Why didn't Italy annex Savoy and Nice like Germany did with Alsace-Lorraine after the fall of France in 1940?

by blerg3409
Klesk_vs_Xaero

Sometimes you can't get what you want.

The annexation of the "traditionally Italian" lands on the French border, with Corsica and a portion of the French colonies was what Italy had hoped for during the war preparations.

Things did not go as planned.

By 1938 Mussolini had become convinced that an European war was unavoidable. As Munich showed, it could be postponed, but it would happen - perhaps around 1941-42; better if 1943, as at the time of the actual war, the Italian army was unprepared.

Since Italy lacked the resources, the industrial output and - to some extent - the manpower of the other great powers, Mussolini had revised the traditional foreign policy of Italy, introducing what was called peso determinante, or decisive weight. Italy could only commit for a short time - a few months more or less - to a full scale war effort. It needed therefore to carefully pick the right moment to enter the war, the exact moment when its entrance would have tipped the scale in favor of one of the contendants (Germany as it was), in order to make the most out of its involvement.

Therefore, when Germany invaded Poland, Italy stayed put: there was nothing it could do really on the Polish front; and more so the Germans were unsure if a peace agreement could be found immediately. As Germany undertook no offensive operations against the United Kingdom or France, Italian involvement would have been useless or even detrimental at the time.

Mussolini in fact had no expectations of immediate actions at the French border, as he begun a partial demobilization in the late 1939.

Things changed when it began clear that there were going to be no peace talks. As Germany begun its French offensive, it also begun to ask - politely - for an Italian involvement: Italy was to take almost no offensive action. In the words of Hitler to Mussolini, Italy's declaration of war would be enough to dishearten their enemies.

As per his strategy, Mussolini was hesitant: committing to soon on the French border would have meant disaster, especially as there had been almost no preparation for offensive action. Nonetheless, order was given, around mid May 1940, to prepare for a defensive engagement along the French border, and possibly some offensive action in North Africa against the British.

The quick German advance surprised everyone, including the Italians. When the modest preparations that Italy had been able to put together in a few weeks were ready, June had already begun and the French situation appeared dramatic: it became a rush to jonin the war before that decisive moment was lost.

In fact it had gone already, as the Germans were beginning to think about the establishment of a puppet regime in Southern France - here the Italian intervention would perhaps have been counterproductive. Hitler himself did not hurry Mussolini but rather asked him to postpone the chosen day for the declaration of war as it was not good luck.

As a matter of fact, Italy declared war on France on June 10^th , when the French establishment was already fully aware of their defeat. The Italian action appeared to many of the French - even those willing to accept the Nazi conditions - as an outright insult.

When Italy attempted to push their demands on the negotiation table, the Germans refused, as it would have further humiliated the French and made the Vichy regime far weaker, arguing that Italy would recieve essentially what they had captured on the field.

Italy therefore hastily resumed the offensive, between June 21^st and June 24^th , failing to make significant gains and therefore not being awarded significant portion of French soil.

It must be noted though, that a large part of the European situation - both in the mind of the German and the Italian - ws to be settled defintively after the end of the conflict, so that the eace treaty with France was not a final statement. Italy did not abandon hopes on French borderlands or colonies, as shown by a report of the Foreign Ministry dated 1941; where Italy shares the German pont of view that it was possible to compensate the Vichy Regime for the losses in Europe with a portion of the former British Colonial Empire.