Arab coalitions have failed to defeat Israel militarily in every war since 1948, with only a few exceptions of success such as Jordan in 1948. Is there a common fault with arab armies or does Israel's army have a superior factor?
The recent discussion you've already had linked to you is very helpful.
The superiority of the Israeli military tends to vary based on the war itself. In 1948, Israeli forces benefited from shorter communication lines, different motivations (i.e. fighting for survival, or at least perceiving as much), and more fighters being fielded at any given moment (much of this comes back down to coordination). In 1967, Israeli forces benefited not only from better coordination, but also significantly from the pre-emptive nature of the strikes on Egypt, which routed Egypt's air force and established immediate air superiority, which gave Israel a leg-up. Also, Israel had far more trained pilots, and better-maintained forces in general.
In 1973, the shoe of surprise was on the other foot. And the air force was hemorrhaging planes, because of anti-air defenses the Syrians and Egyptians set up. But Israel benefited because not only did the Syrians start to run out of anti-air missiles, but they started to struggle to hold back Israeli forces for the same reason as in other wars. Israel also held the strategically placed Golan Heights, which helped prevent rapid advance. Israeli reserves managed to move faster than the Syrians anticipated to shore up the Golan. But perhaps the biggest reason Israel won here was one of the common threads: poor Arab army coordination and tactical decisions. The Arab armies failed to coordinate, as they had failed in 1948 and 1967. In 1973, significantly, the Syrian troubles led to what seemed to be a political decision to move Egyptian forces up and past the air defense apparatus that Egypt had set up, to try and relieve pressure on Syria. This was disastrous, as the Egyptian advance was halted and advancing forces were decimated. Egypt had entered the war with some 1,700 tanks, and roughly 900 were sent forward in the advance. Israel had been preparing a counterattack, and now Egypt left that possibility even more open. Egypt lost roughly 1/4 of the tanks sent forward, while Israel lost a handful, because of the Egyptian decision to launch head-on into Israeli defenses.
The common threads I've always seen and identified are poor coordination, decision-making that relies more on politics than tactical considerations, lower motivation among the Arab troops (at least, compared to Israel's motivation of fearing death, rightly or wrongly), and the better training Israeli forces tend to have overall. I'm not big into the culture arguments personally, but I think they could be correct; just impossible to really know for sure. After all, the "authority" argument, that Arab forces tend to follow more blindly, is somewhat hard to argue as better or worse than Israel's own, which was why Israel did nothing when signs began to point to war in 1973 in the first place.
You'll likely find this recent discussion between /u/cptbuck and /u/the_chieftain_wg to be of interest.