First off, the Gothas and other German bombers used in the air offensive against southern England did not have the range to fly from Germany to the British isles. Most of the bombers' ranges hovered at around five hundred miles, which meant a round-trip attack from German territory to London was unfeasible. Kagohl 3, which was the unit of the bombers involved in Operation Türkenkreuz, was based out of Nieuwmunster, a small town on the Channel coast of German-occupied Belgium. There were other Kagohl 3 airfields in Ghent, which is slightly more inland than Nieuwmunster, but still closer to the UK than Germany.

As for the effectiveness of Türkenkreuz and for strategic bombing in general during WWI, well, it just was not all that effective. The Gotha G. IV was an evolutionary step above other twin-engined German bombers and incorporated such features like a dedicated rear-gunner and the Görtz bombsight which would emerge as standard features of bombers. The various Gotha marks and their stablemates were slightly more capable than their Anglo-French contemporaries, but not grossly so. The development of bomber aircraft kept roughly apace between combatants and many of the Gotha innovations found parallels within Entente air arms such as the British drift sight. Moreover, the Anglo-French as well as the Italians did not have to use ersatz materials or other compromises such as poorer fuel that was becoming all too typical for the machines of the late-war German Air Service.

But the strategic bomber was an immature concept during the war. The accuracy of the Görtz bombsight still left much to be desired and some German bombardiers still used the "Mark One Eyeball" during Türkenkreuz and released their bombload using visual information. This meant that the German bombers were often inaccurate and seemingly indiscriminate in their attacks. Although there was something approaching a targeting strategy for Türkenkreuz to disrupt British war industries and cause chaos within the British isles, there simply were not enough bombers to accomplish this. Even had there been enough aircraft given to Kagohl 3, the aircraft of this era lacked both the accuracy and payload to accomplish much meaningful from a military standpoint. The strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War- fought with much more advanced machines, more experienced personnel, and with a much less extemporized strategy than the Germans in the spring of 1917- showed just how difficult it was to mount a strategic bombing campaign.

Türkenkreuz killed nearly 500 UK civilians, damaged a few buildings, but accomplished very little else. The best thing it did from a military standpoint was that it diverted some AA pieces and a few squadrons of RFC fighters that might have been employed on the front. But Allied material superiority was such by this stage in the war that such a redeployment made only a little difference in the overall trajectory of the war. In this way, Türkenkreuz presaged the V-1 offensive in 1944/45 which diverted some defense assets to meet the a new threat, but accomplished little aside from adding to the butcher's bill of the war.