I would suggest that Caesar was still "junior" to the "players" even in 60 BCE. He had spent the 60s quietly pursuing a popularis via, a "populist line," and had been a staunch supporter of Pompey. At the same time, he had been cultivating relationships with Marcus Crassus which seem to vary from political to financial. On a broader scope, his connection to the Marians was well-known, as he made clear at his eulogy of his Aunt Julia, former wife of Gaius Marius, and by his restoration, while aedile, of Marius' monuments to his victories over the marauding Germanic tribes. But he had also been quietly cultivating ties in other places, including, incredibly, the old Sullans. His ancient and respected name, his congeniality, and his adept oratory helped him to be successful in these endeavors.

In 60, he was returning from a successful pro-praetorian(we think) command in Spain, where he had enjoyed some small military success and had been acclaimed imperator, which was not insignificant. Not everyone was acclaimed imperator by the legions in this period, and notable recent recipients included Marius, Sulla, and Pompey. He had requested permission to stand for the consulship (for 59) in absentia, so that he could throw a triumphal parade, but the staunch republican Cato blocked this request. Caesar's populist tendencies in the 60s had already earned him a powerful enemy on that front.

But the year 60 has little to do with Caesar, in the grand scheme of things, and everything to do with Crassus and Pompey. Crassus first. He was a powerful figure in this time, and had been consul with Pompey in 70. And yet, his motivations (at any time) are very opaque. He was certainly a businessman and liked having and making money, but he was also a Roman statesman who constantly competed with Pompey and other prominent senators. By 60, we think that Crassus had provided financial sureties to Caesar, but this was not unique: he had supported other promising young Romans previously, as a sort of investment. It was always useful to have the support of up-and-comers, especially ones who were poised to stand for the consulship.

It was the same for Pompey. He returned from the East to face a veritable shitstorm of opposition in the senate. Pompey always had a fraught relationship with the senate, the admiration and support of which he always so desperately desired, but upon his return to Italy in December of 62 he found that he could get nothing done. He tried to pacify M. Cato with a marriage alliance, but the stubborn republican was just offended instead. In that offer, Pompey had divorced his wife Mucia to make himself available, and this apparently was quite a scandal. Among her relatives were the still-potent clan of the Metelli, who now became bitter enemies of Pompey. Oops. Pompey was not an idiot, and knew he needed some support in official positions. To this end, he arranged for a pet consul to be installed (for 61 and then 60). Both proved ineffective in getting Pompey's goals accomplished.

This brings us to Caesar in 60. He already had political and financial support from Crassus, both of which were absolutely necessary for him, and without which he probably had very little chance at the consulship. But now the frustrated Pompey cast his eye on Caesar as well. The young man had been an avid supporter of his in the past decade, and seemed impressive enough. Pompey's last two consul plants had fizzled, but third time the charm? He too threw in his support for Caesar's election, making it now all but certain. One of Pompey's primary concerns was getting his acta in the East passed [ie, getting his arrangements as to the Eastern provinces ratified in the senate; until then, they were temporary stop-gaps; consider this his legacy in the East]. He hoped that with Caesar as consul, that might be finally accomplished in the face of fierce senatorial opposition.

Thus, by the time of the elections of 60, you see the beginnings of what would, in the next year, coalesce into something famous: the financial and political networks of Pompey and Crassus, coupled with the popular support, (relative) youth, and energy of Caesar. Caesar's consulship provided an opportunity for Pompey and Crassus, who had become rivals, to align their interests in a dangerous way. Their "junior" partner was the facilitator, and at this point they had no way of knowing that their junior partner would go off to his "quiet" province of Gallia and, in the course of 8 years, create a whole new province, raise and train twelve terrifying veteran legions, and then turn back to Italia a "junior" no longer.

For a lot more on the years leading up to 62-60 and the complicated web of alliances, and since it is still next to my computer from a previous thread, see Gruen, Last Generation of the Roman Republic, 62-82.