I visited Pearl Harbor recently which prompted me to read more about the post-Pearl Harbor war in the Pacific. I read things about how the US was afraid to fight the Japanese Navy at night, and how, even at Midway where the US won a decisive victory, we were lucky with our reconnaissance and the Japanese were unlucky with their reconnaissance , or we were lucky by having a single bomb hit a Japanese carrier in just the right spot to take it out. This doesn't even mention the fact that the US aircraft carriers weren't present at Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack.
Every account of a true naval battle around Guadalcanal that I've read has the allies coming out on the short end. It's my understanding that, at least early in the war, the Japanese could launch 100+ planes in 7 minutes, while it took the US over an hour to do the same.
I understand that our intelligence/codebreaking made a huge difference, and obviously the American industrial complex outclassed the Japanese... but in a fair/equal fight with luck removed, would the Japanese have beaten the US?
PART ONE
I will only discuss naval action in 1942 as that is the tipping point between Washington/London Naval Treaty warships between both nations. Effectively, this is comparing two navies of roughly the same age and the closest in size they would ever be.
The launching planes number is something I've never seen. Do you have a source for that? The US was excellent at carrier airwing logistics and support, I have a hard time believing the Japanese were that much more efficient.
Regardless of where you stand on the debate about how much the US knew or theorized the IJN would strike Pearl, the strike itself was luck. For equal parts US luck, you have equal or more parts strategic failures by the Japanese. The only ships sunk (in 40' of water, most were raised and repaired) were World War 1 era or slightly later battleships and some support vessels:
Most were severely outclassed in terms of torpedo protection (bulge under waterline), radar/fire control and AA. The US didn't lose or endanger it's new North Carolina or South Dakota class battleships that were much more modern and capable. The battleships merely crippled by the Japanese were too slow to steam with the fleet anyway, so no actual logistical or strategic resources were lost. Ships can be raised if sunk in 40' of water and modernized in wartime where a peacetime budget wouldn't allow such a substantive rework of a ship.
The biggest aspect of the Pearl Harbor strike, to me, isn't what the Japanese did hit (negligible actual value in the long run, especially by 1943) but more so what the Japanese didn't hit. The fuel storage depot, stored in above ground tanks, were not hit. The tanks, at the time, stored 4,500,000 barrels of oil. The entire capacity of the US Naval tanker fleet was 760,000 barrels. (Donovan) Not hitting those tanks was an egregious error. Hitting and crippling outdated battleships while not striking the logistical capabilities of the entire fleet is a problem. Those battleships didn't factor into US Pacific Fleet strategy, oil for the carriers and aircraft certainly did.
Preamble: The Treaties that defined global naval design and strategy created a division between US and Japanese surface ship design. All ships were limited in tonnage, capabilities and designation. The US focused it's treaty-era cruisers on guns, AA and radar to assist in fire control. Japan tended to focus on human-led fire control, night fighting and torpedoes. The US cruisers were not armed with torpedoes at all while the IJN armed it's cruisers with the best torpedo in the world, the Long Lance. The aircraft I will give an overall edge to the Japanese Zero, however, it had its glaring limitations. It could be bested by well flown F4F Wildcats, especially in coordinated group formations. It also could not dive and it lost it's world-class performance at higher speeds, which the USN pilots took advantage of. Again, the Japanese ship-based torpedoes were world class, and there wasn't a close second.
Regardless, onto post-Pearl Harbor, this will discuss 4 major carrier engagements in 1942 that serve as a baseline for historical analysis and comparison between the USN and IJN. Two of the engagements are part of the Solomon Island campaign which the Battle of Guadalcanal falls under and will be discussed at the end.
May 1942 - Coral Sea
The Japanese were on their way to invade Port Moresby in New Guinea, and the US met them in the Coral Sea. This was a strategically important area and it could disrupt supply chain and logistical traffic between Australia and the rest of South East Asia. Each side was roughly equal in terms of carriers, cruisers and destroyers. The Japanese had 2 fleet and 1 light carrier, the US had 2 fleet and no light carriers. The Japanese won the first carrier engagement, sinking 1 fleet carrier (1920s era Lexington) and heavily damaging another (1937 Yorktown) while the US merely sank a light carrier. Aircraft losses were almost equal between both sides. However, the Japanese were unable or unwilling to press their advantage so the US arguably won, one way or another, a strategic victory given the Japanese didn't invade Port Moresby.
June 1942 - Midway
You likely know the setup for Midway. Japanese were looking for a stepping stone in the Pacific and Midway was just that. They sailed a sizeable fleet towards Midway and their comms were intercepted by the US Navy, decrypted and the US Navy adjusted. The Japanese launched a strike against the island using high explosive bombs. As they were rearming, over the span of 30 minutes (9:25, 9:30, 10:00) 3 torpedo squadrons came in. All 3 torpedo squadrons did so without air cover (US fighters had to return as they were low on fuel) so the Japanese fighter screens got dragged down all the way to the flying altitude of torpedo planes which was, at the time, low and slow. At that point, the US Mark 13 aerial torpedo was atrocious. It couldn't be dropped from a high altitude (500' or more) or high speed due to malfunctions in stabilization. US Navy Doctrine at that time stated a drop altitude of no more than 100 feet and a speed not to exceed 150 knots and a completely level flight path. (Friedman) Against a full fleet CAP and with no fighter support it's already a very bad idea, at 150 knots it is suicidal.
