To some degree, yes. Historicism is a term used to talk about the belief (pretty standard among historians) that any given point in time is to some degree determined and limited by what came before it. This is sort of basic to what we do what we do: you understand why things were happening by looking at what happened previous. All people, places, things, etc., are stuck in a historical context like a mosquito stuck in amber. It is a necessary humble corollary from this that we, historians in the early 21st century, are stuck within our own amber, no matter how much we might want to have pretensions to objectivity.

But there are more or less egregious versions of this. One can, with effort, come to better understandings of the past on its own terms than your average guy on the street. Will it be perfect understanding, or perfectly objective? No way. Not by a long shot. (And thank goodness — otherwise things might get boring!) Does that mean that we should throw pretensions to objectivity out the window? Probably not entirely out the window — they are useful epistemic ideals, and they keep us from falling too dramatically into a pit of solipsism or dishonesty. But I think most sensible historians recognize there are limits, and that a better approach is to try and cop to your limits and influences, rather than deny them. It is, I think, a healthier approach to try and identify where you are motivated by present-day concerns and issues and to try and use those productively, as opposed to pretending you're really capable of getting inside the world long since past. (Evidence is part of the way we try and square that circle, to be sure, but nobody who is subtle about these things thinks that evidence can be interpreted without an interpreter. Data absolutely does not speak for itself; it needs spokesmen.)

Everyone is trapped within some kind of epistemic bounds. Those bounds are more flexible than they can sound — we live in an era where a lot of ideas are "thinkable." Is the total sum of thinkable ideas available at the moment (much less the smaller subset that are considered "not totally insane") representative of all possible ideas? (And are our standards of what constitute a "totally insane" idea transhistorical?) No way. But neither now nor in the past are the epistemic bounds absolutely totalizing. It's like wearing a jacket (which can come in many different forms and styles, despite all things labeled as "jacket" having a familial relationship) as opposed to specifically a straitjacket.