The Focke-Wulf first tendered its proposal to the Techinischen Amt of RLM for a radial-engined fighter in spring of 1938, less than a year after the Bf 109 B had entered into Luftwaffe service. This might look odd given both the bottlenecks of German aviation production and qualities of the initial 109 subtypes. But awarding the Focke Wulf company a contract was fairly a normal practice for aviation in this era. The 190 was the byproduct of two facets of German aircraft development and procurement that worked to reinforce each other.

One of the cliches in aircraft design circles that developed in the immediate postwar period was that as soon as a prototype flies, designers have to start work on its replacement. This was a trend that stretched back into the interwar years as aviation technology advanced at a breakneck pace. For example, the Luftwaffe's first major fighter, the biplane He-51, could barely scrape by at speeds of 200 mph while its successor, the monoplane BF-109B, could operate at speeds in the 300 mph range. This was a trend all air arms noted and it soon became apparent that procurement would not only have to allow for updates to existing aircraft but the development of new types to stay globally competitive.

This was one of the boons for Kurt Tank and his crew at Focke-Wulf. Although their FW 159 tender for RLM's fighter order had lost out to Messerschmitt's 109, they were still in the game. Although there were proponents of a single standard fighter within RLM, most notably Ernst Udet, a number within the air ministry recognized that it was too dangerous to stake all future development on one aircraft type. Focke-Wulf had already been working on the design of a radial-engined fighter that would be more rugged than the 109. RLM then authorized the construction of three prototypes with a premium placed on ruggedness, the ability to be maintained in the field, and ease of subcontracting. The Techinischen Amt's go-ahead for Tank's design was aided by a demonstration of a captured Soviet Polikarpov I-16 from Spain at Rechlin in 1938 in which the radial-engined fighter demonstrated greater maneuverability than the more sophisticated 109 in mock dogfights. As Rudiger Kosin later recalled, the general impression among RLM over the I-16 was "something like this needs to be translated into German," ie with German technical standards. Even Udet came around to supporting the 190 program as it became clear that this would be an important aircraft for the upcoming war.

The second factor working in Focke-Wulf's favor were the bottlenecks in production of the DB 600 series of engines. The DB 600 series was a remarkable inline engine, but also one that was mechanically complex and difficult to mass-produce. its crankshaft in particular had to be machined to fine tolerances (this was one of several reasons why Japanese licensed production of the DB series never could equal the German engines). While the 109 was certainly a fine fighter, both it an the BF-110 increasingly hogged up the production of the DBs. This was already having an impact on bomber production, with the He-111s having to ditch their DBs for the lower-powered Jumo 211s. Tank made it clear with his 190 tender that Germany could have a slightly more modern fighter that would use BMW radial that were far more easy to manufacture. Tank also argued that his team could work to minimize the drag penalties inherent to an air-cooled engine giving the plane the same performance as in-line fighters whose noses could be aerodynamically streamlined. The development was not straightforward from 1938 though; some of Tank's ducted-streamlining turned out to be less than ideal and the planned BMW powerplant, the BMW 139 ran quite hot with test pilots complaining of excessive engine heat in the cockpit.

The Messerschmitt company did not necessarily like Focke-Wulf poaching on its own turf and argued that existing development of the 109 could fill the roles the 190 would. However, Tank had earned a powerful patron in the form of Hermann Göring who saw a prototype flight of the 801-engined 190 and came away quite impressed. It also did not help Messerchmitt's case that Willy Messerschmitt had an abrasive personality that earned him a degree of enemies within RLM. The emerging problems in the 210 program likewise encouraged RLM to begin looking to alternatives to the Augsburg company.

Furthermore, it soon became clear in 1940 that the 109 had some serious problems in terms of its long-term viability as a frontline fighter. The Battle of Britain had exposed its range limitations and there were increasing problems with both maintenance of the DBs and the 109's landing characteristics left much to be desired. Tank's fighter was very much something the 109 was not. Its wide-track undercarriage was suitable for frontline conditions and the BMW engine could be mass-produced and maintained in the field. The heavy-armament of the 190 was also better suited for some of the envisioned roles for German fighters from the vantage point of 1940. It could not only be a frontline fighter, it also had hardpoints for bombs or auxiliary gun packs. The only area in which the 109 clearly excelled over the 190 was its high-altitude performance above 25000 feet. This initially was not such an advantage, but the advent of American bombers with their superchargers meant that the 109 had a new mission.

In hindsight, splitting production between Messerschmitt and Focke-Wulf might look foolhardy given the problems of German industry in meeting its target goals for production. But this critique misses one of the reasons why RLM turned to Focke-Wulf in the first place. German industry could not develop the 109 and its engines in numbers needed and there were serious doubts that Messerchmitt's fighter could remain competitive after 1941. These latter doubts were confirmed by subsequent 109 development. The 109 arguably peaked with the 1941 F model and the subsequent G and K models had major problems with engine overheating, sluggish controls, and Messerschmitt's design bureau could not counteract the deleterious effect of weight growth on performance. So RLM's 1937 decision to allow Tank to proceed with his design proved to be a wise bet.

Sources

Green, William. The Warplanes of the Third Reich. London: Macdonald, 1972.

Kosin, Rüdiger. The German Fighter Since 1915. London: Putnam & Company Limited, 1988.