Aircraft carrier doctrine was not formulated as a result of real-life battle experience. Rather, it was developed through exercises and wargames, as well as theoretical considerations.

The Royal Navy's first peacetime exercise involving an aircraft carrier came in September 1919. Eleven aircraft from 185 Squadron, flying off HMS Argus, made an attack on the 2nd Battle Squadron while it was moored in Portland Harbour on the 6th. This attack was intended more as a demonstration of the new capability, so was made in broad daylight. To compensate, three aircraft were equipped with smoke bombs, and the attack divided into two groups, each approaching from a different direction. Eight dummy torpedoes were dropped, with a total of six hits scored (the other two dived into the seabed). This exercise clearly demonstrated the use of carriers against a battlefleet in port. Such early exercises also helped develop concepts such as concentrated strikes, as well as the basics of carrier operations, such as the use of arrester wires and landing signals

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Royal Navy carried out a series of exercises, mainly focused on a war with Japan. These generally had two components; a strategic game, carried out on paper, and a tactical game, carried out either with models, or with actual ships. The strategic game attempted to replicate a situation with which the RN felt it might be faced, and was used to set up the condition for the tactical game. One key conclusion from the early exercises was that carriers could not operate entirely with the battlefleet; the carrier's constant need to turn into the wind to launch and recover aircraft would result in the two forces separating.

An example exercise in which aircraft carriers were involved was Exercise MU. This exercise, carried out in August 1925 by the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets in the Aegean Sea, attempted to replicate the conditions a British force might face when attempting to reinforce Singapore. The fleets were divided into a Red, British, force, and a Blue, Japanese, force, with Blue receiving the one aircraft carrier available. Red had to traverse a narrow, mined channel, representing the Malacca Strait, while Blue had to stop them. Blue's plan included an attack on the fleet by carrier aircraft, which was successfully carried out with hits on three Red battleships. It was concluded from this that torpedo aircraft were a significant threat, with it being recommended that a strong CAP be maintained as a protection.

Exercise MU was followed, in 1928, by MU2, which again attempted to represent a reinforcement of Singapore, using an island off the coast of Algeria as a stand-in. This time, both Blue and Red had a carrier, which both used to great effect. A later exercise, in July, pitted two carriers from the Mediterranean Fleet, Courageous and Eagle, against each other. Aircraft from Courageous successfully located Eagle while the latter was in the process of ranging her strike. Eagle was soon judged to have been destroyed. This helped establish a key rule of RN carrier doctrine; that the first carrier to launch would be the likely survivor of the engagement. As such, future British doctrine emphasised rapidly launching strikes, and launching strikes in conditions such as night or poor weather, to ensure that the RN launched first.

1929 saw a number of innovations in carrier operations. On the 23rd March 1929, during Exercise MI, three carriers, Courageous, Furious and Glorious, formed a single squadron. This exercise was used to test a number of theories about how carriers should operate in groups. In the exercise, each of the three carriers was dedicated to a single role; one carried only fighters, one carried only reconnaissance aircraft, and one attack aircraft. This was soon found to be flawed, as the loss of one carrier would deny that capability to the fleet. It was concluded that a mixed airgroup would be superior. A further exercise showed that escorted carriers could form an effective strike force. This exercise also showed that torpedo aircraft were much more effective than level bombers. In 1931, Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson was appointed as Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers. He continued to exercise the three carriers together, refining their tactics and developing new techniques. These exercise helped mould the RN carrier force into what it was at the start of WWII.

The Royal Navy, which, for much of the 1920s and 1930s, did not have control of its own aircraft, and so took a number of doctrinal lessons from the RAF. One such doctrinal lesson was the idea that 'the bomber will always get through' - that fighters could not catch bombers before they could make their attack. This partly resulted from the relative performance of bombers and fighters in this period - multi-engined monoplane bombers were much faster than the typical biplane fighters in operation, while without radar direction, it was unlikely that defending fighters could find attacking bombers, especially over sea. Equally, it was influenced by the theories of writers such as Douhet, who emphasised the strategic capability of bombers, and neglected fighters. Douhet's ideas were held by many in the RAF, and so were passed on to the RN. This led to the RN de-emphasising fighter defence in the design of the Illustrious-class carriers. Instead, the focus was on armour and on anti-aircraft guns.