The single biggest thing they had going for them was initiative. Israel in 1967 did not have the space to trade for time as it did in 1973. It could not afford to wait for the opposition to attack in the time and place of its choosing as it did not have the strength to cover all possible routes, neither could it give up land in order to co-ordinate a concentrated response. By launching its own pre-emptive attack, it did two things.

1. It gave Israel the initiative. It was able to force the Arab nations to respond to its own moves, to engage the Arab forces in smaller chunks and with less support than if they let the Arab forces go forward. Further, because the Egyptians expected to be the ones attacking, they weren't dug in either.

2. The Egyptian air force was basically destroyed on the ground. This provided the Israelis not only with flying artillery support for the ground troops (The IAF also were world-leaders in the concept of turnaround time) , but also reduced the ability for any air reconnaissance on the other side.

The fighting styles were also different. The Arabs tended to be fairly mechanical and autocratic. The toughest opposition to Israel came from the Jordanians, which have historically have had very close military ties to the UK, and to this day tends to follow more the UK's policies on leader flexibility, initiative, and leader flexibility.

This article gets wide circulation in US military circles, and seems to be generally well-regarded. http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars It certainly matched my experience. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the best Arab officer I've encountered in my military travels has been a prince of Jordan. (Current King's Brother, trained in the UK, and a highly professional tanker)

Killer quote: "Kenneth Pollack concludes his exhaustive study of Arab military effectiveness by noting that "certain patterns of behavior fostered by the dominant Arab culture were the most important factors contributing to the limited military effectiveness of Arab armies and air forces from 1945 to 1991."16 These attributes included over-centralization, discouraging initiative, lack of flexibility, manipulation of information, and the discouragement of leadership at the junior officer level."

This, again, comes back to the question of intiative. In the 1973 war, the Egyptian soldiers demonstrated tenacity and courage, presumably the soliders 6 years previously had both. But sitting in trenches and engaging targets which come at you with missiles is far different to the requirements of a war of maneuver which requires a willingness to act on one's own initiative, which the Egyptians did not show.