Part 1 of 3

This is a somewhat controversial question, because Safavid studies still largely labours under the notion of "decline", which might be familiar to you in its more famous uses in the Ottoman and Mughal cases. "Decline" does not simply describe a weakening of the state or an increasing weakness compared to its rivals, but a general-purpose "malaise" affecting all corners of a polity's political and economic life. And analysis of this decline usually assumes a particular classical "baseline" of the state's prosperity, with deviation from that norm frequently being considered part of that decline regardless of its actual effect on the state. The Ottomans provide perhaps the most well-known example: everything after Suleyman was traditionally considered to be a period of unending decline, with the 17th and 18th centuries being understudied and largely written off as a mere period of decay.

Of course, Ottomanists have long since decried this framework, preferring to see the 17th and 18th centuries more as a period of transformation from a military-conquest state into a patrimonial-bureaucratic state. And Mughalists have argued that the Mughal fall was a result of political troubles within princely households combined with financial strain owing to Aurangzeb's campaigns in the Deccan, and masked a broader picture in the provinces that was one of revival, not decline, with the centre's collapse allowing more dynamic and prosperous states to emerge from its yoke.

Studies of the Safavids see no such transformation or revival, however, and the dramatic circumstances of its downfall and the many decades of anarchy which followed make it far more difficult to argue for a less catastrophic analysis of events. And it is perhaps for this reason that more nuanced and less teleological examinations of events have taken so long to get off the ground. The traditional argument- that, following the death of Abbas, the Safavid state was plagued by a series of weak and decadent rulers who neglected governance and then led to a slow decline- stuck around for an awfully long time, and in some ways hasn't gone away. You still see comparatively little analysis of the later, post-Abbas period compared to events in Abbas's reign, and the reigns of Suleyman and Soltan Hosayn are still rather neglected.

Despite all of this, there has been an increasing desire to critique these previous, older notions of the Safavid fall. Aside from typically placing the decline's start at the end of Abbas II's reign (although recognising that many economic and religious factors were already in play prior to this), a number of studies have focused on more structural problems with the entire Safavid system. Rudi Matthee's 2012 book Persia in Crisis is perhaps the only full-length monograph concerning the "decline" and fall (in which, despite still endorsing a slightly odd and less telelogical definition of "decline", focuses more on structural problems and represents a shift away from the older ideas of decadence and inherent malaise), but a number of others since the 80s and 90s have also challenged decline- Andrew Newman's stringent (if somewhat incoherent) opposition, John Foran's economic models, and so on. And thus we can gain... something of an idea of how the Safavid state fell, which I shall try to present, but take this with a pinch of salt. More research by historians is needed on this matter, and what follows is a rather preliminary view of the affair.

The disintegration of the centre's authority.

The Safavid style of monarchy was always far more open and personal than in the Ottoman and Mughal cases. Whereas from Suleyman's reign onwards the Ottoman rulers restricted their visibility and created an aura of impersonal, distant awe, and whereas the Mughals had constructed elaborate court-ceremonies to much the same effect (although with somewhat greater visibility), the Safavids always relied on the Shah's own visibility to his subjects and the ability to petition them. The transfer of the capital to Esfahan and the greater centralisation of the state which went along with that didn't change this a great deal. The Shah was available for petition; he was a regular fixture in direction the ta'ziya passion plays during Muharram and would frequently appear on the balcony of the Ali Qapu during rituals and ceremonies. Abbas I enjoyed watching polo matches or inciting fights between the city's factions; and at times he would even walk the streets of his city in disguise, to see how the common people lived and to check the honesty of the craftsmen.

This system of rule allowed for both the airing of popular grievances but also retained the need for a visible, involved shah in governance. And this system continued to largely prevail under Safi and Abbas II; but it is during their reigns that you can begin to see the beginnings of this system's erosion. Under Safi, the viziers took on more and more of the Shah's judicial functions with regard to the populace. Under Abbas II, this only accelerated, with the Shah ceasing to oversee court cases and with his vizier Muhammad Beg stopping public court cases entirely in 1657. And the Muharram rituals, a moment of particularly dramatic public expression and commemoration in the Royal Square, began to be sequestered within the royal karkhane; representatives from the guilds would continue to perform for the Shah's pleasure, but inside the complex rather than in punlic.

Abbas II, however, was still a competent leader involved in governance. Despite the shutting off of an important valve of public complaint, the government still functioned perfectly well, with the vizier and the shah co-operating on matters of state. But Abbas's son and successor Suleyman proved to be a very different type of ruler entirely. He denied all petitioners of any kind to see him, cutting himself off entirely from direct contact with the people. And he proved thoroughly uninterested in any governance, often disappearing for days at a time on hunting trips or simply secluding himself in his court.

This did little but increase intrigue, manipulation and decrease the power of the state and his government. It became difficult for Suleyman's viziers to pass effective measures, and many of the foundations of the Safavid state ideology began to be eroded. This only continued under Shah Soltan Hosayn, who was equally reticent except where the clergy were involved. Aside from the incompetence of many viziers, even competent ones such as Shaykh Ali Khan were finding it increasingly difficult to enforce their edicts.

The decline of the military had already been noted during Abbas II's reign- he famously noticed, during a military parade, that the same troops were being paraded before him multiple times because they couldn't muster enough for the occasion. But the military was still active in his day, seizing Qandahar from the Mughals, skirmishing with the Russians and putting down Bakhtiari revolts. Saru Taqi's attempts to increase revenue had often seen the army bear the brunt of the cost, and it has been suggested that this led to Saru Taqi's assassination. The continued fragmentation of the Safavid elite began to severely reduce the effectiveness of the military- along with a lack of money caused by several, long term problems with the Safavid economy.