I would say most certainly not. The social, fiscal, and organizational strains that warfare places on a polity means that even with a good reason for war, a state's decision-makers can find themselves faced with enormous internal opposition. "The scenery is nice" is most certainly not enough of a reason to overcome those hurdles.

There's no real explanation as to why anything didn't happen. But sending people to die for tourism's sake is beyond the realm of absurd. I can offer a few examples that I am most familiar with, although there are countless others.

Even in wanton situations of power projection, like the Italian Wars of the early 16th century, the European hegemon seizes one or both of the two of the most important Italian states: the Duchy of Milan and the Kingdom of Naples. Why Milan and Naples and not, say, Venice and Rome? Or even Florence and Genoa? Well, it so happened that the Milanese and Neopolitans institutions were characterized by, among other factors, strong ties to the european powers of the time. When Louis XII pressed his claim to Milan at the end of the 15th century, he not only had a strong legal argument (Louis' grandmother was Milanese) but he and his closest retinue had a very strong grudge against Ludovico Sforza, the reigning duke (long story). Ludovico himself, before ascending to power, had been his brother's ambassador to the French Court, and the social and economic ties between Paris and Milan were so strong when Louis arrived in Lombardy he easily founded a Senate of leading Milanese families to help him govern. Indeed, dialoguing with leading citizens to guarantee stable rule was most certainly not outside of the ream of possibility, and the importance of this dialogue with the local institutions was very clear to Louis; his predecessor, Charles VII, had led the first French expedition in Italy at the head of a broad coalition with the goal of claiming the throne of Naples only to see his military victories undone by his utter lack of a support mechanism. Indeed, this must have also contributed to Louis' decision to strike a pact with Ferdinand of Aragon to partition the Kingdom of Naples, offering the Aragonese the whole of the Kingdom except for the city of Naples. The utility was twofold; the French King needed to neutralize Naples during his expedition, since it was Milan's principal ally (albeit a disgruntled ally, but that's beside the point) and Louis knew from his predecessor's experience that occupying southern Italy was a feat the French simply did not have the means to carry out. Because Naples was pretty much propped up by Aragon to begin with, it made sense to come to terms.

Another example of how inability to establish institutional continuity and effective government can undo even the most meticulous military operation would take place not a decade later; when during the War of the League of Cambrai the French and Austrians were simply incapable of occupying Venetian cities

In fact, nowhere is institutional continuity more evident than in Italy; even before the Italian wars, in a uniquely centralized state like Milan, the Visconti dynasty's expansion was a two-way interaction with local governments, and their overlordship could be easily toppled should local councils develop a powerful anti-Milanese faction. Viscontean rule over cities like Siena and Pisa, for example, was more a consequence of those cities asking for Milanese protection against their powerful neighbor (Florence) rather than a conquest born out of some grand design to unify Italy. Proving the ephemeral and conditional nature of this relationship, the most powerful Duke, Gian Galeazzo Visconti, had a grand state that evaporated on his death. The eastern provinces immediately revolted and after a brief resurgence of the Scaligers, defected to the Republic of Venice. Gian Galeazzo's former soldiery revolted against his wife and successor, and there was no more talk of projecting Visconten rule south of the River Po, let alone the Apennines, as Pisa and Siena thought it better to fend for themselves.

In short, successfully mobilizing resources for non-colonial warfare can only really happen if there exist some sort of a social contract linking the warring parties. "The scenery is nice" does not constitute that sort of social contract.