The experience of PQ 18 shows that there is more to using a weapon than just having it available.

PQ 18 was an arctic convoy in September 1942 that was attacked by 35 dive bombers and 42 torpedo bombers off the north coast of Norway. This convoy was the first to be accompanied by an escort carrier (HMS Avenger) in addition to the more typical cruiser plus destroyer screen.

The Germans attacked over multiple days, leading off with dive bombers followed by a "golden comb" attack in which the torpedo bombers all approached in parallel. The standard defense of a ship against a torpedo already in the water is to turn toward it, presenting a smaller target which is easier against multiple parallel torpedos compared to the case where the torpedoes are on crossing paths. This type of attack also prevents the torpedo bombers from taking evasive action while approaching which led to most of the bomber suffering some damage and at least five were shot down. If the attack had been concentrated against the carrier from multiple directions it may have been more effective in the long run.

Another problem was that the torpedo bombers attacked with no fighter cover. The typical mix of an attack wave in the Pacific carrier battles contained roughly equal numbers of fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo bombers. If the Germans had been able to provide any fighter coverage at all it would have made the attacks of the second day much more effective. The Avenger set sail with just ten fighters so it would not have taken many land based fighters to keep them busy. Instead, the second day attack with 22 torpedo bombers was only able to get two torpedoes launched as just three fighters and AA fire countered the attack.

In the end, the convoy lost about a quarter of its merchant ships, while the torpedo arm lost about 2/3 of its planes. If the attack tactics and composition had more closely matched those in the Pacific it would have been much more effective.

The Germans did deploy a number of torpedo bombers. The Luftwaffe entered the war using the He 115 seaplane in the role. Later in the war, a number of aircraft, including the He 111, Do 17, Ju 88 and Fw 190 were converted to torpedo bombers. However, none of these were truly effective, or able in sufficient numbers to counteract British and Allied naval supremacy. The He 115 was slow and vulnerable to fighters and AA defences. The He 111, Do 17 and Ju 88 were all designed as high level bombers, and were comparatively large, slow targets when used in the torpedo-bombing role. The Fw 190 was more useful as a fighter than as a torpedo bomber.

Two main factors explain the German failure to focus on torpedo bombers. Probably the most important is the inter-service rivalry that existed between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. Until 1938, naval aviation had been the preserve of the Kriegsmarine. In that year, Goering laid claim to all naval air operations, spurred on by a desire to gain the prestige that would come with the launch of the Graf Zeppelin. While the Luftwaffe thus had control over all aspects of naval aviation, there was little interest in it from the organisation and its leadership. They were more focused on building fighters, ground attack aircraft and medium bombers, to fulfil their own goals. As such, they were unwilling to divert resources to build naval support aircraft. Similarly, few Luftwaffe crews were trained in attacking ships or in navigation at sea, meaning there was a limited experience base for a torpedo bomber force. Further complicating matters was the fact that the Kriegsmarine retained much of the responsibility for designing, testing and constructing torpedoes. The Kriegsmarine was unwilling to share these resources with the Luftwaffe, especially since the Luftwaffe did not seem to be cooperative with the Kriegsmarine in turn.

The other important factor is the fact that the aircraft already possessed by the Luftwaffe were capable of doing damage to ships. The Luftwaffe had a considerable force of dive-bombers, quite effective at attacking ships. While dive-bombers could not effectively sink battleships, they posed a major threat to aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers. While the Luftwaffe did poorly in the North Sea and off Dunkirk in 1940, they posed a major threat to British shipping in the Mediterranean in 1941 and onwards. Off Crete in 1941, the RN lost three cruisers and four destroyers to German dive bombers. Many other British ships would be lost to or damaged by German aircraft in the Mediterranean. They also posed a threat to Soviet operations in the Baltic and Black Sea.