Modified from an earlier answer of mine

First off, the impact of the Versailles Treaty was quite complicated upon Germany. While reparations were onerous and did contribute to the hyperinflation of 1924. And here the Treaty also did not have as great of an impact as popular memory holds, much of the German currency problems in the early 1920s were self-created by decisions made during the war and in its aftermath. The Versailles system was also one that German politicians soon found to be quite manageable after 1924. The French occupation of the Rhineland, which was one of the great destabilizers in 1924 opened up, or more accurately, exposed, the political fissures within the Allied coalition. In short, there was no mechanism in place to enforce the Treaty and astute German politicians like Stresemann recognized this. Negotiations over loan repayments and other facets of Versailles represented a longer-term game on the part of the Republic's leadership to return Germany to a respectable place among Europe's great powers. Deals with the rest of the Allied leadership were always predicated on the soft threat that Germany could leave the system and deal with the USSR or the smaller countries of Eastern Europe. The post-1924 stabilization of the German economy though did have an Achilles heel in that it was vulnerable to disruptions in global trade and the employment remained weak through the 1920s.

Hitler, of course, was one of the chief beneficiaries of the collapse of the Weimar economy. Blaming the Treaty for German weakness was one of the staples of Weimar's political discourse, but the NSDAP had been railing against these (often non-existent) fetters the Treaty placed on German strength and power for the better part of a decade. But railing against the existing system and actually implementing a new economic order which would restore Germans to strength and full employment were different matters. A number of contemporaries in the mid-1930s were shocked by the seeming recovery of Germany and its massive displays of military might such as its new air force. The long and the short of it is that the Third Reich could not fund all of this stuff, whether it be new fighter planes or massive autobahns. While rational economic policies often fall by the wayside during wartime, Nazi Germany was rather special in this regard in that it implemented wartime economic measures in peacetime. Despite the popular reputation that Hitler had gotten Germany out of the Depression, the country was on the brink of fiscal ruin by 1938.

A number of contemporaries were amazed by rapidity which Hitler had resolved Germany's unemployment and seemingly put the country back on track by the mid-1930s. This was not that mystical of a recovery in hindsight. Government-led deficit spending and massive public works helped ease the country out of the Depression. The irony is that the foundations for much of this type of recovery were laid in the pre-1933 period, and the NSDAP played no minor role in hindering them. Goebbels's propaganda machine had castigated the autobahns as a Jewish-inspired waste of public tax money. The growth of the NSDAP in the Reichstag hindered any substantive measures by the pre-Hitler government as the Nazis created legislative chaos and political paralysis. The strength of the NSDAP in the Reichstag prevented the body from efficiently and quickly enacting relief measures as the NSDAP reflexively opposed any measure to stabilize the situation in the Republic. Once in power, Hitler reversed course on these policies and touted them as his own initiatives.

This reversal though was less cynical than it might appear at first (although it is suspicious and no doubt the government liked the propaganda value of putting men to work). The main prioritization of spending for the government was for rearmament. The autobahns represented an expansion of German military infrastructure, and that was their main attraction for Hitler. A good deal of the government's spending was towards heavy industry and those sectors of the economy related to rearmament. One 1935 estimate pegged that a quarter of German industry was devoted to production related to rearmament. This skewed the recovery in very odd directions. While GDP grew, the indices for both private consumption and private investment fell.But there was skepticism over the immediate future even in sectors of the economy which had done well out of the rearmament drive. Arms manufacturers like Krupp were looking to more foreign sales in the late 1930s as they sensed that the days of easy profits might be coming to an end.

One of the reasons why some industrial chiefs were pessimistic about the immediate future was that was that they knew of the economic shenanigans being played to pay for rearmament. One of the impacts of 1924 was that it made the German government leery of inflation. The Third Reich adapted various schemes to ensure their massive rearmament did not cause hyperinflation. Some of this involved bartering with other countries for strategic raw materials with finished goods, usually weapons, in lieu of hard currency. Another stratagem was to pay for rearmament under a shell company. The president of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht set up the Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft (Metallurgical Research Corporation) which would be backed up the the Reichsbank. The government then use MEFO bills to pay armaments firms for their goods, which the firms then kept for their high rates of interest. The MEFOs were a form of IOUs that kept the German government technically solvent and obscured the true level of the deficit the Third Reich was holding. The Reichsbank was loaning money to the government at an extravagant rate but keeping everything under the table through a shell corporation. Wages and price freezes in 1936 further gave the illusion that there was a stability to the economic system.

The reality was this was an economic house of cards waiting to crash down. Schacht and even some of the armaments firms recognized this was an unsustainable policy over the long-term by the late 1930s. The MEFO bills might have been a short-term expedient, but the government was increasingly using them as a permanent solution. The Reichsbank issued a moratorium on the MEFO bills in early 1938, which prompted a major cash flow crisis within the Reich. This in turn led to a fall in the German stock market and raised taxes. The aggressiveness of German expansion in this period was partly because many of the principal German decision-makers knew that German finances were on such shaky ground.

The average German worker and consumer still found little in the recovery for them. Autarky drives and protectionism meant there were shortages of non-German goods. The creation of state-initiatives like the Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service/RAD) and Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German work front/DAF) respectively served both to give Germans a guaranteed some form of work and were to act as an arbiter for the German worker. In practice, such National Socialist organizations almost invariably decided in favor of industry in labor disputes and were prone to cronyism. The DAF may have led to the beautification and worker facilities, but they did little in the way of protecting workers like unions or other forms of labor organization had done in the Republic. Both industry and the state used the RAD, which was compulsory for young German men, as a way to punish shopfloor malcontents. The DAF did improve conditions for some workers, but not surprisingly, these were in new areas of the economy directly related to rearmament, most notably aviation.

So recovery was real, but it was quite hollow and a very qualified economic success story. Although the state prided itself on eliminating class distinctions and uniting all Germans in a Volksgemeinschaft, class distinctions arguably sharpened during the 1930s. One metric of growing prosperity- car ownership- showed that car ownership remained largely a middle- and upper- class phenomena. The much ballyhooed Volkswagen was supposed to bring car ownership to all Germans. Launched with great fanfare, Volkswagen's KDf-Wagen was a state-subsidized basic car that would be paid by subscription. This was part of a wider panoply of state initiatives of the Kraft durch Freude (strength through joy/KdF) to provide the good life to all Germans irrespective of class. But actual subscriptions for the KdF-Wagen were pretty dismal numbers. Research into the saver program shows that much of the program's subscribers were already affluent and many already owned a car. This was of a piece with other KdF programs. The subsidized vacations of the KdF were often used by the middle-class to supplement their own leisure time, and it was less of a leisure program for the masses. Although internal reports showed that there was a good deal of interest in the KdF-Wagen and other Volksprodukte, few Germans were willing to pony up the resources to make these programs viable. This not only testifies to the hollowness of wages under Nazi recovery, but also the skepticism many Germans had that Hitler could live up to his promises. And this skepticism was right in that nary a single subscriber received their KdF-Wagen. Production delays and the onset of war saved the regime from an embarrassing collapse of the KdF-Wagen initiative as the Hitler had seriously underestimated the costs of setting up a new production line.