Part 1

Earlier this week we had a question about Paris under English rule during the Hundred Years War, which inspired me to write something about the French experience of occupation during the period. It also gives me the chance to expand on my answer from the other day about medieval brigands.

Starting with a quote from G.L. Thompson's Paris And Its People Under English Rule because I think it does a good job of framing this period generally:

"The Kingdom of Bourges [the area loyal to the Dauphin, the future Charles VII] was, of course, beyond the authority of the government in Paris. Yet, for the people of the capital, it can never have been possible to forget the existence of the regime south of the Loire, for the simple reason that many of them had friends or relations there."

Going from the bottom up, let's begin with the commoners. If you were a member of the peasantry during this period it, frankly, sucked, as Monstrelet attested (Book 7, Chapter XXVII):

"The reason why they put on the red cross was on account of the truce between king Charles and the duke of Burgundy, which was not then expired. They had always been of the duke’s party; and very many mischiefs were done to the poor, countrymen by English, French, and Burgundians."

To clarify, the red cross was a symbol of the English, and therefore the Burgundians were disguising themselves to get around the truce with Charles VII.

Carrying on, it was pretty grim everywhere (Book 7, Chapter XXVII):

"one of his [the Comté de Vaudémont] captains was the bastard de Humieres: and on their arrival, they commenced a severe warfare on the Barrois and Lorrainers, to whom they did much mischief by fire, sword and plunder.

Book 6, Chapter LXIX:

"The castle of Torcy was also put into the hands of the French by some of the country people, who had connections with the English, and who betrayed it to the enemy. Thus in a short time were four of the strongest castles of the enemy recovered; and in consequence of their capture, those parts were very much harassed; both by the French and English."

Book 6, Chapter XVI:

"Nearly at the same time, sir John de Luxembourg besieged the church of Broissia, which some pillagers of king Charles' party had fortified, and committed great ravages over the country."

Monstrelet clearly viewed his times with some dismay, as evidenced by this remarkable passage, commenting on the peace made between the recently quarrelling dukes of Burgundy and Bourbon (Book 7, Chapter LXVIII):

"A knight of Burgundy, observing this, said aloud, 'We are very foolish to risk our bodies and souls at the will of princes and great lords, who, when they please, make up their quarrels, while we oftentimes remain poor and in distress.' This speech was noticed by many on each side for there was much truth in it, - and thus it very frequently happened."

Monstrelet was pretty keenly interested in the impact of the violence of his time on the population of France, and I think it's enormously to his credit. The thing I want to highlight here is that all three of the factions - the Burgundians, the Valois, the Lancastrians, were complicit in making people's lives absolutely miserable.

Monstrelet isn't our only source for what a bad scene it was though, Thomas Basin wrote a history of the reigns of Charles VII and Louis IX as well as a short discourse on his life. Basin was bishop of Liseaux under the English in 1447, but but survived the reconquest by Charles VII in 1449 before ultimately running afoul of Louis XI in 1464, being exiled from his bishopric in 1468 and finally ending up in Rome in 1474. His work provides a sharp window into the period. Basin says that his parents left Harfleur after its capture by King Henry V to "avoid the violences, offences and misdemeanours of the troops". The region around Caux was despoiled by "the armies of England, on the one side, and those of France, on the other". The result of which was a "dreary countryside, devoid of farmers" many of whom fled to Rouen for safety. Basin does admit that, once Henry had control of the duchy a "sort of peace" was restored, but that does not lessen the preceding violence.

Basin describes in detail the deprivations of brigands, brought about by the war. He says that there were:

"a great number of desperate and scattered men, who either because of weak-mindedness, or hatred for the English, or for the pleasure of stealing others' possessions, or forced to escape the nooses of Justice because they were conscious of their crimes."

These men, this "kind of villain, commonly known as 'brigands'" grew strong in Normandy and the surrounding provinces "tyrannising the inhabitants and infesting the countryside". Like "wild beasts or wolves, they inhabited the thickest and most inaccessible forests" and sallied out at night, robbing and abducting the peasants, taking them back to their hiding places. There the brigands subjected their prisoners to all manner of hardships and forced the prisoners to bring them large sums of money, as well as any provisions they may have required. If they failed to do this the remaining hostages were killed, or they would be hunted down. The English captains did all they could stamp out this kind of activity, dealing with it in the harshest manner, but they were ultimately unsuccessful, the brigandry being symptomatic of their occupation.

So, being a rural peasant during this period was pretty rotten. Next, I want to talk about the towns. The obvious dimension is yes, there was the risk of your town coming under siege, and the anxiety over which faction to throw their lot in with must have been pronounced for those living in border regions. But, for the purposes of this post, I'm really more concerned with the experience of occupation, rather than warfare, so I'll leave it at that. Additionally, there is an element of control being maintained by the presence of large garrisons, but, again, a military focused discussion of the deployment of soldiers in Lancastrian France isn't what I'm interested in here.

