Ok, I want to tag /u/IEVOLVEDFROMATACO here because I think Caesar’s movements in the fall of 48 and the winter of 49 demonstrate he did not intend to take supreme power, answering their question.

I’m relying on Goldsworthy’s book to refresh my memory, but I should also say the impression I give of events here is the result of a graduate seminar about Caesar I took some time ago. I think we read six biographies of Caesar then, in addition to the sources.

Caesar’s 10 year command in Gaul was scheduled to come to an end at the end of 49. The end of that proconsular command would strip him of immunity from prosecution for his actions during his consulship in 59. He also needed to arrange for land for his soldiers and get official approval of his arrangements in Gaul. Winning the consulship would put him in a position to accomplish all this.

His plan was to stand for consul in absentia in the election of 49. This would mean he would not have to lay down his imperium when entering the city, as he had been forced to do for the elections of 60. Then, he sought to stand in absentia because he had been granted a triumph, which he could only celebrate if he did not give up his imperium by crossing the pomerium. The elections were to be held before his triumph though. He applied to the Senate for permission to stand in absentia, but Cato filibustered the motion. In 60, Caesar chose to stand for consul rather than celebrate his triumph. This time, in 49, Caesar had already accounted for this: in 52 he got a law passed that allowed him to stand in absentia.

In 51 Caesar’s enemy M. Claudius Marcellus (keep track of the names, there is more than one Marcellus) won the consulship and began to nip at Caesar’s arrangements. Marcellus tried to fiddle in various ways with Caesar’s troops, from having Caesar removed from command to discharging his soldiers before the campaign ended. C. Claudius Marcellus was consul in 50. By then Pompey and Caesar seem to have split; when the Senate asked both generals to give up a legion, Pompey gave up one he had previously loaned to Caesar and which Caesar was still using – so Caesar lost two functional legions to Pompey’s 0. A bit later, during an illness, Pompey proposed both he and Caesar resign their commands, and Caesar’s ally Curio accepted it! December 1, 50, the Senate passed this compromise with only 22 senators voting against. Marcellus refused to accept the vote.

Shortly after this a false rumor circulated in Rome that Caesar was marching. When the Senate refused to act on the rumor, Marcellus presented Pompey with a sword and asked him to defend the state, which command Pompey accepted. Early in January a letter arrived from Caesar endorsing Pompey’s earlier compromise. In response yet another Metelllus proposed that Caesar quit his command or be named a public enemy. Caesar’s allied tribunes of the plebs Marc Antony and Cassius (that one) vetoed the bill. On January 7, the Senate passed the senatus consultum ultimum, naming Caesar a public enemy. Antony and Cassius vetoed this too, and the new consul Lentelus chased them out of the city – a violation of their sacrosanctity as tribunes of the plebs. This violation was one of the reasons Caesar cited to justify his march south.

On the 10th, while Caesar was at Ravenna, an advanced force in disguise took Ariminum. On the 11th Caesar crossed the Rubicon (which no one ever mentioned in any meaningful way in connection to Caesar until Lucan in the 70s CE).

I’m going to pass over the military maneuvers of the next few days and just say that Caesar advanced, bypassing Rome, to Brundisium, arriving on March 9, where he attempted to besiege Pompey and his allies. According to Google that 671km or 416.94 accomplished in 62 days. I don’t know if it’s very fast for an army, but it was fast enough that Pompey et al. Left Rome faster than they should have, as we’ll see in a second. March 17 Pompey escaped by sea to Greece and Caesar marched for Rome.

By April 1 Caesar had reached Rome for the first time since crossing the Rubicon. The things Caesar wanted to accomplish were 1) explain himself to the Senate, 2) explain himself to the People, 3) get access to the Treasury (which Pompey inexplicably left behind). By June 49 Caesar was campaigning in Spain.

The main sources of Caesar’s activity in Rome in 49 are Caesar, Plutarch, Suetonius, and Appian. Very much later we get Dio. Caesar is the surviving contemporary source, although other contemporary accounts might have existed for the later sources to make use of, in particular Asinius Pollio and Nicolaus of Damascus.

