The study mentioned in the article was conducted by retired U.S. Army soldier Trevor N. DuPuy, who formed an extant research organization dedicated to the study of armed conflict. Several books have been published on the topic, including DuPuy's A Genius for War and Numbers, Predictions, and War, and Israeli historian Martin van Creveld's Fighting Power. These works make the claim, using mathematical models, that the Heer was more effective in converting available manpower and resources into fighting power (battle results) than the U.S. Army, and as a result, was more effective.

Many gobbled the data up as soon as it appeared, as well as other direct or indirect "Germans were better at ‘x’ or had better ‘x’" myths, and now regard them to be the truth. The height of Wehrmacht glorification in West Germany came in the 1950s as the U.S. was eager to bolster western Europe against the Soviet Union, and a large amount of former Nazi propaganda was used to demean the Soviets. The works of DuPuy and Creveld have come under fire in recent years, and some think that their modeling, as well as the research materials used, was kind of shaky. Horses Logistics and war economy are not considered, and DuPuy in particular seems to disregard the large number of German prisoners of war streaming back into U.S. cages even in the course of normal operations.

One has to admit that the German army in the ETO was an effective, if not necessarily efficient force. Unfortunately, while both men seemed to have proved the Werhmacht’s superiority, neither of them was fully able to explain German defeat in any other terms than United States material advantage.

Former United States Army Chief of Military History John S. Brown rebutted DuPuy's studies in a January 1986 article in Military Affairs journal, criticizing, among other things, the proportion of German panzer divisions studied in comparison to regular infantry formations, the number of engagements that favored the defender (the Germans; post-war, German commanders estimated to the Americans that a numerical advantage of anywhere from three to six to one was needed to decisively dislodge a defender from a fortified, prepared, position), and the weight that he placed on firepower comparisons. When Brown recalculated DuPuy's data, he found the Americans slightly superior overall; German panzer divisions were more effective than American infantry divisions, but American armored and infantry divisions outclassed German infantry divisions handily. DuPuy rebutted Brown's reassessment in another Military Affairs article in October 1986, seemingly sticking to his guns. Brown re-published his article as an appendix to his 1986 book Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II.

Brown also argues that the research materials used by DuPuy, Creveld, and others, were "tainted." A large percentage of German experiences from the war available immediately after it came from the mouths and pens of high-ranking former military members (many of whom, no doubt, were eager members of the Nazi Party) instead of low-ranking frontline soldiers. On the American side, it was different, with average soldiers being encouraged to share their experiences and thoughts, even if overwhelmingly negative, and being systematically interviewed after even very minor battles thanks to the work of pioneering soldier-historians like Forrest C. Pogue.

Immediately after World War II, a historiographical bias set in. German sources available to English-speaking authors were dominated by official records and testimony, and later memoirs, of captured German officers. American sources were much broader, featuring monumental bodies of correspondence, anecdotes, interviews, and oral testimony from soldiers of all ranks. the lower in an institution one descends, the more inchoate [rudimentary] its activities may appear. Postwar America had no lack of veterans with a pet story illustrating martial miscarriages. Many of the veterans' stories were humorous; some were not. Debacles such as Buna, Kasserine, and the Rapido River engaged the attention of print media and historians. It is true that German botches also received some publicity, but many of these were conveniently blamed on Hitler alone and were generally of less interest to the American public.

The Germans, similar to the Americans, published studies and pamphlets to be handed out to their soldiers in training and combat which would raise their morale and give them more confidence when fighting an enemy. These studies, known as "Battle Experiences" attempted to appraise the American soldier to the German;

At the end of 1944 the German training staffs published a series of "Battle Experiences," containing the official enemy estimate of the American soldier, his tactics, and his weapons. For the most part this German's-eye view is presented in the form of a "catch-all" characterization of the American troops fighting on the Western Front; in numerous instances, however, generalizations are supported by examples chosen from the Lorraine sector. Since the "Battle Experiences" were prepared for and issued to the troops, they contain much that stems from the politico-military dogmas of the Nazi party or that obviously is intended to raise the morale of the individual German soldier.

Despite recognition that the individual American was a more skilled and tenacious fighter in the fall of 1944 than in the early weeks after the Normandy landings, the doctrine of the superiority of the German infantryman did not alter. Stripped of the numerous propaganda reasons put forth to support this allegation, the core of the argument is as follows: the American soldier depends upon tremendous matériel support to bring the battle to a successful conclusion; when he is denied heavy support by the combined arms the "drive" in the attack dwindles; he avoids close combat, dislikes night fighting, and surrenders readily--all symptoms of his poor quality as a soldier.

The German soldier was alerted to capitalize on several peculiarities shown by American troops. The Americans were depicted as being careless with radio conversations, although the radio silence of the Third Army armored divisions before the 8 November offensive was admitted to have been notably successful in misleading German intelligence. The Americans tended to start their attacks late in the forenoon and to "call off the war" at midnight. American security during hours of darkness was careless, particularly on rainy nights. The individual American soldier was "more tenacious" on the defensive than in the attack. American infantry and tanks tended to stick to streets and roads; tanks avoided woods and heavy underbrush.

Besides including such derogatory comments, the German "Battle Experiences" described in detail those aspects of American tactics and techniques believed to be worthy of emulation. High on all lists was the effective cooperation between infantry and tanks, tanks and planes. American artillery was an object of praise. It was distinguished, said German observers, by a speedy system of communication, accurate fire, a plentiful supply of ammunition, greater range than that of comparable German types, skilled employment of artillery planes as aerial OP's, and extensive use of white phosphorus. The American replacement system was regarded as very effective, although the German writers agreed that the national wealth of manpower was a basic factor in helping make it so. American tactical leadership was rated highly, learning with surprising rapidity, as it seemed to do, from its own failures and from the enemy.

Planning and preparation appeared to err, from the German point of view, on the side of caution. The Germans found what they considered evidence of hypermethodical thinking, and of a tendency to make success absolutely certain, in the practice of combining one armored division with two infantry divisions. They agreed, however, that the motorization of American infantry formations prevented the infantry from acting as a drag on the armor. This cautious approach to tactical problems was seen also in the practice of using battalion attacks, heavily supported by all arms, to open a hole on a narrow front. The later "Battle Experiences" noted that the Americans were trying to break away from "sterile" limited-objective attacks on a narrow front, but that when improvisation failed the American leadership quickly reverted to cautious tactics. The XII Corps attack on a broad front on 8 November was singled out particularly as evidence of an attempt to break away from small-scale and "riskless" solutions. In connection with this attack, it was observed that artillery fires massed all along the front made it impossible to determine what the points of penetration might be. On the other hand, the German observers pointed to the XX Corps attack across the Moselle north of Metz as a good example of the satisfactory results to be attained by a very limited use of artillery fire prior to the assault. The final drive toward Sarreguemines was regarded as a reversion to the tactics of improvisation and quick exploitation which, in the German view, had characterized Patton's use of armor in the break-out at Avranches. But the "Battle Experiences" expressed surprise that the American armor tended, at the close of the autumn campaign, to be parceled out in small detachments intermixed with the infantry divisions.