The key period for the creation of Lancastrian policy towards the towns in France was, not surprisingly, the reign of Henry V (d. 1422). Henry's treatment of the Norman towns was (with important exceptions, such as Caen and Harfleur) marked by "conciliation and clemency" (Murphy, 2013). For example, on taking Rouen, the capital of the duchy Henry ordered the construction of a new palace and appeared dressed in the arms of the duchy (an important part of Lancastrian propaganda in this period was the idea of the reclamation of the duchy of Normandy as part of their ancestral dominions, this separateness and prominence of Normandy appears many times in letters of the period).

Henry filled the two highest positions in the administration of the town, the captain and the baili with English appointees. The reasoning for this is obvious, especially with the military connotations of the captain's role. However, outside of these two highest offices there was mostly continuity with the previous administrations, and when these lower office holders died or stepped down Henry would refill these positions with Normans, not English, appointees. Furthermore, Henry also left taxation in the hands of civic administrations, rather than with his own officers and confirmed the appointments of those civic administrations.

A key point of Henry's policy was requiring the citizens of the captured towns to swear an oath of loyalty to him, and important issue that helped to strengthen his legitimacy as duke of Normandy. People who took this oath had all their rights and property confirmed and even those who fled the duchy at first were confirmed in their rights and property if they returned and swore the oath. Henry also confirmed all franchises and liberties held by the town, which was significant they underpinned the political and economic rights of the towns. He also rewarded Norman, as well as English, supporters with property in the duchy, and married heiresses to the merchants of the towns, allowing the urban elite to extend their power out into the countryside.

In general Henry's attempt to co-opt the elite of the towns was very successful. For example, the town councils aided in the suppression of seditious activity in Caen and Dieppe. Whilst this seditious activity does highlight the fact that acceptance of Lancastrian rule wasn't universal, most citizens of the towns do seem to have reconciled themselves to Henry's rule after he took Rouen and it became clear that the Valois monarchy was incapable of resisting him effectively.

The two exceptions to these policies were in Harfleur and Caen. In both cases, and especially Harfleur, Henry encouraged a policy of English immigration and indeed grants to Englishmen in both of these towns outstrip any other by an absolutely vast amount.

To move out of Normandy briefly, I'd like to focus on the specific case study of Amiens. Amiens, in Picardy, lay on the intersection of Lancastrian and Burgundian power and was a very large town in this period, having a population between 20,000 - 40,000. The location of Amiens on the intersection of the Lancastrian and Burgundian spheres was very meaningful because Burgundian support was key and making many northern towns accept Lancastrian rule. After Henry V's untimely death in 1422, Amiens looked to the parlement of Paris for guidance (a large number of cases heard before the parlement came from Amiens, showing strong connections between them), and followed their lead in recognising the infant Henry VI as king of France (indeed, the government of Amiens don't appear to have even debated doing otherwise).

As I'm constrained by the 10,000-character limit for each comment, I really couldn't go into the amount of detail I wanted to in my "Draftee's Journey" comment, so I'll focus on the draft process itself below.

The Draftee's Journey

Robert S. Rush’s book GI: The US Infantryman in World War II gives a very nice overview of the US infantryman’s experience in WWII, by using four vignettes, of soldiers serving under different circumstances and in different units and theaters.

Selective Training and Service Act of 1940:

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, passed on September 16, provided for compulsory military service of selected men aged 21-35 in the Army for one year. They could only be deployed in the Western hemisphere or on U.S. lands. Not more than 900,000 men were to be in training at any one time. To organize the registration and other registrations after that, the Department of Selective Service set up 6,443 local boards nationwide. Each county had to have at least one board, and/or one for every 30,000 people. 8 registrations would be held;

Draft Registrations:

Registration/Event	Date	Birth dates	Note
1	10/16/1940	10/17/1904-10/16/1919	Men 21-35
2	7/1/1941	10/17/1918-7/1/1920	Men who had turned 21 since the last registration, and men who were of age but had failed to register in the 1st registration
3	2/16/1942	2/17/1897-10/16/1904 and 7/2/1920-12/31/1921	Men 20-44
4	4/17/1942	4/28/1877-2/16/1897	Men 45-64
5	6/30/1942	1/1/1922-6/30/24	Applicable 18 year old men
6 (I)	12/11/1942-12/17/1942	7/1/1924-8/31/1924	""
6 (I)	12/18/1942-12/24/42	9/1./1924-10/31/1924	""
6 (I)	12/26/1942-12/31/1942	11/1-12/31/1924	""
6 (II)	1/1/1942-3/31/1947	1/1/1925-3/31/1929	Men were to register as they turned 18
Extra	11/16/1943-12/31/1943	1/1/1899-12/31/1925	Men 18-44 living abroad. Beginning 1/1/1944, men were to register as they turned 18
Special	10/23/1944-10/31/1944	11/12/99-10/31/26	Men 18-44 living in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Beginning 11/1/1944, men were to register as they turned 18

The First 3 Registrations:

The DSS Form 1 (registrar's report) and DSS Form 2 (registration certificate) were issued to all men in the area of each local board that were of age. The DSS Forms 1 were collected, shuffled, and given random serial numbers in sequence that counted the total number of registrants in each area. They were then sent to the state's Director of Selective Service, who reported the highest number issued by any local board to Washington.

