Not really no, and its sort of a misunderstanding of and conflation between the immediate Operational goals of the attack and the larger Strategic ones. They were complimentary to be sure, and in the established spirit of IJN doctrine to be sure but it was not ever thought of or meant to win the war in a day or demonstrate to the mongrel Americans the futility of warring against the Yamato Race.

The immediate quandary faced by Japan was that if there was to be war against America, then how best to begin it in order to achieve their immediate objectives. That being securing the Southern Resource Area and all the oil, rubber, and other resources to keep the war economy going. The Pacific Fleet was then the only major force that could check that drive before it was complete. The idea to strike at the fleet in Pearl Harbor then was one first floated in seriousness in early 1941 by Yamamoto and cleaned up by a small circle of officers whom he trusted and respected. This was in line with IJN doctrine to meet a lack of numbers with aggressive bold action, especially attacks from unexpected vectors, and mirrors the surprise torpedo boat attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur to open that war. As one of Japan's most influential officers, and the top sea going admiral Yamamoto then used all the gravitas and influence to get his plan adopted as the war plan. Bucking the traditional practice of sea going admirals being given strategy formulated centrally by the Naval General Staff.

The purpose o the attack then was why it was so key to Yamamoto, that of buying operational freedom of action. By immobilizing the US the Japanese could act boldly in other theaters and concentrate their limited resources elsewhere. All without needing to keep concentrated forces in the Central Pacific to counter a surprise US sortie.

If the Americans really didn't want to fight after a day, great! But the immediate goal was simply to take away the ability of the US to meaningfully intervene in the drive South.

The long term goal was essentially similar too. By crippling, even for a few months, the main US force the IJN could easily move into their second stage of the war. That was the construction of a line of mutually supporting island bases from the Solomons, up through the Marshalls and Gilberts, to the Central Pacific, backed by a second line of larger bases in the Carolines, Marianas, and places like Rabaul. These unsinkable aircraft carriers could surge support to the point of any attack, with the fleet ready to bleed any task force stuck around an island, and the main body ready to engage in the final decisive battles at the opportune moment. A USN unable to raid these bases, let alone invade before the needed new construction, and reinforcement, and seizure of these bases would greatly aid in that effort.

Again it was never considered, outside of some vague wonderings if the Americans might be willing to quickly cut their losses, that the attack on Pearl would win the war in a day. It like most of Yamamoto's plans was part of a huge series of moving parts that had int he end actually very limited immediate goals.

For more you may try these books:

Prange's book may be old and hasn't aged well in aspects but his At Dawn We Slept is still the go to in most ways for the run up to Pearl.

For a more general intro to the origins of the Pacific War and with more recent scholarship I would point to Ian W. Toll's Pacific Crucible.