I've always heard the Japanese Zero was far superior to the F4F Wildcat. Of that's so, how did the F4F have a kill ratio of almost 7:1, and even almost 6:1 in 1942?

Simple, it was not far superior in every aspect, and operational postures through 1942 allowed for many supporting factors to aid the USN and USMC pilots in the Wildcat in the Solomons. While organizational culture in the IJN also contributed to playing into tactics that USN pilots developed to maximize the F4F's advantages. Though we should note the 6-7 to 1 figure is very much on the high end of credible, both sides overclaimed kills to an almost absurd degree in many Pacific engagements, its estimated at Midway that 5-6 Zero pilots each claimed to have shot down Jimmy Thach's Wildcat for instance! But even 4-5 to 1 in 1942 is remarkable and worth looking into.

Essentially it came down to the more nimble, and incredibly long ranged, while the Wildcat versions used in the Pacific War in 1942, -3 -3A -4, could generally outdive a Zero and had both better armor around the cockpit and a more rugged construction, along with after a few months self sealing fuel tanks.

So it was not an advantage in every aspect for the Zero, in the 4 great carrier battles in 1942, and over Guadalcanal there were numerous instances of Zero after Zero pumping rounds into a Wildcat, shooting it to shreds, injuring the pilot, but still having the F4F limp home.

And that ties into one of the key aspects of most Zero/Wildcat enagements in the Fall of 1942 in the Solomons. The US was usually on the defensive defending either Henderson Field, a convoy or other valuable point. That meant damaged aircraft were more likely to be able to reach safe harbor and land, that radar usually gave sufficient warning to allow fighters to vector or scramble to an advantageous position. While often IJN aircraft were at the extreme end of their range having been in the air for hours by that point all the way from Rabaul or surrounding airfields, and often without easy means to communicate as many land based Zeros ditched the radio from the cockpit to save weight, and had little fuel for dust ups while escorting bombers over the target.

While we can also note that IJN fighter tactics and their developed counters played into it. Both sides liked to attack in a high dive, though a focus on deflection shooting allowed most USN pilots to make them at more oblique angles. While Zero pilots were often more than willing to engage in a turning fight if the target broke in one direction. That is part of why tactics like the Thach Weave could be effective if executed properly with one Wildcat turning in towards his buddy with a tail and getting a snap shot at the enemy or forcing him to break and become vulnerable. Or simply ramming home that the best answer if nothing else is to dive away from a Zero instead of trying to turning from him.

That is not to say the Wildcat didnt have some very bad days where it got the worst of things. The first day off Guadalcanal cost Fletcher 8 precious Wildcats to just 2 Zeros for instance. But by being part of a mutually supporting team, and a rapid, conscious diffusion of newly learned tactics and lessons USN and USMC VF squadrons were able to take the measure of their foes.

I would suggest looking into two of the very best books out their on USN fighter squadrons in the first year of the war in The First Team and The First Team at Guadalcanal by John Lundstrom if you would like to do more reading!