It is true that Master Sun was far more focused on battlefield strategies and tactics than organization or administration. Thus it behooves us to look beyond Sun’s Art of War and at some of the other surviving texts from the scholars and philosophers of the era. In this we’re sadly rather limited, since there are precious few texts that have either survived or been unearthed… still, we’ve got a few options:
From the Zhou period: 六韜 (Six Secrets, attr. Lü Shang)
From the Spring and Autumn, and Warring States Period: 吳子 (The Wuzi, attributed to Wu Qi), 尉繚子 (the Wei Lioazi, of uncertain authorship), and 司馬法 (The Methods of the Marshals, from the State of Qi). That last one will prove particularly important in that it focuses much more on administrations and organization than most of the others.
Logistics were , then as now, of paramount importance to any campaign in the Warring States. And we must keep in mind at all times the sheer number of troops under a given banner. Warring States armies were big. Really big. You just won't believe how vastly, hugely, mind-bogglingly big they were. I mean, you may think your local Super Walmart is big, but that's just peanuts to Warring States armies. Put it another way, the only time in the Three Kingdoms we really see armies of multiple hundreds of thousands clashing was the Battle of Red Cliffs in 208 AD. Virtually all other engagements were up into the high 5-digits, maybe sometimes bursting the 6-digit barrier… but in the Warring States we had armies of hundreds of thousands clashing with other armies of hundreds of thousands on the regular. This meant, of course, that supplying these soldiers was one of, if the the, most important issues facing any of the states. It’s not for nothing that Sun Tzu wrote, “Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.”
The armies were maintained, then, though careful preparation and stockpiling of surplus rice during bountiful years. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities and the collapse of the Zhou regime, these stockpiles had been conceived for civil use in years of bad harvests or famine, but during the Warring States, their primary use was to feed the military. Since the peasantry was almost entirely agrarian, and taxes were in-kind, this was easy enough for the kings to compel, though the taxation rates were often ruinous to the farmers. On campaign, soldiers were issued 3 days’ worth of rations, which of course necessitated a huge reliance on supply trains to maintain themselves from their own stockpiles, as though foraging on the attack was sometimes possible it wasn’t reliable enough to sustain their numbers for any predictable period of time. From the Sima Fa (Methods of the Marshals):
Horses, oxen, chariots, weapons, relaxation, and an adequate diet are the army’s strength. Instructions are simply a matter of preparation; warfare is only a question of constraints. The army’s commanding general is the body, the companies are the limbs, and the squads of five are the thumb and fingers.
That line about the breakdown of the armies into their respective command units is worth fleshing out further. It is easy, after all, to upon completing The Art of War to imagine that The General on high issues The Command and the The Army as a single blob carries it out. That is, of course, not at all how Warring States forces were composed. Generally speaking, an individual army(軍) had a fighting strength of 12,500 (give or take). This would be further subdivided into five divisions(師) of 2,500 each. Each division in turn consisted of five 500-strong brigades (旅). Below the brigade level, there were smaller units of 100 (營), 50 (隊), 25 (排) and all the way down to a 5 man squadron (队).
This level of interdependence and the necessity of cooperation and unity between the civil and martial spheres of a state is hit on time and again in ancient Chinese military classics. The Six Secret Teachings, of instance, devotes its entire first chapter to appropriate civil administration, saying that a worthy king must not “abandon the foundation to govern the branches” and that in terms of the relationship between the civilians and the military, “nothing surpasses unity. The unified can come alone, can depart alone. The Yellow Emperor said: ‘Unification approaches the Tao and touches on the spiritual.’ Its employment lies in the subtle.”
On the advance, the marshals of Qin advocated dispersed formations, to be compressed and condensed into tight formations with well-ordered mixtures of weaponry when an enemy force was engaged – namely shieldsbearers in the front with daggeraxemen behind, and crossbowmen in the rear, with cavalry to harass form the flanks. Force number could be large or small, depending on the requirements of the campaign or mission, and should respond appropriately:
When you employ a small number they must be solid. When you employ a large mass they must be well ordered. With a small force it is advantageous to harass the enemy; with a large mass it is advantageous to use orthodox [tactics]. When employing a large mass advance and stop; when employing a small number advance and withdraw. If your large mass encounters a small enemy force, surround them at a distance but leave one side open. [Conversely,] if you divide [your forces] and attack in turn, a small force can withstand a large mass. If their masses are beset by uncertainty, you should take advantage of it. If you are contending for a strategic position, abandon your flags [as if in flight, and when the enemy attacks[ turn around to mount a counterattack. If the enemy is vast, then concentrate your troops and let them surround you. If the enemy is fewer and fearful, avoid them and leave a path open.
In terms of what army encampments themselves looked like, that – alas! – is more up in the air than, say, what Roman legionnaire camps looked like. The lack of substantive texts on “okay, here’s what a successful camp looks like” suggests that it was of lesser importance than that of their far-western contemporaries, a supposition which is furthered by the reliance on mobility (esp. chariots and then later on cavalry) rather than establishing fortified, semi-permanent frontline camps like those in Magna Germania. When on the offensive, the armies of the Warring States do not sem to have taken nearly as great a care in fortifying their camps, since we encounter time and again nighttime sneak attacks meeting with great success against all parties – one prime example being the destruction of two Qin camps of some 200,000 soldier by the forces of Chu in the initial states of Qin’s conquest of Chu, when they burned the camps in the middle of the night.
The general was typically camped among his soldiers, as it was considered the proper duty of his to lead by example in all things – in battle and elsewhere. From The Six Secret Teachings:
If in winter the general does not wear a fur robe, in summer does not carry a fan, and in the rain does not set up a canopy, he is called a ‘general of proper form.’ Unless a general himself submits to these observances, he will not have the means to know the cold and warmth of the officers and soldiers.
If, when they advance into ravines and obstacles or encounter mudy terrain, the general always takes the first steps, he is termed a ‘general of strength.’ If the general does not personally exert his strength, he has not means to know the labors and hardships of the officers and soldiers.
If only after the men are settled in their encampment does the general retire; only after all the cooks have finished their cooking does he go in to eat; and if the army does not light fires to keep warm he also does not have one, he is termed a ‘general who stifles desire.’ Unless the general himself practices stifling his desires, he has no way to know the hunger and satiety of the officers and troops.
The general shares heat and cold, labor and suffering, hunger and satiety with the officers and men. Therefore when the masses of the Three Armies hear the sound of the drum [signaling their attack] they are happy, and when they hear the sound of the gong [signaling their retreat] they are angry. When attacking a high wall or crossing a deep lake, under a hail of arrows and stones, the officers will compete to be first to scale the wall. When the naked blades clash, the officers will compete to be th first to go forward. It is not because they like death and take pleasure in being wounded, but because the general knows their feelings of heat and cold, hunger and satiety, and clearly displays his knowledge of their labor and suffering.
Oh god I'm at the character limit... finished in Pt. 2