My first, and possibly only, book is now on sale. We shall now see just how little demand there is for very dry, highly technical developmental histories of WW2 vehicles, most of which did not see service.

Information [on] Sister Maria is drawn from the two spiritual autobiographies Maria wrote, over eighty letters she wrote to her siblings, a smattering of letters penned by outsiders, and the biography published by her last and favorite confessor.

And that, dear friends, is the difference between the early modern era and the Middle Ages, where information on someone like Hadewijch is drawn from the fact that the texts attributed to her exist so they had to have been written by someone.

I've posted a third episode of my podcast! On mourning dress customs in America, Britain, and France. This is a topic I've been into for a long time, since I came across an 18th century French text discussing mourning stages that were borderline identical to those often described as being invented in the wake of Queen Victoria's desperate grief for Prince Albert. If listening isn't your thing, I posted the transcript to this one on the blog post.

The Navy Records Society recently posted an amazingly bad poem (shades of E J Thribb) written in 1916 to celebrate the Battle of Jutland.

#The Battle of Jutland, 31st May 1916

The fog hung thick o’er Jutland’s Coast,

As Beatty’s ships engaged the Hun,

A portion of our mighty Fleet

Outnumbered two to one.

To hold the foe till help arrived

Their task on that eventful day,

For Jellicoe was hastening on

To join them in the fray.

Outnumbered in that awful fight,

Amidst the storm of shot and shell,

The Lion against the eagle’s might

That harbinger of Hell.

All unafraid they battled on

And coolly kept the foe to grips

Till through the fog appeared the lines

Of British Battleships.

The scale was turned, the Germans fled,

Harrassed and driven back to Kiel,

Battered and torn at every yard

By Britain’s walls of steel.

Our Cruiser fleet had stood the test,

Their duty done, they steamed for home,

Leaving behind fourteen stout ships,

At rest beneath the foam.

Many brave hearts there with them lie,

Their last fight fought, their duty done;

Still many more were lost that day,

A hero every one.

Sadly we laid them all to rest,

In Sailors’ graves beneath the tide;

How well they’d fought for England’s name,

How gloriously they died.

With saddened hearts we mourned their loss,

Though well we knew ‘twas not in vain;

They fought and bled, the world to know,

Britannia rules the main.

Nobly thy fought, bled and died,

For Britain and her glorious name;

Written in blood their names appear,

Inscribed on England’s roll of fame.

The sea their life, the sea their grave,

They died for England, home and glory;

Though now they rest beneath the wave,

Their deeds live on, a deathless story.

It's an interesting look at an aspect of the reaction to the battle that I've not really explored before; that of the wider public. Inside the RN, and inside Britain's government, the battle was seen in much less heroic terms.

I've been reading a lot into the works of Yulia Ivashchenko, who has done a lot of cutting edge research into whaling history. She has featured or authored a number of great pieces in Soviet whaling history, primarily the massive secret catch numbers in the Pacific that were only brought to light by the collapse of the USSR and Ivashchenko's efforts in interviewing and translating Soviet scientists and whalers data and statements. If you're interested in reading into some of the "other" data and revelations that came from the fall of the Soviet Union, do check her work out.

This semester for my MA has been going well. Tough but well. Finally nailed a subject area for my thesis!

I sold my copy of For Want of a Gun: The Sherman Tank Scandal of WWII. I had pretty low expectations going in, which were confirmed, but the straw that broke the camel’s back was this review, and I finally decided that this whale that was taking up about a third of a shelf on my bookshelf needed to go.

I luckily got back basically every penny I spent on it, and picked up the following (all in their original first edition GPO binding and in quite good condition to boot), which will be far, far more useful to me;

• Hershey, Lewis B. Selective Service in Peacetime: First Report of the Director of Selective Service 1940-1941. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942.

• Hershey, Lewis B. Selective Service in Wartime: Second Report of the Director of Selective Service 1941-1942. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943.

• Hershey, Lewis B. Selective Service as the Tide of War Turns: Third Report of the Director of Selective Service 1943-1944. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945.

• Hershey, Lewis B. Selective Service and Victory: Fourth Report of the Director of Selective Service 1944-1945 With a Supplement for 1947-1948. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1948.

How are people liking the short answers threads? Are they doing what their backers intended?

Had a question that's been bothering me, and I can't really find a suitable sub for the discussion. So if anyone has ideas as to where I can post for a meaningful discussion, I'd appreciate it as well as any answers anyone would like to give in this thread.

My question is, what happened to the anti-war movement in the United States? Where did it go? Who/what killed it?

I think this is a great discussion to have on Veterans day, yet I can't find a single article today from the typical MSM that has any kind of counter opinion to why we are involved in global conflicts.

Week 3

By November 9^th the Italian rout had ended. The Army, now behind the line of the Piave river, had managed to stabilize somehow, despite suffering 500,000 casualties in less than three weeks and losing 3,200 big guns, and would go on to stop the further Austrian offensive, which resumed on the 12^th .

