Yes, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Compelling Japan's Surrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry, or Invasion: Reconsidering the US Bombing Survey's Early-Surrender Conclusions," Journal of Strategic Studies 18 (June 1995): 101-148. Bernstein's contention is specifically about this oft-cited paragraph:

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Bernstein argues, essentially, that the conclusions regarding the atomic bomb in the USSBS go beyond the evidence they had in front of them, and that the USSBS authors were engaging in a kind of inter-service politicking (by arguing that their previous bombing efforts, and not the atomic bomb or threat of invasion, had reduced Japan to the position of surrender, they were arguing for their continued funding, priority, etc. over these new weapons and in the soon-to-be-formed Air Force over the Army and Navy, etc.). That does not mean that one need disregard everything in the USSBS, or what one must accept the opposite of its conclusions; Bernstein is simply saying that one should not use the USSBS's conclusions without understanding that they were created in their own political context. I use the USSBS conclusions only to illustrate that one need not be a pacifist of some sort to suggest that the atomic bombs were not the be-all and end-all of World War II (which is more about the way these matters have been framed today than how they were framed back then), and to illustrate that, at the near time of their use, their efficacy/necessity was not universally accepted even among the military commanders.