The first lottery was on October 29, 1940. In Washington, the numbers 1 to 9,000 (the highest number assigned by any board was 8,090, but late registrations were accounted for) were placed into capsules and then into a glass bowl. Secretary of War Henry Stimson stirred the bowl using a rod made from a beam of Philadelphia's Independence Hall. He then drew a number from the bowl and opened it. President Roosevelt announced the number; 158. More numbers were drawn in a random order until the lottery was concluded.

The numbers then became a National Master List, which was given to the local boards. In the local boards which had issued under the highest serial number, the numbers that didn't exist were crossed out. The remaining serial numbers then, in the order drawn, were given order numbers, beginning with 1. This was the order in which men were to be classified and called for military service.

A second lottery was held following the second registration on July 17, 1941, as was a third lottery on March 17, 1942.

Starting on August 16, 1941, men who had reached the age of 28 before July 1, 1941 were deferred from being drafted, and if already in the service, could apply for a transfer to a reserve component. This provision was abolished soon after the war began, and the Selective Service classification of these men (I-H) was eliminated by the end of 1942. The term of service of the October draftees was extended by eighteen months on August 18, 1941. On December 20, 1941, the ages of men liable for induction were increased to 20-44. Men aged 18-64 who weren't already registered were compelled to do so when the time presented itself. The term of service of draftees was extended, for the duration of the war plus six months. 20-21 and 37-44 year old men were registered in February 1942.

Week 18 – Parliament stuff

 

Parliamentary life, when looked up close, is marked by a slow, regular rhythm. General themes are not introduced by themselves, but grow over time through stratification of slightly varying chords. The Italian Parliament in time of war was no different. The interventionist-neutralist fracture; the general anti-socialist stance; the attempt to restore the parliament's prerogatives; the large abundance of executive legislation; the land reform; the social reforms in favor of the war veterans^1 . All slowly varying with time, driven by the inner workings of the Parliament, where any abrupt change had to be originated outside. The Parliament would then for a while play the music of the world.

The Caporetto defeat had been one of those changes.

 

After a long hiatus the Italian Chamber resumed open session on February 12^th , and would remain busy until a further suspension on the 25^th .

Two main themes held the Chamber's attention.

Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando had chosen to start with one and ignore the other in his relation speech over the recent Paris Conference of the allied leaders. His Government – he remarked – had appreciated the Chambers' support, as it had “received unanimous confidence from all the parties that weren't forced on anti-war positions by prejudicial reasons [i.e. the socialists]”. The Government's “unyielding resolve to persist in the enormous struggle [of the war] was not the result of a choice but of an inescapable need”. “Moderate proposals” had been made over time, that were reasonable enough to “disturb within the country those feelings of the Italian's rightful expectations”; but “such doubts had been […] entirely swept away” by both the allies' reassurances and the enemy's behavior. The “peace talks of Brest-Litowsk had been a remarkable lesson” for any party “that wanted to make of peace its core program, and in the name of peace had risen to power”: “such a party had then been met with such enormous demands by the Central Empires that it could not reasonably accept them, and had therefore been forced to downright surrender”. No, those good natured folks who had delusions of peace needed to understand that “to demand a peace at any cost would only result in a peace so dishonorable to become unbearable”.

The Central Empires had shown in fact little interest for genuine peace talks besides “some equivocal evasive statements” aimed at “keeping intact the substance of their demands”.

Italy could not settle for that. The reasons that had moved Italy to war were still valid; and “Italy did not want more but could not accept less: the completion of its national unity and safety of its borders of land and sea”. The recent events of the war had shown how dangerous was the incomplete border with Austria, a “formidable threat always looming” on the Italian frontier.

For this reason Italian war had a “sacred” goal: the very existence of the Italian people: “to be or not to be”. Therefore “nothing felt more painful than the suspicion […] that the ends of the Italian war were motivated not only by the inescapable needs of existence, but also by ambitions of imperialistic domination and oppression of other races […] No one in the world could look with more sympathy to the aspirations of the many nationalities that suffered still under the oppression of domineering races. And their struggle, if it was met with large consensus and deserved attention among the public opinion of any free and civilized nation, found in Italy, thanks to a commonality of history and ideals, spirits no less fervent and sympathetic.” But Italy did not only “look at the struggle of these oppressed nationalities” but took active part in it, as the Italian war was after all a “war against a mutual enemy”.

