Political/military historian-in-training from the Netherlands here; this is a really interesting question!

In order to answer this question we must first grapple with the two assumptions you present in the question.

1. "The Dutch have an impressive military history". Though I really enjoy hearing this compliment, I must unfortunately argue against its veracity. Yes, it is correct that the Armed forces of the Netherlands have a very long history of fighting on land and sea with many battle honours won. It is however incorrect to assume that this long history and the military exploits contained therein is explicitly 'Dutch'. The most significant military victories post-1648CE were more often than not won at sea, and also almost always as part of an alliance or coalition (The wars of the Anglo-Dutch union against Louis XIV's France being the most salient example). Between 1711 and 1939 there are barely any examples of military exploits that saw the Dutch face-off on land on their own against a foe with technological parity. Only in the naval realm did such engagements come to pass. Colonial victories yielded some prestige, but were never sufficiently drastic to catapult the Netherlands into a position of military renown in Europe, let alon the world. In practice this meant that both domestic and foreign impressions of Dutch military strength, prowess, and reputation were rather low. In the 19th century, specifically between 1830 and 1898, there was a long-running public debate on whether the Dutch nation had any martial qualities at all, and whether it stood any chance against great military powers like the UK, France, and Germany. The outcome of this debate pursued something of a Swiss defence model, prioritizing citizen service and territorial defence (including in the colonies) over maintaining a large standing army and navy. This model quite non-coincidentally was also cheap in terms of running costs, and saw only minor investments of state funds into the military. By the start of the Second World War this meant that both army and navy were underfunded, equipment was heavily outdated, and the majority of land-based units was filled with conscripts rather than professionals. From the outside looking in, the Netherlands was thus at most a regional military power, which suffered from low domestic support for military efforts, and an economy too dependent on trade and through-transport to make war profitable or even exploitable. In short, no-one in Europe in 1939 considered the Netherlands to have a powerful army and navy, and only few expected the Dutch to hold more than just their own in any forthcoming conflict at that time.

2. Which brings us to "The Dutch surrendered immediately to the forces of Nazi Germany"- matter. This is more correct than the previous assumption, but still needs some more nuance. Between January of 1939 and the May Days of 1940 the Dutch Armed Forces were in a state of mobilisation, numbering about 280 000 troops in total, including navy, naval air service, and air force. Organised into 8 divisions (7 infantry, 1 light mobile, and 2x independent brigades) this seems like a formidable defensive force. It is however the case that these units were terribly undergunned in terms of anti-tank weaponry, utilised 1896 vintage artillery, lacked (light) machine guns, lacked anti-aircraft weaponry, and was majority short-term conscript. Though in the wake of Hitler's taking power in 1933 defence reforms and modernisations (most sanctioned in 1937-38) had taken place, much of the equipment had not been delivered (such as with a major order for Krupp howitzers), had not been mass-produced for the domestic market (such as with the Fokker XXI. fighter), or was diverted to the East Indies for service there. Fortifications and inundations did exist in significant quantities and were of relatively modern construction quality.

Bearing down on the Dutch forces was the 22 division-strong Heeresgruppe B made up out of the 6th and 18th armies, of which the latter would do most of the fighting in the Netherlands. The German divisions on average were 50% larger, and possessed twice the available and effective firepower of their Dutch counterpart. The further deployment of armoured vehicles, close air support aircraft, and airlanding forces in the form of the Fallschirmjäger further tipped the balance maximally in favour of the German forces.

Upon the declaration of war on the 10th of May 1940 the German assault circumvented the majority of static defences, and caught the still-assembling Dutch forces by surprise on numerous occassions. Only at the Afsluitdijk (Kornwederzand) and the Grebbeberg did the Dutch put up any form of organised and succesful defence for more than 24 hours. The German airlanding near Den Haag was initially foiled and countered, but with the arrival of armoured support was finally successful in securing its secondary objectives. The first three days also saw the nigh-complete destruction of the Dutch Navy present in European waters, with only few craft escaping to open seas and later to allied countries. The air force was largely destroyed on the ground in the opening hours of the German offensive and did not participate in the fighting almost at all.

The threat of mass bombings of major (and culturally significant) cities like Utrecht, Rotterdam, Den Haag etc. in combination with a general breakdown of the command structure and largely the ability to fight the advancing German forces eventually led the commander-in-chief Winkelman to call for a ceasefire and consequent surrender. By May 15th the majority of the army had laid down its weapons, with stragglers and independent elements still fighting alongside French forces in the province of Zeeland. Following the surrender on the 15 of May, a government-in-exile was formed in London by Queen Wilhelmina, which still had sovereignty over the East Indies and Caribbean territories, and called for military personnel that found itself abroad to rally and form the core of its armed forces in exile. Between 1941 and 1945 these forces - land, naval, and air - participated in the European and Pacific theatres, mostly in supporting roles as manpower and equipment were terribly scarce. By the end of the war, these exiled forces became the core of the reconstituted Armed Forces in the Netherlands.

Then for the conclusion: why do we talk of 'French surrender monkeys' and not of Dutch surrender monkeys'? Mainly and primarily because a) the Netherlands was not a great military power before the war, b) the Netherlands had the odds stacked against it from the start of the conflict, and c) the Why-we-Fight-ish way of looking upon minor allies by particularly the United States in the Second World War and minor Dutch participation with its exiled forces lumped it together with other small nations like Denmark and Norway in the liberation-narrative.

The work of my supervisor, Prof. Ben Schoenmaker called Burgerzin en Soldatengeest ('civic spirit and military ethos') I used to explain the pre-1914 historiography, and for the WWII part I drew on the many detailed works of E.H. Brongers, one of the older and more renowned Dutch military historians of the Second World War.

Hopefully this covers the basics, should you want to know more I'd happily recommend you more sources!