Regardless, seeing carrier aircraft surprised the Japanese as they were expecting an uncontested (outside of limited response by Midway launched aircraft) invasion. They scrambled to rearm their strike aircraft for ships, which would be armor piercing bombs and torpedoes. Just as this happened, at 10:30, a combined strike by 3 dive bombers (with fighter support) swooped in and nailed 3 carriers. A later strike finished off a fourth carrier.
There was no official word about the timing of the strike, however, I personally believe it was a highly calculated strike orchestrated by Admiral Spruance and Captain Miles Browning. There is too much happenstance around it to write it off to fluke or luck, but it would require a statement to the effect of "I sent 30 men to their graves to achieve strategic advantage". Outside of perhaps General Patton, that isn't a public statement many US flag officers would make, especially at such a tenuous and early point in the war where it could have a detrimental effect on morale.
For reference I would contend that terms like "good" and "lucky" are sort of pointless. You have to be good enough to be able to take advantage of opportunities and make the most of limited windows. Thus you aren't going to be lucky if you aren't good. And in general there are 3 ways you can make that happen, technology, doctrine, and leadership. While not uniformly better the IJN can be said to have an aggregate advantage in its strength as a fighting force over the USN in December 1941 even if it wasn't built on a firm foundation and could be easily eroded.
And the course of 1942 in the Pacific is basically one of the USN catching up and learning what their pre-war doctrine worked and what didn't. And in general getting better at their craft, from UNREP, to strike spotting, to gunnery, to CAP doctrine, all went under the microscope of combat.
While in the carrier battles of 1942 bear this out. Both sides had instances where the combination of doctrine, technology, and leadership worked out for them, and where it didn't. Yorktown likely could have been saved had I-168 not been in the right spot and kept after the previously spotted USN task forces. However the IJN I-Boat force had been late getting in place to begin with and were unable to properly serve their role.
While the 1.5 hits on Akagi were also the result in part of a coming together of the same 3 factors. Mcluskey as CEAG was new tot he role having just come over from the fighter squadron, and not totally up to speed on dive bombing doctrine. His decisions nearly meant that both Enterprise squadrons ganged up on Kaga instead of splitting the 2 carriers in CARDIV1. Dick Best only recognized this at the last second and was only able to wave off himself and his 2 wingmen. As lucky as that may have been to have at least the ability to attack both ships, had he not been acknowledged as one of the best VB pilots in the fleet its quite possible he misses in his attack, or had he not recognized that doctrine was breaking down and pulled off his dive in time. And had the SBD not been able to lug out a big 1,000pd bomb that far it would not have been as damaging a hit on the carrier.
but in a fair/equal fight with luck removed, would the Japanese have beaten the US?
Removing again the idea of luck as some force of nature, and simply substituting the ability to be good enough to seize opportunities as they arise, I would say you are simply not looking at the right battles.
The 2 carrier battles of the Fall of 1942, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, were fought with rough parity on both sides. And on them the USN and IJN fought essentially to a standstill. While the USN would be reduced to eventually a single carrier operational(Enterprise and then Saratoga) the IJN had its remaining first team of naval aviators gutted and suffered more losses than even at Midway.
The first year of the war is really the IJN slowly losing its dominance in technology, leadership, and doctrine to the USN, to a period of rough parity into 1943, then losing it forever,
Regarding the flight operations:
I found the cited "one hour versus 7 minutes" source from "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway" by Parshall and Tully. That's 108 aircraft from 4 carriers versus 116 from two carriers, one of which had mechanical problems as cited by Parshall and Tully and accounted for the gulf in time. I can't see the Bibliography so I don't know what source they're citing for those figures. So it's 1 hour for 116 aircraft for that specific launch pattern, not even indicative of that carriers flight operations for that day (4 June).
I read the War Diary of Enterprise's CO which stated they initiated the launch at 0906 of 57 aircraft and no second entry for until 1015, which was reporting a sighting. No indication from the CO of the carrier that had mechanical problems causing a severe delay in launch times. So I don't know what Parshall and Tully are in turn citing. I'd like to see it, if possible.
Thomas Hone's "The Battle of Midway" iterates that Enterprise maintained roughly 20-25 seconds per aircraft launch on average and the CO's report bolsters this across multiple 8/10/12 fighter CAP launches. CO Report can be read here.
Later in the day, the CO notes launching 24 aircraft at 1730 and then landing 20 aircraft starting at 1742 which would indicate a fully cleared flight deck 12 minutes after launch which would put it at no more than 30 seconds per aircraft being launched.