British paras (or airborne troops- as they included also regiments of glider-carried infantry) were issued with and supposed to wear helmets on campaign, but as an elite unit some individuals preferred to wear berets and some commanders would turn a blind eye to this. In most cases though, soldiers wearing berets in campaign photos probably had a helmet ready somewhere: in the Oosterbeek perimeter outside Arnhem the British took a lot of long range and mortar fire, and photos from that position almost always show paras wearing helmets.

The British Parachute Regiment had a genuinely excellent record. In the first instance it had to build up a force from scratch, with a little help from Polish emigres, as the British (and US) had not even considered their use before the German successes in Holland and Belgium during the 1940 Blitzkrieg.

It's first operation in Italy, to blow up a viaduct, was not very successful but it was anyway seen as largely a learning exercise. An attack on a German radar installation at Bruneval went off with great success, and was led by John Frost who later commanded the section of paras who held the northern end of the Arnhem bridge.

Used in North Africa and the Sicily landings, the paras suffered from being widely scattered and thus could not concentrate to attack their assigned positions, but they anyway performed well to cause confusion, and showed toughness and resilience.

On D-Day the 1st Airborne Division was used with tremendous success, seizing two bridges on the extreme eastern flank of the invasion and thus protecting the beachhead from that quarter, also taking nearby German fortifications with great elan. They drew off the strength of the 21st Panzer Divison, the Germans' only mobile unit in the immediate battle area, holding it at bay despite the vulnerability of airborne troops to armour. They fought on as ground troops for some time afterward. D-Day was unquestionably their greatest wartime success.

In Operation Market-Garden their performance was brave, but flawed. The British were given the task of seizing and holding the northernmost bridge (Arnhem), furthest from the relieving armoured drive of XXX Corps, while US divisions took interim bridges, notably Eindhoven (101st) and Nijmegen (82nd). Things started to go wrong for the British quickly.

Their commander wanted to be dropped right on the bridge, and the refusal of this was perhaps central to all the issues that followed. The Air Forces thought the bridge would be well defended by anti-aircraft guns, necessitating a landing several miles away. This immediately meant both the troops would have to cover the ground to the bridge before it was destroyed, hold their landing area for follow-up waves, and hopefully maintain communication between the two areas. In the event, most of the battalions were delayed by German skirmishers and scratch forces, and did not make it to the bridge. One battalion plus some other units did make it, seizing the northern end and establishing themselves in nearby buildings. An initial counterattack by the reconnaissance battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Division was smashed, leaving a trail of burning vehicles on the bridge. The presence of this SS Panzer Korps was a notable intelligence failure of the operation. Although revealed by recce aircraft, the operation was pursued one suspects because the Allies had a vast and expensive airborne army, and it was too hard not to use it.

The British divisional commander lost all contact with his men and higher headquarters as radios failed completely, and going forward to see things for himself, became trapped in a building surrounded by unsuspecting German soldiers... it was a full day before he was back in command.

The Germans quickly moved armoured and other forces in to contain the British, but they pout their main effort in further south to hold of the relieving Guards Armoured Division, knowing that if they could stop this, the paratroopers were doomed.

Asked to hold the bridge for 24 hours, Frost's men held out for over 70, before a lack of ammunition, a growing number of wounded, and the German use of large-calibre guns on the buildings they occupied forced their surrender. The troops in the Oosterbeek perimeter held out longer, many being relieved when XXX Corps finally did arrive soon after.

Market Garden is a complex battle and the reasons for its failure are similarly complex, and controversial.

The paras were later used in the Rhine crossings, Operation Varsity, with great success, but this massive set-piece attack has been likened to cracking a walnut with a sledgehammer.

The bravery and dash of the British paratroop and glider forces compares well with their US and German counterparts. The Germans did not stage any airborne operations of any scale after the invasion of Crete in 1941, but used their paras extensively as elite ground troops, notably at Monte Cassino and in Normandy. The US airborne forces shared battle honours at Sicily, Normandy and at Market Garden, the 101st defending Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge.