In the case of South Korea, the root cause was that it wasn’t a single man on whom all power was dependent on therefore the death of that individual wouldn’t necessarily cause the collapse of the system. Indeed one can say that all the dictators were products of that system rather than the originators of it.

It’s widely known that Rhee Seung-Man came to power post-WW2 on the back of support from the USAMGIK (USA Military Government in Korea). What’s less known is that the USAMGIK established a pattern of political violence to enforce its desired outcomes, many of which were against the will of the korean people, when political means failed to do so. This violence was carried out by paramilitary groups that were either supported (e.g. tied to Rhee) or directly (i.e. funding & training) created by the USAMGIK. These groups were directly responsible for the suppression of political dissent at the time but their impact would be felt far into the future.

For instance, the Korean National Youth Corps (KNYC) was established by the USAMGIK in October 1946. This group was headed by Yi Beok-seok but controlled by Hodge via Lt Col Ernst Voss, ostensibly an “adviser”. Journalist Mark Gayn recounts in his book “Japan Diary” (pg 437):

He [Yi] talked on, and gradually I began to think that I was listening to a description not of a Korean democratic organization but one of Hitler’s infamous “Leadership schools”. The words were the same – the nation, destiny, discipline, endurance; the strange choice of teachers and subjects; the avowed kinship withother rightist strong-arm bands. And then the inspiration became clear.

Lee [an older alternate for Yi] was telling us of the proposed curriculum: history, ethics (taught by himself), politics. “Also”, he said, “methods of combating strikes. And history of Hitler Jugend.” One of Lee’s right-hand men, it appeared, had been an enthusiastic member of Hitler Jugend in Germany for three years.

We were distracted by the appearance of an American officer in an adjoining office … “That’s Colonel Voss,” said General Lee. “A very good man.”

Colonel Voss opened the door and stepped in. We said hello. “You don’t have to talk to me,” said Voss. “My ideals and thoughts are the same as General Lee’s. He’s a great man.”

On the next page he recounts a discussion with an unnamed american officer:

“For the time being, Lee is trying to work quietly. But mark my words: he’s going to be a big-time operator in another year – with our help.”

“It’s simple to dismiss his, or Rhee’s, bands, as neighbourhood gangs. This thing has gotten to be too big to be dismissed lightly. These boys have become the Storm Troopers of Korea. The Military Government has permitted the development of an integrated, large-scale movement much like Hitler’s. And probably for the same purpose”.

The group wasn’t restricted to violence only however, with 14 members being directly elected to the National Assembly in the first elections held after the departure of USAMGIK in 1948. Yi himself became Premier and Minister of National Defense and as Kim Bong-Jin writes:

His “Hitler Youths Dream” was finally realized when his “right-hand man”, An Ho-Sang [who went on to become Minister of Education under Rhee] established the Student Defence Corps (SDC) in all high schools and universities. The SDN system organised students into military-style units and mandated anticomunist practices and curricula. Greeting seniors or teachers took the form of military salutes with slogans such as “Smash Communism” or “Anticommunism”. Students were to learn gyoryoen or Military and Spiritual Training as a compulsory subject in regular school curriculum. The system that strove to make all Korean students a vanguard against communism lasted all the way to the 1980’s.

It’s worth noting that the term “communist” has historically speaking been applied as a broad brush against anything deemed anti-government. To illustrate the point, the recent protests against the now ousted Park Geun-Hye were labelled by some sectors as being communist-led and indeed there was a drastic difference in opinion regarding the impeachment between those 60 and over (i.e. educated during this period) and those much younger.

Another organisation, the North West Youth Association (NWYA), was heavily involved in the suppression of “communist revolts” around the country (most prominently at Jeju Island in 1948). However its members were also fast tracked into advantageous positions:

The NWYA acquired the right to publish school certificates for youths from North Korea to enter or transfer to schools and universities without examination. In this process, not a few intentionally misrepresented their school careers to enter more prestigious schools and universities.

During the military period, merely graduating from these prestigious schools was sufficient to guarantee elite socio-economic status as that would enable one to access jobs in the most prestigious companies and access to the social circles to advance one’s self. Some ogranisations were known to select only from the one university that most of its management were alumni of.

It expanded its power to the Korean Constabulary. On 23 October 1947, NWYA members comprised two thirds of the cadets in the fifth term of Military Academy. On 6 April 1948, after six months of training, they were commissioned as second lieutenants. They later made up the core of anti-communist military officials sent to suppress the Jeju Insurgency of April 3 [NB: both the military and the NWYA took part in this suppression], the Yeosu Revolt of 1948-1949, and to fight in the Korean and Vietnam War. On 16 May 1961, some of them participated in the military coup led by Park Chung-hee.

A 20 year old in 1948 was a 60 year old in 1988, in other words the military of 1988 cannot be said to be completely divorced from the young officer corps of the 1940’s & 50’s. One cannot ignore the impact of this era when looking at subsequent events and indeed it should come to no surprise that the dictatorships during this period came in the form of military presidencies.

When Rhee was ousted via popular revolt, that didn’t remove his support base. Indeed Rhee was beholden to his support base rather than the other way around, for example he actively opposed bringing pro-japanese collaborators to justice despite him being ostensibly anti-japanese because they were a significant part of his power base.

It was that same power base that had brought Rhee to power, now embedded in the military, that brought Park Chung-Hee to power. In turn Park Chung-Hee brought Chun Do-Hwan (1980 – 1988) to prominence and in turn Chun was a key supporter of Roh Tae-Woo during his election in 1988.

If not Park, then it could’ve easily been someone else. If not Chun, then someone else. It was never about a single individual.

Sources:

”Paramilitary Politics under the USAMGIK and the Establishment of the Republic of Korea” by Kim Bong Jin, Korea Journal, Summer 2003

“Japan Diary” by Mark Gayn, 1989