Like most questions in this vein the answer is sorta both yes and no. The USN by June of 1942 was getting proficient enough to get lucky, and the IJN was limited enough to get unlucky.

The battle represented the first time that Japan's supreme raiding force, represented by the Kido Butai, was faced with striking an enemy position that was prepared for its coming, and an enemy force at sea that could at least offer rough numerical parity. While of course for the USN it represented just the second time it gave battle with multiple carriers in play on the field, and the first where it had a strong advantage in intelligence and could better prepare the ground as it were.

But the flaws that would prove so catastrophic for Nagumo, namely the low priority given to scouting from the air wing and a hands off almost organic management of the CAP, were both in evidence to astute observers well before. In particular RAF bombers had been able to appear in the open almost on top of the force during the Indian Ocean Raid. And at Coral Sea the 5th CarDiv made almost a farce of it. Most famously a pilot at one point identified the Oiler Neosho and her escorting destroyer as a USN carrier task force. While CAP above the task force did little to stop piecemeal USN attacks on the force through intermittent cloud and squalls, though a heavy price was extracted after their bombing runs, especially on the SBD's.

While there are also moments of staggering unluckiness on the USN side which could have still rescued the day and indeed did add to the toll extracted by the IJN. First is the incredibly disappointing leadership by Admiral Mitscher, Commander Ring, and the rest of the leadership aboard Hornet, leading to Commander Waldron of VT-8's virtual mutiny once in the air, and 50% of the HAG being lost being lost for virtual no damage inflicted. Including several ditched VF pilots who were never seen again. Several explanations for Ring's flight plan have emerged over the years, and a debate of sorts over the actual course he flew, though the most convincing is that acting on the assumption by most USN leadership at the time Mitscher and Ring elected to aim further North for the assumed 2nd IJN carrier force while Enterprise and then Yorktown would attack the one already spotted(as the theory was that the IJN preferred to operate in 2-3 carrier groups separated by a large distance and had been backed up by experiences at Coral Sea). Other errors and mishaps also plagued the USN in the battle. TF-16 was slow in getting both air groups aloft and due to a lack of time the recommendation for a running rendezvous hadnt filtered over from Yorktown so precious time and fuel was spent during the hour it took for the other carriers to get their birds in the air. While after the battle it was a feat of skill and good instincts that allowed I-168 to emerge in position to finish off Yorktown. While McClusky's mishandling of VB/S-6 nearly allowed Akagi to go unmolested if LT Best hadnt managed one of the most well placed dive bombing runs of the war with his 2 wingmen.

While we have other instances off the USN demonstrably having become more proficient in their operations which had little to do with luck. First we should point to Yorktown's conduct in the battle as the most experienced of the carriers present. Even in Arashi hadnt been sighted Kido Butai would have come under attack which would at the very least have delayed for another hour or so any organized attacks on the USN force. Yorktown's air group had launched after the recovery of her morning search and was the only force that manged to stay coherent for the flight meaning her VB and VT squadrons attacked roughly together and would still have arrived at varying altitudes, and in a wholly different sector from the previous VT-8, and VT-6, and the Midway based attacks. Even accounting for just the Soryu would have done much to disrupt Nagumo's plans and allowed the battle to continue at roughly a draw, while Yorktown would still have been in the unfortunate position to draw the brunt of repeated IJN attacks as there was never a very clear picture of the disposition of the US forces on Akagi's bridge.

The results were very much the conclusion of trends in the 6 months of war to date, the IJN had met with virtually nothing but success and were unmotivated to be heavily critical of their approach, while the USN had gone through a painful learning process which had begun to produce forces capable of taking advantage of opportunities in battle and fighting their ships and aircraft to their fullest.

Shattered Sword by Parshall and Tully

The First team by John Lundstrom

Miracle at Midway by Gordon Prange

Pacific Crucible by Ian W Toll

Office of Naval Intelligence Narrative of the battle first disseminated in 1943.

USNI piece of the Hornet Air Group controversy and presumed cover-up.