During the course of World War 1, the British promised the area known as Palestine to many different people: to the Hashimites in Mecca, to the Saudis in Arabia, to the Zionists in the Balfour Declaration, and finally to themselves in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. I can understand why they promised it to the Saudis and the Hashimites- they wanted them to undermine Ottoman power by opening up a second front, and the easiest way to get the Hashimites and Saudis to do that was to promise them more land at the end of the war. And the Sykes-Picot Agreement makes sense, because it was a continuation of Britain's empire-building project. But I don't understand what benefit Britain got by issuing the Balfour Declaration. The Jews weren't a significant force in the region, and they weren't a global power. Why did Lord Balfour think appeasing Zionist interests was important enough to anger his erstwhile Hashimite and Saudi allies?
Hi there,
There are a couple of things I'd like to correct in this before we discuss further the motivations of Lord Balfour. First of all, the Hashemites you describe as being in Mecca were not promised the area. Furthermore, you differentiate between the Hashemites in Mecca and the Saudis in Arabia. The Hashemites were the ones reportedly promised the area in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondences between Hussein bin Ali (Sharif of Mecca, and a Hashemite) and Sir Henry McMahon.
It was in 1924 that the Saudis (Ibn Saud) overthrew the Hashemites and established Saudi Arabia. The British did not promise them the area at hand.
Secondly, it is worth noting that there is significant dispute over whether or not the British actually did promise the area known as Palestine/Israel to the Hashemites. Certainly Hussein argued that they did, but the British seemed to use some sleight of hand and wordplay to their advantage in refusing to acknowledge that interpretation. Whether it was misunderstanding or duplicity, you are correct that the motivation was ultimately to undermine the Ottomans.
It's also worth noting that Sykes-Picot did not entirely promise the area to themselves, either. Sykes-Picot proposed primarily the southern portion of the area to the British zone of influence, while the northern half (including Jerusalem) was set to be an international area. This was meant to make the French more comfortable, of course, with the arrangement.
With that out of the way, let's discuss the question. First and foremost, it was not solely Lord Balfour's decision. Balfour was Foreign Secretary, but the decision of the Declaration was made by the British War Cabinet. It was the Cabinet that decided the ultimate text that was sent out by Lord Balfour. Since you've asked specifically about Lord Balfour, however, I'll discuss that.
The motivations of Lord Balfour were multi-fold:
He had an admiration for Jews. He said, for example, that Jews are "exceedingly clever people who in spite of their oppression achieved a certain success which excited the jealousy and envy of the peoples among whom they lived." This, of course, also recognized Jews as a people, which was a precursor to the idea that they are a nation deserving of a state, so to speak.
His second, and perhaps most important motivation was his belief that Jews needed a state as a place to live freely and in peace. He was a sincere believer in the idea that a Jewish state was the best way to handle anti-Semitism, by providing Jews with the ability to have a state of their own to protect themselves.
What was perhaps the only other contender for most important reason is the third: the question of Jewish support for the war effort. Balfour was quoted a few good times as saying that Zionism was popular among American and Russian Jews, and should be acknowledged as such, and would make very good headlines in support of the British in WWI. He also noted, at least once, that the Germans were also courting the Zionist leadership, which worried him. This, coupled with this genuine belief in the morality of it, was more important than the risk of angering the Arab allies at the moment of the war, when it was already fairly late in their joining with the British and when the Arab forces were fighting for far more than just that one area (the McMahon Correspondences related to Arab sovereignty in much of the Middle East, not just the area of Israel/Palestine). It was a calculated risk for Balfour, in that case.