.

In fact a first step in the Italian failure had been the inability to "surround" Greece, with a clumsy diplomatic attempt in late October to bring Bulgaria into the war - a fact that would have prevebted the Greek Army to mass on the Albanian border. This had been only one episode on the amateurish foreing policy of the couple Ciano - Mussolini, with the first one thorughly enthused by the perspective of an easy victory over Greece, that was supposedly weakened and divided by the Italian political pressure.

Visconti Prasca had assured his ability to perform the planned offensive, that he had designed, despite the modest forces under his command. This had been attributed to the fact that he was wary of asking for reinforcements, since then he would have had to be put in charge of an Army - thus being promoted de facto to Army General. Which may be in part true. But the overconfidence and superficial planning ran more deeply in the Italian chain of command.

The main idea of the offensive was even more ambitious than Visconti Prasca's plans. In the days before the offensive, a double amphibious operation had been devised, to take place after the breaking of the Greek lines, involving a first landing in Corfu. The entire plan had been approved without informing the Chief of the Navy Cavagnari - curiosly replaced by Admiral Riccardi on December 8^th - who, after finally being informed, replied that it would not have been possible, even with good weather and months of preparations.

Another point that the cartoon may be referencing was the bombing of Taranto performed in the night between the 11^th and the 12^th by the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy, which severely damaged the battleships Vittorio Veneto and Littorio - an event that weighted heavily on the sacking of Cavagnari.

Meanwhile, in North Africa, by early December the Italian Offensive towards Egypt had stalled short of Marsa Matruh and, again, December 9^th would be the day of the British counteroffensive (Operation Compass) which would push the Italians way back into Lybia.

So, to summarize - unlike the "undefeatable" Germans - the Italians were in early December 1940 an easy target for an american cartoonist.