From the Japanese side of things...

Japanese plans for combat in the Dutch East Indies Operation classified enemy naval threat potential in their September 1941 report to the Emperor as follows:

US Asiatic Fleet: 4 Carriers, 2 Cruisers, 14 Destroyers, 17 Submarines
US Pacific Fleet: 7 Carriers, 7 Battleships, 18 Cruisers, 46 Destroyers, 28 Submarines
Dutch East Indies: 5 Cruisers, 8 Destroyers, 19 Submarines
British China and East Indies Fleets: 2 Carriers, 2 Battleships, 27 Cruisers, 15-16 Destroyers, and 1 Submarine

It should be noted that the count of aircraft carriers includes things like seaplane tenders such as USS Langley, so this analysis somewhat overstated the threat.

This analysis was fairly accurate with regards to the US Asiatic Fleet, although it understated the US Submarine threat somewhat.

Japanese anticipated countermeasures were to launch strikes on Davao and the Cavite Navy Yard in order to knock out as much of the Asiatic Fleet as possible. However as the main carrier strike force (The First Air Fleet) was planned for the Pearl Harbor attack, these attacks were made primarily by aircraft from Taiwan as well as some naval aviation (Davao was struck by aircraft from the light aircraft carrier Ryuujo). However these attacks did relatively light damage. Only one ship was in Davao at the time and it was able to escape. The raid on Cavite Naval Yard did manage to destroy a good amount of the US submarine torpedoes in storage, as well as sinking the submarine Sealion, but for the most part the Asiatic Fleet at this time was relatively intact. However the fact that they had lost many of their torpedoes combined with poor commander ability (on top of the fact that the contemporary US torpedoes had a high dud rate) resulted in ineffectual US submarine operations in the early stages of the war.

The air raids did show however that the operating bases of the US Asiatic Fleet were vulnerable to air raids that were thought to be out of operating range. In fact they were, most of the aircraft had only gotten to this point by stripping them bare and equipping them with auxiliary fuel tanks in order to extend their range. As a result the Asiatic Fleet withdrew towards Australia, aside from some of the surface ships which redeployed to the Dutch East Indies to join an Anglo-Dutch force that would later participate in the Battle of the Java Sea. During this withdrawal many ships came under Japanese attack and some were sunk or forced to be scuttled by damage.

The combined force of British, Dutch, and American ships (or ABDA, American-British-Dutch-Australia) was quite a strong surface component, but it suffered several major issues. The Dutch commander was relatively new to the position as the previous commander (who spoke English fluently and worked closely with the Royal Navy) had been killed in a plane crash shortly before the war. The Americans for their part were not as integrated as the British and Dutch were, either, and as such this large force of 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers suffered from serious coordination issues that would prove to be their downfall.

The Japanese had been keeping track of the operations of the ABDA fleet for some time, as this "strong surface group" was inhibiting the invasion of their primary objective of Java. Army aircraft had more or less destroyed the Allied air presence in the area (though the Dutch fought back quite hard) and so the Japanese were able to keep note that there were a good amount of cruisers and destroyers in Batavia's port. However the Japanese were also on a very tight invasion timetable and so their invasion convoy and escorts frittered around back and forth until the decision was made to draw the Allied fleet into battle using the convoy essentially as bait. This almost led to disaster as the heavy cruisers that constituted most of the Japanese surface firepower were separated from the convoy and nearly were out of range to participate in the battle. However Allied vacilation, presumably due to either poor coordination or fear of naval air strikes caused them to delay their advance and allowed the Japanese to consolidate their forces.

While Japanese ships suffered from worse gunnery than Allied ships, they were equipped with the Long Lance torpedo. Japanese plans were to dash close to the Allied ships and release a torpedo volley to minimize the Allied gunfire advantage. In reality, the Japanese torpedoes were extremely inaccurate, scoring one hit from a volley of over 90 torpedoes. However the significant Japanese resistance, combined with the presence of mines (which also claimed a British destroyer), allowed the escort fleet to protect the convoy from attack, until the heavier ships arrived and in an long engagement managed to sink two Dutch light cruisers.

However most of the remaining Allied ships, including most of the American ships, had managed to escape. However with the fleet in disorder it was unable to offer much effective resistance. Two cruisers, the USS Houston and HMS Perth, ran into a surprised Japanese convoy in the process of unloading, but failed to deal significant damage, most Japanese losses probably being caused by panicked destroyers firing torpedoes. A good amount of other ships, such as the USS Pope and USS Langley, were sunk by air attack in their escape to Australia. 4 destroyers did manage to make it back, but for all intents and purposes the Allied naval force in the Dutch East Indies had been destroyed.

Sources:

The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, National Defense College of Japan

Japanese Destroyer Captain, Tameichi Hara

Many of the surface ships of the US Asiatic Fleet were destroyed by superior Japanese air and sea power in a series of battles in the Dutch East Indies (DEI, now Indonesia), along with British, Dutch and Australian ships in the region. The Asiatic Fleet became a significant part of the multinational ABDACom (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command), which was tasked with defending the 'Malay Barrier', a notional defence line running down the Malay peninsula, and through Sumatra and Java to Australia.

