Yes, this is true to an extent, but the numbers can be exaggerated depending on who is recruiting or who is accepted into the Ba'ath party. Lets first take a look at what the Iraqi Ba'athist party represent. Since the rise of the Ba'ath party in the 1950s, the party was committed to the construction of a "unified Arab socialist society."^1 It was also elitist in character. The circle of organized supporters (rather inactive Ba'athist members) were no fewer than 500,000 in 1976, while "active members" is highly exclusive forms scarcely more than 10,000.^2 Naturally, before attaining "active membership," inferior Ba'athists have to go through a course of training at the School for Party Preparation.

The centralization of power by the Ba'ath party had taken shape by 1974. The smallest unit in the party was the party cell (khaliyya), composed between three to seven members. These cells functioned on the neighborhood level where they meet to discuss and carry out party directives. Next on the ladder was the party division (firqa), made up of several cells operating in small urban areas or villages. These divisions functioned as the party's eyes and ears. Above this was the section (shu'ba), composed of two to five divisions. A section usually has jurisdiction over a territory the size of a large city quarter or a county. A branch (far'), composed of at least two sections, operated at the provincial level. The Regional Command, elected by the party's congress, operated at the national level. Above the Regional Command is the National Command headed by a secretary-general. The Regional Command developed the ideological agenda for Iraq, while the National Command connected the Iraqi party to its allies in other Arab countries.^3

Here are some charts displaying the diversity of the command chain in the Iraqi Ba'ath party, taken from Hanna Batatu. "The old social classes and the revolutionary movements of Iraq : a study of Iraq's old landed and commercial classes and of its Communists, Baʻthists, and Free Officers." New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1978. Pg. 1080-1082

1. Religious, Sect, Origin 2. Education, Sex, Age 3. Class, Occupation

The active members paid careful attention to the recruitment and indoctrination of party members. Potential recruits were known as party "friends" and "supporters" but technically were not inside the party ranks. Candidates to become active members were required to undergo a long probationary period, taking anywhere between five to eight years. During this time, candidates would perform party tasks under careful supervision and attend party seminars and courses before admission to the party. By the early 1980s, according to official party sources, full members numbered 25,000; followers, about 1.5 million.^4

What was important to the Iraqi government was not the active membership into the Ba'ath party, but the surrounding security apparatus that formed the state police and military governed under the Ba'ath. To ensure an coup-deterrent system, these security institutions became an elaborate network that intertwined with other non-security state institutions. Under Saddam Hussein, he increasingly brought the security institutions under his control. The development and role of security institutions became understandably murky as it was designed to watch not only the people but each other. The intertwined network included the Public Security Directorate (Amn al-Amm), the "official" government organization responsible for criminal investigation, traditionally attached to the Ministry of Interior; the General Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat al-Amma), in charge of watching party and non-party political activities at home and abroad; Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat Askariyya), responsible to collect data on foreign military threats, ensuring the loyalty of Iraq's officer corps and the party's Military Bureau, in charge of security in the military.

  Endnotes

1. Iraq, "Speech of the Leader-President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr on the Anniversary of the 14 and 17 July Revolutions". Baghdad, 1975. Pg. 9.

2. This figure comprises the members of such auxiliary organizations of the Ba'ath party as the "People's Army," the Students' Union, the Peasants' Associations, the Federation of Labor Unions, and so on. Even Ba'athists admit that a large proportion of their "supporters" are "opportunists" and could not be relied upon in a moment of crisis.

3. Phebe Marr. "The Modern History of Iraq". Westview Press. 2011. Pg. 225-26.

4. Abd al-Jabbar, "The State, Civil Society, and Democratic Transformation." Pg. 80. The Economist. London. 1978. Pg. 78-79.