Was France's plans for an inevitable war against Germany, "we'll figure it out when the time comes?" Surely, with the failures of the Franco-Prussian war they had some sort of organized doctrine for such an event..
The best I can find is that (summing it up) France thought it would be a quick war that focused more on mobility and speed than durability and power..
Thanks!
The French had a very vague plan for what to do in the event on an attack by Germany, known as Plan XVII. Essentially, the plan was primarily focused on mobilization and quickly concentrating French forces. It was not as detailed or as rigid as the Schlieffen Plan, and it was entirely reactive, whereas the Schlieffen Plan was proactive. French military planners heavily bought into the idea that the best defense in the event of a German attack was an overwhelming offense and drew up their strategies accordingly. Indeed, one of the central tenets of Plan XVII was that of élan vital, the notion that the brave fighting spirit of the French soldiers would be enough to carry any attack through.
With that in mind, Plan XVII called for four immediate, large-scale offensives to be conducted separately along the Franco-German border in the event of a German attack. Specifically, these offensives would target Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes, with the force in the Ardennes able to shift to Luxembourg or even the Belgian border if necessary. Despite that contingency, Plan XVII did not seriously take into account the possibility that German forces would invade solely through Belgium, presuming that Britain's guarantee of neutrality would deter German attacks. Unlike the Schlieffen Plan, which was very strict in terms of timetables and movement orders, Plan XVII gave the commanding officer of the French forces more flexibility and leeway in terms of plotting these offensives and shifting to respond to the German's attacks. Plan XVII was implemented at the beginning of the war, but German defenses roundly defeated the offensives, turning them into something of a nightmare for the French, and the German assault through Belgium outflanked French forces (largely concentrated in the south) and quickly forced them onto the defensive.
Why is it not as notorious as the Schlieffen Plan? As I mentioned above, Plan XVII was strictly reactive. Despite its offensive nature, it was never meant to be implemented to start a war, only in response to an attack. The Schlieffen Plan is often rightfully listed among the potential causes of WWI. One could not say the same about Plan XVII. Similarly, while the Fischer Thesis and other histories are not against placing the blame for the war at the feet of the Germans, it's rare to see that particular charge leveled against the French. As Joachim Remak notes in his chapter of The Origins of the First World War, "The French, in 1914, entered the war because they had no alternative. The Germans had attacked them. History can be very simple at times." So, the Schlieffen Plan's infamy comes from its potential role as a firestarter for the war, Plan XVII does not possibly share that burden, therefore it is not "similarly infamous."
Sources:
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pre-war_military_planning_france
http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/plans.htm
Joachim Remak, "1914 – The Third Balkans War: Origins Reconsidered,” In The Origins of the First World War, edited by H. W. Koch.
The French had a very vague plan for what to do in the event on an attack by Germany, known as Plan XVII. Essentially, the plan was primarily focused on mobilization and quickly concentrating French forces. It was not as detailed or as rigid as the Schlieffen Plan, and it was entirely reactive, whereas the Schlieffen Plan was proactive. French military planners heavily bought into the idea that the best defense in the event of a German attack was an overwhelming offense and drew up their strategies accordingly. Indeed, one of the central tenets of Plan XVII was that of élan vital, the notion that the brave fighting spirit of the French soldiers would be enough to carry any attack through.
With that in mind, Plan XVII called for four immediate, large-scale offensives to be conducted separately along the Franco-German border in the event of a German attack. Specifically, these offensives would target Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes, with the force in the Ardennes able to shift to Luxembourg or even the Belgian border if necessary. Despite that contingency, Plan XVII did not seriously take into account the possibility that German forces would invade solely through Belgium, presuming that Britain's guarantee of neutrality would deter German attacks. Unlike the Schlieffen Plan, which was very strict in terms of timetables and movement orders, Plan XVII gave the commanding officer of the French forces more flexibility and leeway in terms of plotting these offensives and shifting to respond to the German's attacks. Plan XVII was implemented at the beginning of the war, but German defenses roundly defeated the offensives, turning them into something of a nightmare for the French, and the German assault through Belgium outflanked French forces (largely concentrated in the south) and quickly forced them onto the defensive.
Why is it not as notorious as the Schlieffen Plan? As I mentioned above, Plan XVII was strictly reactive. Despite its offensive nature, it was never meant to be implemented to start a war, only in response to an attack. The Schlieffen Plan is often rightfully listed among the potential causes of WWI. One could not say the same about Plan XVII. Similarly, while the Fischer Thesis and other histories are not against placing the blame for the war at the feet of the Germans, it's rare to see that particular charge leveled against the French. As Joachim Remak notes in his chapter of The Origins of the First World War, "The French, in 1914, entered the war because they had no alternative. The Germans had attacked them. History can be very simple at times." So, the Schlieffen Plan's infamy comes from its potential role as a firestarter for the war, Plan XVII does not possibly share that burden, therefore it is not "similarly infamous."
Sources:
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pre-war_military_planning_france
http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/plans.htm
Joachim Remak, "1914 – The Third Balkans War: Origins Reconsidered,” In The Origins of the First World War, edited by H. W. Koch.