The Asiatic Fleet's commander was Admiral Thomas Hart. Hart's main surface combat power was embodied by its two cruisers, the heavy cruiser Houston and light cruiser Marblehead. They were supported by thirteen old Clemson class destroyers. It also had a significant non-combatant force, with four seaplane tenders (including the Langley, converted to a seaplane tender from the USN's first carrier), six minesweepers, two oilers and a destroyer tender. It also had five gunboats and a number of PT boats for protecting the Philippine coast. The Asiatic Fleet also had 29 submarines and three submarine tenders, though few of these were lost.

At the start of the war, much of the Asiatic Fleet had been dispersed to bases around the Philippines and DEI. Hart wished to protect his links to British and Dutch forces in the area, in the event of a surprise attack. With the declaration of war and Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Hart's force withdrew to link up with British and Dutch naval forces. The forces that would become ABDA faced little challenge in December 1941 and early January 1942 - the Japanese were invading the northern coast of Borneo, outside their defensive perimeter. With this conquest complete, the IJN began operations against the eastern coast of the island, capturing the airfield and oil field at Tarakan on the 11th January 1942. ABDA was formed shortly afterwards, though discussions had been ongoing since the start of the war. Allowing the Japanese to capture any bases closer to Java than Tarakan would allow them to base aircraft within range of Java, effectively neutralising ABDA's fleet. To this end, four American destroyers were dispatched to intervene in the Japanese invasion of Balikpapan on the 24th January. The destroyers, aided by Japanese confusion over a possible submarine attack, engaged the transports, sinking four and a patrol boat. However, they failed to prevent the Japanese from landing troops. This limited success encouraged further action.

On the 1st of February, air reconnaissance of Balikpapan Harbour indicated that the Japanese were gathering ships and troops for a further invasion. In this case, the target was the town of Makassar on the island of Celebes. ABDA, under the command of the Dutch admiral Karel Doorman, sortied in strength to engage this force. Four cruisers (two Dutch and the two American cruisers) and seven destroyers sailed on the 3rd February, hoping to carry out a night attack on the invasion force. This required them to transit in daytime, a risk when travelling through waters covered by Japanese aircraft. On the 3rd, the fleet was sighted by Japanese aircraft, but not attacked. The next day, they were attacked by Japanese bombers. Marblehead took two hits and one near miss, heavily damaging her. Houston took one hit, knocking out her after Y turret. The Allied fleet withdrew to cover the damaged ships, which returned to Java for repairs. Neither ship would be fully repairable on the island - Marblehead was withdrawn to the US through the Indian Ocean, while Houston remained in service, albeit with only six of her nine guns active.

The next battle came on the night of the 19th-20th February, following Japanese landings on Bali. The invasion convoy had been attacked by Allied aircraft, with a single transport damaged; as a result, it began to withdraw back to the north. ABDA had been caught unawares by the landings, so the naval attack was more piecemeal. Two separate groups attacked the invasion force in the Bandung Strait. The first, with the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter and Java, two American destroyers and one Dutch destroyer, did little damage. The Allied ships had little experience or training in night-fighting, while the Japanese had carried out much more training in in pre-war. The Japanese used this experience to score a torpedo hit on the Dutch destroyer Piet Hein, sinking her. The next force to engage had the Dutch cruiser Tromp and four USN destroyers. They did slightly more damage, damaging three destroyers, but Japanese gunfire heavily damaged Tromp and the destroyer Stewart.

While this is mostly focused on the battles taking place during early 1942, there were also a number of Japanese attacks against Allied shipping routes during this period. On the 19th February, four Japanese carriers carried out a massive bombing raid on the Australian port of Darwin. The destroyer Peary, part of the Asiatic Fleet, was sunk during this attack. On the 27th February, Langley was part of a convoy shipping P-40 fighters to Java. This came under attack by Japanese bombers, with Langley taking multiple hits and ultimately sinking. The oiler Pecos, also part of this convoy, would be sunk by aircraft from the carrier Soryu on the 1st March.

