On July 25^th 1934 the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was murdered by elements of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Dollfuss, a conservative-authoritarian, had been looked upon with favor from the Italian Regime since his appointment in 1932, even enjoying financial support. He had also been on personal terms with mussolini for a few years – at the time his family was spending the summer holidays in Riccione.

His murder was therefore considered a serious issue by the Italian Government. Mussolini went as far as to mobilize four divisions on the Austrian frontier, apparently to prevent a possible German occupation. There was nonetheless no real threat of conflict.

Austria had been, since the treaties of 1919-20, a key point of Italy's foreign policy. Italy had in fact, despite its internal struggles, hoped to gain a prominent role in the Balkanic-Danubian area, essentially occupying what had been left empty by the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Along this lines went the various agreements developed over the years: the official protectorate on Albania, the treaties with Jugoslavia, the recognition of the Soviet Regime, the attempted influence on the Greek Government, the ties with Romania and Bulgaria.

Obviously, the establishement of "fascist" regimes in those country was considered with favor by the Italian Regime. But that was not the only reason of the Italian protection of Dollfuss.

Vienna was the German door on the Danube and the Balkans: the Italian foreign policy required therefore both an agreement with Austria and Austrian independence from Germany, so that Austria could work as a stopping piece on German ambitions. The rise of a more aggressive Government in Germany – despite ideological affinity – was therefore a threat to the whole Italian foreign policy in the area.

This explains why Mussolini took such a strong stance on the issue, culminating with his speech of Bari (September 6^th 1934) where he described his soverign disdain for certain transalpine doctrines of peoples who did not have knowledge of a written language when Rome gave the world Caesar, Virgil and Augustus. Nonetheless, by that time, Mussolini's acts were essentially posturing, as it had become clear that Hitler had at the moment no intention to actually attempt the anschluss and that he wasn't behind the assassination.

The Italians had at first suspected that the Austrian Nazis had been pushed to action by the Germans because of known previous ties of Rohm to the Austrian SA. And therefore connected the action to a supposed internal struggle of the Hitler faction with the extreme. That such interpretation was essentially wrong, is something we know now as we know that Hitler was not pleased with the Austrian initiative.

The issue was significant enough that Italy kept an apparently non conciliatory stance towards Germany for the following year; it was in any case more bickering than hostility.

Why then, did Italy agree to the anschluss four years later? Tossing away years of political preparation and the entire concept of an Italian-led revision of the treaties in the Balkan area.

This is harder to explain because, at the time, the Italian foreign policy had begun to switch away from the "foreign office" to become more personally driven. Much of the explanation resides therefore in Mussolini's understanding of political relations after the Ethiopian war. He appear to have believed (in fact this belief dated back September 1934 and the events following Dollfuss death) that the French and British were not really willing to support the Stresa agreements opposing the anschluss; that, in case Germany had moved forward, they would have just complained loudly leaving Italy even more isolated. He therefore saw his possibilities as either accepting the anschluss with a friendly Germany or accepting it with a hostile Germany.