Before addressing surface combatants' anti air capabilities one thing I would say right off the bat is that the opening of the war emphasized that you could almost never have enough fighters with you.

And we see throughout 1942 an ongoing push to increase the number of fighters embarked aboard USN carriers. The simple reason being that intercepting with other aircraft was the surest way to defend a task force from air attack, and the calls on a fighting squadrons time were numerous. Each carrier's fighting squadron had to provide CAP over the task force on a rotational basis, and ideally provide escorts to any outbound strike lest those planes be slaughtered, and could not be guaranteed of being at full strength when called upon as wear and tear and maintenance needs never ceased.

Over the first two years of the war Fighting Squadron size went from between 12-16 aircraft at the start of the war, to 18-21 by the middle of 1942, 21-24 by 1943, and even into the low 30's on some carriers as new types of fighters allowed for a more multirole mission along with increases in range and fighting performance of the VF squadrons. And we see this in how fighter operations were handled through the first year of the war, at the Coral Sea and Midway a bare minimum was able to be provided for escorts to outbound strikes. By the landings on Guadalcanal that August and the carrier battles that Fall CV's began to carry enough aircraft to start doing justice to both missions instead of prioritizing as severely(and really in 3 ways as it was almost impossible to satisfactorily support both Dive and Torpedo bombers with one group of escort fighters). The experiences through 1942 also reinforced the need for a coordinated, well run, radar augmented fighter direction scheme, allowing for CAP aircraft to be directed at a useful range by ship based controllers using established radio channels to maintain clear communications both ways. This is in contrast to the IJN scheme of basically trusting the aircraft aloft to stay sharp and surface combatants to contribute as possible with shells fired into the water or smoke as a signal.

The need for more fighters also drove the development of new models as well, most specifically the F4F-4 Wildcat which added folding wings to allow for more to be stored without adding additional space aboard the carrier. The aircraft was not universally liked as pilots didn't like adding 2 more guns but not additional ammo belts but that change was made mostly to appease and keep uniformity with the British.

The first year of the war brought great debate and changes in other areas as well. Notably a large debate emerged about the dispersal or concentration of individual carrier task forces. Pre war doctrine envisioned carriers that would coordinate but operate just over the horizon from each other so that an attack on one might not endanger the other. However this dispersed defensive strength as well. The 4 great carrier battles of 1942(Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz) were all fought like this. But some admirals began to push for a combined screen and force, to better support coordination and defense, notable Fletcher and Ted Sherman were early supporters of this, and the carrier support of the landings on Guadalcanal saw 3 carriers operating as one for an entire day as a proof of concept. However it would take the coming of the new Essex class ships in 1943 and the rising of experienced leadership to all ranks to fully implement the concept.