At the same time as Langley was sinking, the climactic battle for ABDA was taking place. The Japanese had been gathering forces to land on Java, with its major naval bases. Losing the island would spell the end for the Allied defence of the Malay barrier. ABDA gathered its strength, and, on the 27th, attempted to strike against Japanese invasion convoys in the Java Sea. ABDA had two heavy cruisers (Houston and the British Exeter), three light cruisers (De Ruyter, Java and the Australian Perth), and nine destroyers (three British, four American and two Dutch). The battle was a confused whirl of attacks by the ABDA forces, hoping to break through the Japanese escorts to the invasion convoys. During the first engagement, Exeter took a shell hit to one of her boiler rooms, crippling her, while no damage was done to the Japanese fleet. The Japanese followed this up with a massive torpedo attack, sinking the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer. In an attempt to cover Exeter's retreat, the British destroyer Electra engaged a Japanese light cruiser and destroyer, successfully buying time and damaging the destroyer, but at the cost of the ship herself. The four American destroyers laid a smokescreen and made a torpedo attack to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the fleet. This had little effect, as did Japanese fire on them. Following this, the destroyers withdrew to the port of Surabaya. At 9:25 pm, the British destroyer Jupiter was sunk by a mine, while Encounter was dispatched to rescue survivors. Shortly afterwards, the remainder of the ABDA force, now just four cruisers, reengaged the Japanese force in a night engagement. The two Dutch cruisers were sunk by torpedo hits, while Perth and Houston survived to withdraw. In the next few days, there were two more battles as the remaining Allied ships attempted to flee from Java following the Japanese invasion. Perth and Houston were sunk in a night action in the Sunda Strait on the 1st March (in which two Japanese ships were sunk by friendly fire). Exeter and Encounter were sunk by Japanese surface ships in the Java Sea in the morning of the 1st March, while the American destroyer Pope, accompanying them, escaped but was sunk by aircraft a few hours later. The destroyers Pillsbury and Edsall, and the gunboat Asheville encountered a strong Japanese surface force in the Java Sea at about the same time, with all three being sunk. Stewart was scuttled on Java, as she had not been sufficiently repaired from the damage she had sustained in the Bandung Strait. She would later be salvaged by the Japanese, and operated as a patrol boat, PB-102

Some of the Asiatic Fleet ships had remained in the Philippines to support the Army's operations or submarine operations there. Many of these ships were scuttled or sunk by Japanese aircraft during the final stages of the battles in the Philippines. While none of them really represented a significant part of Asiatic Fleet's combat strength, they were numerous. Six PT boats, four minesweepers, three gunboats, a tug and the submarine tender Canopus were lost in the Philippines.

As you've gotten by and large a great rundown of the actual events I wanted to just spend a bit of time laying out the context. And how while not as successful as hoped, the Asiatic Fleet actually did what it was expected to do, sell itself as dearly as possible and serve as a speed bump to slow Japanese advances.

By 1941 USN war plans envisioned no speedy relief for forward positions like Wake, Guam, or the Philippines. The fleet would need months to mobilize, induct reservists, bring all available ships up to strength, and concentrate into a useful force. Until that happened, maybe as long as 6 months, the main body was not expected to go much past Hawaii or certainly beyond the date line. Only initially limited actions such as a raid on the Mandate islands were pictured. In order to shake off the rust, test the fleet, keep morale up, and prick Japan. But the requisite fleet train and amphibious capabilities couldn't be conjured overnight.

And while earlier versions of War Plan ORANGE had envisioned a faster relief, early establishment of a forward anchorage in the Philippines and fighting the war from there forward, such ideas were accepted as unworkable by 1941. As by then Pacific strategy also had to fit into the global 'Germany First' context. And while some versions of the plan suggested a Flying Column of faster ships including a carrier perhaps, could be sent to the area by way of Australia this too was given up on despite encouragement by the British on this front.

So the idea, despite different understandings across branches, was that the island bases should be fortified to defend themselves as long as possible now that war appeared imminent and arms build ups in full force. They might survive until relief or evacuation as the fighting evolved, or at least buy more time.

While this is reflected in the assets allocated to the Asiatic Fleet. A few divisions of old flush deck destroyers of WW1 vintage. While the Clemson class gave reliable service in many roles they were simply outgunned by more modern designs. But the USN had over 120 of them still and could afford to trade them to Britain, or use for backwater posts and guard ships along with numerous conversions. Similar story with the multiple older submarines present. Same story with the fleet train, older tenders, slower replenishment ships, and converted craft like the mentioned Langley. While older designs were in service everywhere, more important bases and formations we're seeing newer and more efficient classes enter service as part of the build up.

While the teeth if the force, or at least what they had, was in the handful of cruisers. And even here it isn't much, the fleet regularly rotating out one or two of the early generation Treaty compliant Heavy Cruises which were fine but not all together happy compromise designs as the main surface assets and flagship. A cruiser would be refit in California, come out to the Far East, cruise around showing the flag for maybe 2 years then be relieved by the next one. While the Houston's partner in the light cruiser Marblehead was an even older Omaha class from the 20s. The first US attempt at a modern cruiser, they were cramped, inefficient, over stressed design with a poor gun layout to boot. By 1941 they were used for backwaters, secondary tasks, or leading destroyer formations to host the additional staff, but were very much a step or more behind their newer cousins.

The USN didn't expect much of the force besides slowing down the IJN some, hopefully in conjunction with allies, maybe for so long relief might arrive or the war would end. But it was there mostly to show the flag and presence while supporting local security in peacetime, and was outfitted accordingly.