Yes, since after all, throughout the war the USSR maintained a border with the Japanese controlled regions of China, and Japan wasn't exactly a friend, but it was not a particularly strong force.

To start, just prior to the outbreak of World War II the two powers had been involved in low level clashes, most notably Khalkhin Gol in the spring and summer of 1939. This tension aside however, once Germany launched Barbarossa in 1941, Japan and the USSR remained at peace, honoring their neutrality pact, until the very last moments of the war when the USSR invaded Manchuria as per agreement with the Wwestern Allies. Although the two Axis powers were nominally in a military alliance, Japan was not obligated to join in the conflict with the Soviets, and spurned German requests to join them unless certain conditions were met - which never were.

That fall the Soviets began moving large numbers of troops from the Far East to their fight in the west, which through September had been minimal, but in October became a torrent. From June through September, only seven divisions were moved, while October-November alone saw 12 Divisions, plus 12 naval rifle brigades. Although the impact of Richard Zorge, a spy working in Japan who reported on Japanese unwillingness to do anything less than back a clear winner and help with the clean up, should be noted, just how important Zorge was is a matter of debate - there is no question that it helped solidify the correctness of the decision in Stalin's mind, but the pressing threat from the Germans was enough that even without such assurances, the Soviets were faced with little choice, it was simply a gamble they couldn't afford not to take. Additionally, while the movement of 19 Divisions is by no means insignificant, due to increasing numbers of call-ups, the strength of the Soviet forces in the Far East was actually increased following the transfers, having averaged between 43 to 48 Divisions during the period they were occurring, but 51 to 53 by early 1942. By no means was that a full-throated military force, in comparison to what was being fielded against Germany, but it was hardly something to dismiss.

After Dec. 7, 1941, the Japanese threat was greatly reduced. Not only had the immediate chance of Japanese intervention dissipated with the failure to take Moscow and speedily bring the USSR to its knees, but Japan entering conflict with the western Allies following Pearl Harbor meant that her eyes were focused elsewhere. Despite this, the Soviets hardly neglected the Far East, continuing to raise divisions stationed there, which reached 65 by mid-1942. In the face of Operation Blau, although it did slightly raise fears again of Japanese intervention, 10 divisions were sent to the Stalingrad Front.

Following victory at Stalingrad, the concerns with Japan were less that she might join Germany her war against the Soviets, but now quite the reverse, when and how the Soviets would join the Western Allies in their war against Japan. Although in no rush, Stalin was looking ahead, beginning construction of additional rail capacity for the eventual transfer of forces east, and committing, in late 1943, to joining the Pacific War once Germany was defeated. By the fall of 1944, the General Staff had began work on initial preparations for conflict in the Far East, and the General Staff's recommendations were officially accepted in June, 1945, with orders sent out to the commanders of the Far Eastern and Transbaikal to be prepared within a month for operations to commence. Offensive operations were launched at midnight, August 9th immediately following the delivery of news to the Japanese ambassador that war had begun. By this point, the Soviets had built up a force of roughly 1.5 million men who utterly overwhelmed the poor quality and understrength Japanese forces in Manchuria, who made considerable gains before JApan's unconditional surrender less than a week later (although operations would continue for several days beyond that).

David M. Glantz (2017) The Impact of Intelligence Provided to the Soviet Union by Richard Zorge on Soviet Force Deployments from the Far East to the West in 1941 and 1942, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30:3, 453-481

HASEGAWA, TSUYOSHI. "SOVIET POLICY TOWARD JAPAN DURING WORLD WAR II." Cahiers Du Monde Russe 52, no. 2/3 (2011): 245-71.

Yes, since after all, throughout the war the USSR maintained a border with the Japanese controlled regions of China, and Japan wasn't exactly a friend, but it was not a particularly strong force.

To start, just prior to the outbreak of World War II the two powers had been involved in low level clashes, most notably Khalkhin Gol in the spring and summer of 1939. This tension aside however, once Germany launched Barbarossa in 1941, Japan and the USSR remained at peace, honoring their neutrality pact, until the very last moments of the war when the USSR invaded Manchuria as per agreement with the Wwestern Allies. Although the two Axis powers were nominally in a military alliance, Japan was not obligated to join in the conflict with the Soviets, and spurned German requests to join them unless certain conditions were met - which never were.

That fall the Soviets began moving large numbers of troops from the Far East to their fight in the west, which through September had been minimal, but in October became a torrent. From June through September, only seven divisions were moved, while October-November alone saw 12 Divisions, plus 12 naval rifle brigades. Although the impact of Richard Zorge, a spy working in Japan who reported on Japanese unwillingness to do anything less than back a clear winner and help with the clean up, should be noted, just how important Zorge was is a matter of debate - there is no question that it helped solidify the correctness of the decision in Stalin's mind, but the pressing threat from the Germans was enough that even without such assurances, the Soviets were faced with little choice, it was simply a gamble they couldn't afford not to take. Additionally, while the movement of 19 Divisions is by no means insignificant, due to increasing numbers of call-ups, the strength of the Soviet forces in the Far East was actually increased following the transfers, having averaged between 43 to 48 Divisions during the period they were occurring, but 51 to 53 by early 1942. By no means was that a full-throated military force, in comparison to what was being fielded against Germany, but it was hardly something to dismiss.

After Dec. 7, 1941, the Japanese threat was greatly reduced. Not only had the immediate chance of Japanese intervention dissipated with the failure to take Moscow and speedily bring the USSR to its knees, but Japan entering conflict with the western Allies following Pearl Harbor meant that her eyes were focused elsewhere. Despite this, the Soviets hardly neglected the Far East, continuing to raise divisions stationed there, which reached 65 by mid-1942. In the face of Operation Blau, although it did slightly raise fears again of Japanese intervention, 10 divisions were sent to the Stalingrad Front.

Following victory at Stalingrad, the concerns with Japan were less that she might join Germany her war against the Soviets, but now quite the reverse, when and how the Soviets would join the Western Allies in their war against Japan. Although in no rush, Stalin was looking ahead, beginning construction of additional rail capacity for the eventual transfer of forces east, and committing, in late 1943, to joining the Pacific War once Germany was defeated. By the fall of 1944, the General Staff had began work on initial preparations for conflict in the Far East, and the General Staff's recommendations were officially accepted in June, 1945, with orders sent out to the commanders of the Far Eastern and Transbaikal to be prepared within a month for operations to commence. Offensive operations were launched at midnight, August 9th immediately following the delivery of news to the Japanese ambassador that war had begun. By this point, the Soviets had built up a force of roughly 1.5 million men who utterly overwhelmed the poor quality and understrength Japanese forces in Manchuria, who made considerable gains before JApan's unconditional surrender less than a week later (although operations would continue for several days beyond that).

David M. Glantz (2017) The Impact of Intelligence Provided to the Soviet Union by Richard Zorge on Soviet Force Deployments from the Far East to the West in 1941 and 1942, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30:3, 453-481

HASEGAWA, TSUYOSHI. "SOVIET POLICY TOWARD JAPAN DURING WORLD WAR II." Cahiers Du Monde Russe 52, no. 2/3 (2011): 245-71.