Caesar wrote only two sections about his actions in Rome. He says he personally addressed the Senate, and insisted on his intentions to seek traditional office (in contrast to Pompey, whose career was entirely extraordinary); he insisted on his right to stand in absentia; he reiterated his offer for bilateral disarmament; he complained about his enemies and asked his offers be sent to them. The Senate approved this but no one was willing to carry the message and the tribune of the plebs L. (guess who?) Metellus was a pain in the ass. Since he had already wasted several days on this he left the city.

Suetonius says even less – only that he returned to Rome before moving on to Spain.

Plutarch wrote only one section. He also says Caesar addressed the Senate, who refused to send the embassy to Pompey. But he adds this incident:

When the tribune Metellus tried to prevent Caesar's taking money from the reserve funds of the state, and cited certain laws, Caesar said that arms and laws had not the same season…. Caesar walked towards the door of the treasury.... Metellus once more opposed him, and was commended by some for so doing; but Caesar, raising his voice, threatened to kill him if he did not cease his troublesome interference…. Then Metellus, in consequence of this speech, went off in a fright, and henceforth everything was speedily and easily furnished to Caesar for the war. So he made an expedition into Spain….

THIS is notable. The treasury was inside the pomerium. Caesar was operating under his proconsular imperium, which he would lose if he crossed the pomerium. Metellus was a tribune of the plebs. Caesar claimed to be fighting to defend the sancrosanctity of the tribunes of the plebs. And he threatened one with death here? If Plutarch is telling the truth, in this confrontation Caesar loses his legal right to command troops, his immunity from prosecution, and one of his justifications for war. His other justification – his right to stand in absentia, which he said he mentioned to the Senate – would be moot here, also, since he crossed the pomerium and dissolved his imperium.

Appian also wrote only one section about Caesar’s time in Rome. He simply says Caesar had the treasury opened and threatened Marcellus with death.

Dio left the longest account, but is also a very late source and is sometimes thought untrustworthy for that as well as other reasons. But he has interesting things to say. He says when Caesar spoke to the Senate at Rome the Senate met outside the pomerium. He says Caesar likewise assembled the people outside the pomerium. Both speeches had the same content Caesar reported. Dio also says Caesar sent soldiers to the treasury, and the soldiers somehow sidelined Marcellus who had physically stationed himself outside the treasury to prevent its breach.

So we have conflicting reports. Caesar doesn’t give us much. Plutarch and the tradition that followed him (Appian, Suetonius) have Caesar throwing away his claims to legitimacy in this short period in Rome. Dio, very late, seems to be using a different tradition in which Caesar seems to defend his legitimacy.

It’s worth noting that when Caesar returned to Rome from Spain in December 49, he got himself appointed dictator for the purpose of holding elections. This was not uncommon. Both elected consuls, the officers usually responsible for holding elections, were overseas (with Pompey) and not about to return to Rome to hold elections. In those sorts of circumstances – where the consuls could hold elections – appointing a dictator to do the job was normal. Caesar held the elections: he won the consulship for 48 along with Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus, and Caesar campaigned for the next year with consular imperium. He resigned this dictatorship after something like 10 days.

My thoughts are that both before and after his visit to Rome in 49 Caesar expressed concern for and acted to maintain his imperium. If he had entered the city in April 49 and forfeited his imperium, he would have been acting illegally for the whole first Spanish campaign, and it makes no sense to get appointed dictator for holding elections and getting elected consul in that circumstance. It would have been an open government of violence. If he addressed the Senate and People outside the pomerium, and send others to break into the treasury, he would have maintained his imperium and his justifications for war. It’s hard to imagine why he would talk about addressing the Senate and defending his right to stand for election in absentia if that very address would have made the point moot.

I think all of this means Caesar meant to continue constitutional government. The counterargument that all of this is a fig leaf to justify his government of violence is made knowing the end result. I don’t think it’s possible to honestly argue Caesar aimed for monarchy at any decision he made at the time. That claim can only be made by someone who knows what really happened.

So, I hope that addresses both questions.

Yes, sorry. I meant as far taking dictatorship to reform the system. I've heard it said that Caesar thought the biggest mistake that Sulla made was relinquishing power, allowing his system to be deconstructed.