I won't deal much with the military operations in the following weeks. So, I think it's best to spend a few words here on the issue of what caused the defeat. We will hear this over and over again in the future; yet, despite the various claims by military and political forces, there was no military strike, no refusal to fight, no sabotage or treason.

Even in those moments, when the shattering of the command line (often the commanders retreated ahead of the troops either to discuss the situation with the High Command or to establish a deeper defensive line) left the troops to their own judgment, their action did not take a political form^1 , except perhaps for very minor episodes. Furthermore, the events of soldiers actually refusing orders during the Austro-German offensive were minimal.

It is in fact a fair assessment that the attitude of the Italian soldiers towards the war – as a whole – had not changed much^2 from the autumn of 1915 to that of 1917. The Italian private betrayed both a latent hostility towards the war effort and a resigned acceptance: war was a misfortune, like a bad harvest, a famine, a sickness: it was bad but the only way out was to suffer and pull it through. This was especially true for the land workers, who made up almost a half of the Italian Army (2,600,000 over 5,750,000 according to A. Serpieri – but suffered most of the casualties, forming the bulk of the infantry forces, so that for example 63% of the 345,000 war orphans were children of land workers), and were a mass of mostly illiterate men, superstitious often, who had no understanding of the purpose of the war, nor cared for the cause of liberalism vs authoritarianism, nor for the freeing of those lands they were fighting on. Many men, respectfully, addressed the issue with their commanding officers, asking why were they fighting there, as that wasn't good land [soil] and wondering what kind of crop could they grow on it.

These men had often accustomed to the war the way an animal gets used to the stick. They suffered plenty and accepted sufferance because it could not be avoided ; so that their only rage came against those who did manage to avoid it: the shirkers. A category that included the qualified industry workers – needed for war production and therefore exonerated from service, or at most employed in safer branches such as artillery or engineers – who became subject to a widespread contempt from the land workers [according to data from the High Command, casualties ratios were around 40% for infantry, against 4% for the other Arms; living conditions were also worse].

Now the men, when left in absence of orders by the retreating commands, just walked the way back home – quietly for the most part – finding the city of Udine, where the High Command used to be, empty, depots on fire, and kept going; many thought the war was over; “the King has fled”, “Cadorna has shot himself”, such voices ran through the retreating troops. The newly deployed regiments were met with incredulity: “why are you still going? The war is over.” But instead of chanting the internazionale, they shouted Viva la pace! Viva il Papa. Viva Giolitti!.

When finally met with their superiors, they managed to recover some degree of discipline; accepting orders meekly^3 , even in large numbers [it must be remembered that these retreating masses included all auxiliary personnel, supply, administration – that for some units made up almost half of the organic – often mixed with civilians along the various converging paths towards the plains; so that even in the presence of commanding officers, it was difficult to keep orderly movements], nor were reported widespread episodes of violence [see for instance G. M. Trevelyan direct testimony]. For example, when a crowd of retreating men who had left their ranks and stripped away their insignia – some carrying small livestock – met the car with the King and the Prime Minister Orlando, they paused to offer their salute to the King.

Another episode, referred by Don G. Minzoni^4 , depicts a soldier who was taking a calf home with him; after his commanding officer forbade him from doing so, he pretended to comply but immediately after he went back and dressed up the calf with helmet and jacket and drove it among the ranks.

Faced with this various testimonies in the following months, even the supporters of the “strike” explanation for Caporetto had to change their views, concluding that “yes, the strike could not have been the only reason”. Nonetheless this narrative spread rapidly in the immediate aftermath of the defeat and affected both the political and public opinion.

According to P. Melograni the “moral” interpretation of Caporetto as a military strike was born out of ignorance of the events but was allowed to spread because many had a personal interest not to look fro the truth: Cadorna and Capello, first and foremost, because it would have forced them to admit their mistakes; the new High Command, because it would have meant admitting Badoglio's responsibilities [these appeared clearly during the inquest, and the report was consequently redacted, omitting those pages, as we may see in the future]; many interventionists, because they would have taken blame away from the neutralists, that they could otherwise point out as responsible for the defeat with their propaganda; many neutralists because they believed that interpretation of the defeat to be evidence of the will for peace of the Italian people.

Of this enough. Back to current business.

On November 4^rd a meeting of the newly appointed Government found an agreement on the replacement of Luigi Cadorna as Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. The General paid the price of both his obstinacy on blaming the defeat on the collapse of the internal front (and therefore on the inadequate action of the Ministry of Interior – Orlando himself) and the mistrust of the French and British allies. The decision was postponed until after the Rapallo meeting (November 5^th and 6^th ) between Prime Minister V.E. Orlando and the French and British representatives, Painlevé and Lloyd George.