As I noted already in the previous week Orlando's accomplished speech could not hide the intrinsic weakness of the Italian foreign policy situation and the ambivalence of the Government's outlook on the problem: on one hand the Italian territorial demands, on the other the principle of nationalities. Sacrifices had to be made if a compromise was to be found; but talks of compromise would have been untimely. It was surely convenient to wait and see. In the face of many advocated wheel turns, Orlando appeared to believe it was better to wait and see.

 

The Chamber – well, as the radical Meuccio Ruini [session of the 22^nd ] put it – everyone felt the need to “go on a scavenger hunt for the perfect formula to summarize the goals of War”.

It was Giuseppe Bevione [session of the 12^th ] [a publicist, originally for the neutralist “La Stampa” of Turin, elected to the Chamber in 1913 with the support of the nationalists and catholics, then left “La Stampa” to support the Italian intervention and after Caporetto moved progressively towards moderate positions, re-entering the group of the liberal right] who, after a few formal obligations, opened the hunt – in what was in fact a rather balanced summary of the point of view of the liberal-conservative forces – by reading to the Chamber the text of the Treaty of London as published by the Bolsheviks.

Quoting himself [the piece, still in “La Stampa”, titled “Nationality and democracy”, dated back to September 29^th 1914] Bevione argued that “a victory of the Entente meant, especially if Italy and Romania were going to be involved, a reconstitution of a Chart of Europe based on the principle of nationalities.” These principles that - Bevione observed – were not in contrast with what stated by the Government the day before, had been in part lost along the way by the allied nations, “in fact, what arguments based on the national rights could justify the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits to Russia?”. Such agreements, once public knowledge, had hurt the allies war effort, offering the socialists good points to “state that the Central Empires imperialism found its counterpart in an Entente imperialism”. Now that the Bolsheviks had made the secret treaties public, it was mandatory that those papers were discussed if the allied Governments were to regain the trust of their peoples; those documents in fact “betrayed a concept of war […] that had to be completely eradicated”.

If compared to Russia's, Italy's war demands were comparatively tame. Yet it was a major blunder that the Treaty of London had yet to be published in the Country while allies and enemies could read and spread it alike and that the Italian Chamber had not been allowed to discuss it. Bevione intended to fix this and read a translation of the sixteen articles of the Treaty [as published by the “New Europe” according to him]. Articles 4 to 8 clarified the Italian war goals: “the province of Trent, South Tyrol up to Brenner, Trieste with its surroundings, the County of Gorizia and Gradisca; the entire Istria […] with its neighboring islands.” Thus the border line was fixed in thorough detail down to the coast. There Italy was “to receive Dalmatia in its actual extent including the islands north and west” and a few rocks too small to qualify as islands. The entire Gulf of Kotar would become neutral zone, pending its assignation to Montenegro; so would the coast to the north up to the Dalmatian border, pending assignation to Serbia, and neutral also the coast of Croatia with Split and Dubrovinik, up to and including the City of Fiume. The coast town of Durazzo (Durres) could be given to the Muslim independent State of Albania. Provided Italy's demands were met, Italy would not oppose the division of the north and south Albanian districts among Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. “Italy would be allowed to direct the Albanian foreign relations”. Finally per article 8, “Italy would gain full sovereignty over the occupied islands of Dodecanese”.

Articles 9 to 13 were more general with the 9^th “acknowledging as an axiom, the fact that Italy was invested in the upkeep of political equilibrium in the Mediterranean, which was that region bordering with Antalya (southern Turkey), where Italy already held established rights, […] and would be granted right of occupation” in the case of partition of the Turkish region. Italian rights in Libya would be acknowledged as well and compensation was established for possible expansion of French and British colonies in Africa.

Article 14 committed the British Government to provide Italy with favorable conditions for a loan of 50 million pounds.

Most contentious was article 15 [here in form given by Bevione] the stated that “France, Great Britain and Russia were committed to support Italy, in so far as to prevent representatives of the Holy Sear to conduct diplomatic action for the establishment of peace and the settling of the issues concerning the war.” The Catholic Arnaldo Lucci [session of the 20^th] would openly criticize “the petty presumption, negatively affirmed or affirmatively denied […] by that supreme accessory to imperialism that was secret diplomacy”^3 where “everyone's secret thought was […] how not to concede mastery of the world”. And later Giulio Rodinò would remark “the absolute loyalty of the Catholics to the Motherland” despite the questionable choices of the Italian government, that “had not even considered providing an answer to the Pope's note [that of August 1917]”. Even stronger words would use Guido Miglioli [session of the 22^nd] wondering if the article “wasn't in itself an offense to the liberal doctrine” of the Italian State.

Finally article 16 proclaimed the secret nature of the Treaty.