The short answer is that the 70's did see an expansion to diplomatic outreach from North Korea to the rest of the world. Included in this was an outreach towards South Korea and the US regarding peace talks and unification as well but that didn't progress beyond discussion.

From the standpoint of formal relations the DPRK initially followed a strategy of fostering relations with the eastern block countries, i.e. Russia, eastern europe, but in the 60's they approached many of the newly independent countries, e.g. sub-saharan africa, SE asia, middle East. The 70's saw a further expansion of that outreach, including countries countries that we'd regard as western european but had strong socialist presence, e.g. Sweden, Portugal, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland. There was a slowdown and drawback in the 80's and 90's due to negative perceptions following two terrorist acts and the economic issues due to the fall of the soviet block (this led to 30% of embassies closing).

It was during the 90's that the focus turned back to the US, and to a lesser degree Japan, and we saw the Agreed Framework signed. While the focus was on the formal denuclearisation of North Korea, it can also be seen as Kim Il Sung's final attempt to bring about a peace treaty with the US.

As relations with the US worsened, North Korea turned its focus towards the European Union in the 2000's and opened formal relations with many countries that we'd regard as "the West", such as the UK, Germany, Italy, Australia, etc. According to reports from north korean escapees it seems that there's a strong focus, e.g. european tourism, on trying to obtain euros as they can be used in foreign trade.

Inter-korean relations were at an interesting point in the early 70's. At that point both countries were at a relative par economically and both sides were optimistic enough that they could confidently engage in dialogue with each other. This contrasts with Park Jung-hee's avoidance on the topic of North Korea in the 60's when SK was in a weaker position, and similar avoidances by NK closer to the present day.

The North believed that eventually the South would transition towards a “democracy”, which was borne to be true, and that “democracy” would naturally turn towards the DPRK perspective, which did not eventuate. Per Kim Il Sung’s words:

In the absence of the Americans in South Korea, or of any other foreign forces [like the Japanese], the South Korean people could install a democratic progressive government through its own force, and the establishment of such a government would draw us very close to each other so that, without fighting, we could unify the country

from “Overconfidence Shattered: North Korean Unification Policy, 1971–1975.” by Brend Schaefer (2010)

In contrast, Woo states:

President Park’s stance toward North Korea switched dramatically at the beginning of the 1970s. Whereas he had remained passive and distanced himself from the idea of contacting Pyongyang throughout the 1960s, he began contemplating direct inter-Korean contacts as the United States and China were courting each other. A newly shaped balance of power between South Korea and North Korea helped Park Chung-hee ease his tough stance toward Pyongyang and seek ways to develop inter-Korean dialogue

This only lasted for a few years in the early 70’s however. It ended once both sides saw that the propaganda war was pointless, and the attention of Park Jung Hee and Kim Il Sung turned towards solidifying their power within their own countries.

Sources:

“The DPRK and Diplomatic Relations with other Countries”, (National Committee on North Korea) Issue Brief

“Power Transition and Inter-Korean Dialogue in the Early 1970s” by Woo Seongji, Korea Journal, vol. 56, no. 2 (summer 2016): 81-110