One of the key reasons for the difference was that the balance of naval power shifted between the wars. In WWI, the Royal Navy generally outnumbered the German High Seas Fleet, so most battles would favour the British. In WWII, the Royal Navy had far more commitments, with both the Italian and German fleets threatening in Europe, while in the Pacific, the Imperial Japanese Navy and US Navy were more balanced.

The majority of the battleship actions in both wars occurred in the European theatre, and given that I'm more familiar with those, I'll be focusing on them. During WWI, the two main battlefleets clashed only once, at Jutland. Both before and after Jutland, both fleets also used raids and probes in attempts to draw out the opposing fleet; the Germans made several raids on the British East Coast in 1914 and 1916, as well as an abortive raid on a convoy to Norway in 1918, while the British made repeated probes into the Heligoland Bight. However, neither side could afford losses. The Royal Navy's Grand Fleet had more battleships and battlecruisers than the German High Seas Fleet, but any losses would help the Germans close the gap; equally, any German losses would make the gap wider (at Jutland, the RN had 28 battleships and nine battlecruisers, against 16 German dreadnoughts, six 6 pre-dreadnoughts and five battlecruisers). As both fleets had significant strategic goals - help maintain or destroy the Allied blockade of Germany or the German blockade of Russia, or to defend against or carry out an amphibious operation - then losing ships would make carrying out their mission much harder. Losses could not be afforded as a result.

In 1939 or 1940, the situation was much different. The German Navy had shrunk greatly following the Treaty of Versailles. The Royal Navy had also shrunk, following the naval limitations treaties of the 1920s and 1930s, and years of under-investment. Even so, the Royal Navy was much stronger than its German counterpart. As such, German planning had to take a less direct approach than it had in WWI. Rather than seeking a fleet engagement, they sought to destroy British and Allied shipping. The RN, meanwhile, could much more afford to lose ships, as losing one or two battleships would maintain its level of superiority - in 1939, the RN had 12 battleships and three battlecruisers against just two German battlecruisers. Added to this was the increased capability of aircraft, which could compensate for losses.

In the Mediterranean, meanwhile, things were much closer to the WWI experience. The Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet in 1940-41 had at most five battleships, plus two-three extra battleships or battlecruisers from Force H, while the Italians had six battleships. This meant that, at first, the experience was similar to the North Sea in WWI. However, the British air raid on the Italian fleet at Taranto, disabling three battleships, broke the equilibrium. An inconclusive battleship engagement at Cape Spartivento was followed up by a more decisive battle at Cape Matapan. However, the Italian fleet remained timid. Sensitivity to losses, and a lack of fuel, meant that the Italian fleet suffered from the same issues as the High Seas Fleet of WWI.