Rather fewer high ranking Japanese officers survived the war, compared to Germany. Not to mention, post-war Japan lacked the bedrock of generalized interest in military history academia that Europe has. A surprising number of the Wehrmacht's officers and the general staff came from scholarly backgrounds.

This enabled them to produce superior retrospective accounts, such as compiled in:

https://books.google.com/books?id=AQJny3H51ZQC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

By contrast, most leading Japanese military planners such as Hideki Tojo and almost the entirety of the upper ranks of the Ministry of War, were either executed or committed suicide after the war. A few, like Count Hisaichi Terauchi died shortly after imprisonment owing to health failure.

Others, owing to the nature of island warfare that turned each battle into a 'last stand' for the defenders, were killed in action, such as Tadamichi Kuribayashi - famous for his defense of Iwo Jima.

The 'Tiger of Malay', Tomoyuki Yamashita was unceremoniously executed after the war, in what even many of his former enemies claim was an unfair trial. His chief of staff Akira Muto, was also executed.

The architect of Pearl Harbor, Isoroku Yamamoto, was famously shot down and killed in 1943, as a culmination of 'Operation Vengeance' - an American initiative designed to specifically hunt down and kill Yamamoto.

Perhaps most damning to post war Japanese military academia, was the cloak of conspiracy that MacArthur threw over the proceedings, when he allowed defendants to cooperate in such a way as to spare the Emperor and the Japanese royal family from any complicity in war crimes. Many convicted war criminals were subsequently released as the Cold War began to heat up, such as Shinzo Abe's grandfather Nobusuke Kishi, who would go on to serve as Prime Minister.

This created a culture where serious academic investigation of the recent military past was discouraged.

Most of what there is came in the form of a general historical narrative, rather than serious strategic scholarship. An example would be:

Dai Toa Senso Zenshi (The Complete History of the Great East Asia War, 1953) by Takushiro Hattori, who was the head of Operations for the Army General Staff, from 1941-1945.

Because of all these factors, I can't think of any serious academic attempt made by former, high ranking Japanese military leaders, to deeply analyze the strategic or operational efforts they were involved in. Certainly, nothing like we have for say, the Battle of Kursk, from the German side.