This urgent meeting was necessary in light of the situation, made worse with the forcing of the Tagliamento the day before, that had brought L. Bissolati to telegraph to the Prime Minister in these terms: situation worsens rapidly with forcing high Tagliamento by enemy. Will attempt resistance on Piave with few hopes. Believe necessary explain full picture to allies. If they believe their interest to resist need send fifteen more divisions on the Mincio [the allies doubted Italy could resist on the Piave; the Mincio River went from the Garda Lake to the Po, through Peschiera and Mantova, the land where the Wars of Italian Independence had been fought]. Otherwise our Country is open to enemy's will and current Government not adequate to discuss surrender. Must be called into government representatives of those who arranged moral dissolution of the army [he means Giolitti].

In light of the situation, the Ministry of War Alfieri had been sent to the front to get a picture of the state of the army by himself.

Orlando had already obtained from the King his approval to the replacement of Cadorna in their talks on the 28^th of October – an action he might have wanted to postpone until after a normalization of the military situation. Confronted with the explicit mistrust of the allies though – the French and British refused to put their divisions under Cadorna's control – Orlando had to reassure them that: the Italian Government had already agreed on the necessary reorganization of the High Command. As it had been established during the last Council of Ministries, which entrusted him and Sonnino with full powers, in agreement with the War Ministry. […] Yet it was necessary to take into account the difficulty of accomplishing such changes in difficult circumstances. The French and British weren't sold on his reassurances.

It was actually the allies (the British diplomat Maurice Hankey during lunch break) who offered the unresolved Orlando a way to get rid of Cadorna without too much noise; as Cadorna was appointed Italian representative to the Inter-allied Council.

The news reached Cadorna on November 7^th. Despite protestations, he eventually accepted his new role. On the 9^th his replacement was found in lt. General Armando Diaz (former Commander of the XXIII Army Corp, and staff member of Roberto Pollio's Office – who had held the position of Chief of Staff before Cadorna), under suggestion of the Ministry of War Alfieri.

What is the current opinion in scholarship about the Hellenocentrism of the sources that recorded the events happening after the death Alexandros III of Makedonia, The Great King, the King of Kings, King of the Four Corners of the World?

I say this because the sources seem to say offhandedly about the daughter of Artaxerxes III, about the daughter of Dareios III, and about Amastris, the niece of Dareios III.

It is logical that their roles are downplayed, but even so, the only use of royal purple recorded in the sources is done by Krateros. It is also recorded that Phila used the royal purple in 317 BCE or so. Anyone with some knowledge of the marriages of the age might see where I am going.

For starters, it seems that Perdikkas and Roxanne conspired to have murdered these Persian brides of Alexandros. I read it somewhere that one of them might be pregnant and that's why they acted? After all, Roxanne herself was pregnant, so hardly her son would be above the other one in the succession.

Roxanne's marriage was done in a moment of great need. Alexandros needed the marriage to get a loyal following of powerful lords of the Upper Satrapies, at the very least enough to get a great part or at least significant enough faction on his side to have a hope at conquering the rest. I am aware that maybe the fact that Alexandros later married these daughters of the two last kings of the Achaemenid line might be the reason behind the revolt of Spitamenes. This in itself might have prompted the massive wedding to definitely tie fortunes together.

So like this, I also see that Krateros was essentially married to the last heir of the Achaemenid line, Roxanne might have been considered a traitor, and so was Perdikkas. Since we know these things from tertiary sources (Roman sources commenting on Hellenistic sources commenting on the witnesses such as Ptolemy, Aristobolus, Hieronymos, etc) it might be something got lost on the way. After all, the Alexandros told in Roman sources is a moral telling many if not most of the times, so to reduce it to a noble infighting instead of crimes of murder and one party not accepting the charges is plausible or am I looking too much into it?

So this is the thing: How trustworthy is the Roman historiography that we can assure they did not slip up on these details such as Krateros marrying Amastris and then Amastris marrying the Tyrant of Herakleia Pontika and Krateros marrying Phila who would later marry Demetrios, how curious the first family to declare themselves kings? And I am aware of them winning and not being any more royals around, but maybe being royal was also a condition for allowing the army to claim which party they support, though that is a foregone conclusion (I mean, it is their army, how not to support them?) my point is that, the reliability of Roman sources hating all Orientalism. Only Diodoros strikes me as honest and honesty does not mean providence foresight, so...

Anyone have any suggestions on books about mercenaries in general or mercenaries around the Italian wars? Currently I'm reading Mercenaries and their Masters(Really enjoying) and Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns(Not enjoying as much, but it's still quite good)

I've come across a few Medal of Honor recipients with very vague citations. Is there a place to search to find more detailed information on their actions that warranted the honor? I've tried the official CMOHS.org site to no avail.

Just finished watching Assassin's Creed and wondering about any good books to read to learn more about that Spanish Inquisition time period.

Seems wicked.