The Treaty of Versailles and Italy's alignment towards Germany are almost 20 years apart. Therefore a lot of things changed in the meantime and, while Versailles remained a point of Nazi propaganda, the concrete issues and the instances of Italian support of German expansion had little to do with the Treaty deliberations.

After the war, the main focus of Italian diplomacy had been the settling of the border issue with the newly formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia, mainly concerning the city of Fiume and pieces of coastline. Italy in fact had failed to find an agreement in Versailles and only reached a temporary agreement in the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty of Rapallo in November 1920 - a final agreement had been found in Janauary 1924 with the Treaty of Rome that gave Fiume to Italy and the surrounding coast to Yugoslavia.

Besides this, the Italian diplomacy had kept moving along traditional lines after the fascist rise to power. In the first years at least Mussolini - even when holding the Foreign Affairs Chair himself - had not steered much away from a policy of equilibrium, while developing his concept of peso determinante or "decisive weight", according to which Italy, too weak to carry a war of its own, would have been able to influence the outcome of a conflict between major powers; in fact not much different from the traditional policy that had inspired Italy's intervention in WW1.

Along this line you can see the supporting role played by Italy in the Treaties of Locarno (October 1925), that had the purpose to settle definitively the unfinished business of Versailles and possibly bring forward a pacification between the major powers (a fact that would have been confirmed by Germany's admission into the League of Nations in the following year). If not in spirit, on a practical level, the agreements between Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy made the Versailles Treaty "obsolete", as the Locarno Treaties were no longer an imposition to Germany.

Now, while Italy had a small role between the major powers, there were hopes that it could play a major role in the balkanic region. The end of WW1 had seen two significant events in the Century old tradition of Italian diplomacy: the dissolution of the Austro-Hungaric Empire and the end of the Ottoman rule over large regions. The Austrians had been a stopping point for any Italian initiative towards the east since the time of the Congress of Vienna: with them gone there was a chance for Italy to replace Austria as the major influence over the Balkanic Region. In light of this Italy kept a keen eye on the conflicts and tensions that followed the end of the War, offering his support for a general policy of "revision of the treaties" in the Balkans. The various para-Versailles Treaties had often been opposed by the small Nations and Italy, while aiming at safeguarding the general balance was interested in establishing its influence by offering its arbitrage over border issues, its protection or patronage to those nations that would seek it - all of course with the placet of the major powers: GB and France.

Now, the fall of the Ottoman Empire had brought forward even more opportunities for the Italian foreign policy: while the Empire itself had been a fairly weak opponent, any hope of Italian economical penetration into the Turkish mainland or into the Middle East had been prevented by the far strong influence established in the late 19^th Century by the German Empire. The fact that Germany was now forced to a very modest foreign policy activity was a sure advantage for the Italian hopes over the region - it matters little that those hopes did not come to much, for the French and British economical influence revealed themselves far stronger and the Turkish Nation showed a surprising ability to resist foreign capitals penetration.

Under these circumstances it is understandable why Italy pursued, from 1922 almost to 1935 with the Stresa Agreement, a moderate policy of Balance whose ultimate purpose was to establish influence over the Balkanic area. In reason of this, step such as the establishment of a Protectorate over Albania, the develompent of ties with the authoritarian regimes in Romania, Hungary and Greece and even the requests for an area of economical exploitation in the southern Turkey, all make sense. Most of all, this policy required good relations with Austria: a small Austrian Nation was the pivot Italy required to stop any other influence into the Balkans - on the other hand, Austria was for Germany the door tp the Balkans.

So, from 1933 to 1935 Italy took a conciliatory but firm anti-Anschluss stance; repeated with the aforementioned Stresa agreements.

Now, the reason why this policy essentially turned around in the 1936-38, culmination not only with the acceptation of the Austrian annexation but with the establishment of an Italo-German alliance are both complex and unclear. By that time the Italian Foreign policy had taken a more personalistic form, with individual personalities working towards the creation of "diplomatic feuds" of sort; consider for example the huge influence the Italian Foreign Ministry Count Ciano had on the develompent of the Greek Invasion. Also Mussolini had clearly become more open to adventurism as both the Ethiopian War and the Spanish Intervention showed.

Anyway, the events of the 1935-37 years marked the end of the Stresa Front. By that time though, Italy's support of Germany had little to do with Versailles anymore.