Why exactly has the concept of virtue lost so much popularity in Western society? I'm referring to the pagan, Aristotelian virtues adopted by many Christian thinkers (e.g. the cardinal virtues) as well as the general concept of "respectable sensibilities" that were especially prevalent in the 18th and 19th centuries (at least as I perceive them to have been as a lay person). Was this really just a matter of declining religiosity? If so, would it be because these virtues were viewed to be part-and-parcel with religion?
I'm genuinely curious because I personally think the concept of aretaic virtue, at least, is a pretty helpful one, but my question isn't meant to have a normative implication that views this (self-perceived) historical shift as necessarily bad.
Alasdair MacIntyre's 'After Virtue' tackles exactly this question. I'm not sure to what extent he admissible in the sub as a source, seeing that he's a philosopher, and the book is one of philosophy, but he does employ a specifically historico-philosophical method. He outlines this point in the book, saying that his perspective is one both alien to analytic philosophy, due to it's reliance on a historical perspective to elucidate philosophical issues, and to a history proper, because he deploys normative philosophical arguments to which a traditional historian is probably allergic (I sau probably because I do not know the extent to which normative neutrality is the standard at the moment for historians, but I'm guessing you guys don't have large digressions on meta-ethics on your papers on 13th c. Saracen piratery for example!).
Anyways, MacIntyre sees the decline in virtue ethics as linked to the replacement of the Aristotelian natural framework, which had dominated European (and Islamic and Jewish) thought for the best part of 2,000 years. This is tied to Christianity as well because Aristotle was incorporated in the tradition through thinkers such as Aquinas.
Just to go back a bit, for MacIntyre virtue ethics is given it's first explicit formulation by Aristotle, who basically systematically expounds what virtue means in the context of 4th century Athens. The language of virtues had existed previously, and incorporated in, for example, Greek Epic poetry, but a theory of virtue not been explicitly formulated.
The tradition of the virtues, which undergoes some modifications in the context of Christianity, but still retains its force as a living tradition, starts to disappear with the arrival of modernity: that is to say the frameworks inaugurated by Newton, Descartes, Bacon and the like.
This doesn't happen all at once, but gradually as Aristotelianism is dismantled the virtue tradition is de-natured. There is still talk of virtues, but for MacIntyre by the 18th and 19th centuries you cannot speak of a living tradition of virtue ethics. This has to do with some philosophical matters that I won't go into in too much depth here, but will briefly summarise: for MacIntyre virtues must be embeded within certain practices (he gives some examples such as chess, of medicine), in which you can achieve excellence. They must form part of a tradition. And they must take place in the context of a life that is lived narritavely. By 19th century none of these conditions hold. And in practice we see the emergence of Kantian deontology, utilitarianism, Humean skepticism, and so on. Curiously, for MacIntyre Jane Austen is an exception of someone still advancing the tradition of genuine virtue ethics when it had largely been abandoned.
This is an incredibly brief sketch of a long and complicated argument that I have certainly not done justice to. You are best of just reading the book (you can find pdfs online). But if you have any questions, and if this does not get removed, I'm happy to try and answer them.